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West Europe Report

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15 August 1985

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POLITICAL

BELGIUM

FIRST CONGRESS OF BRUSSELS DEMOCRATIC RALLY PARTY

Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 17 Jun 85 p 3

[Text] Just 3 months ago in Etterbeek the Brussels Democratic Rally Party (RDB) held its first congress since its founding; 200 people were in attendance.

This invitational structure, organized by dissidents of the FDF [French-speaking Brussels Democratic Front] and led by Deputy Leon Defosset and Senator Serge Moureaux, depicts itself as a "political movement." Working in collaboration with the PS [Socialist Party], its objective is to establish a progressive front in view of the next elections.

The congress ratified the RDB-PS agreement, already adopted last week by the Brussels Federation of the PS.

Two Speeches

The first congress was concluded with speeches by Serge Moureaux and Leon Defosset.

The speech of the movement's secretary general was marked by an appeal to liberals to join the RDB in order to establish a true center left in Brussels. In Moureaux' opinion, the PRL [Liberal Reform Party] is increasingly resembling a party of the extreme right: he no longer feels comfortable with the European democratic liberals and prefers to side with Mr Chirac and the English conservatives. With the departure of Mr Perin, "he has lost," he says, "his last moral assurance." He is inviting genuine progressive liberals to join the RDB.

In Mr Moureaux' opinion, the role of the RDB, in conjunction with the PS, is to be the expression of a center left which is not socialist but which unites progressive people of all philosophical and political horizons, of all origins: progressive liberals,

progressive Christians (the SeP [Solidarity and Participation]. "The RDB," he says, "should constitute a true force for freedom and progress. This force will work side by side with the PS, perhaps with the assistance of Francois Perin."

Mr Defosset asserts that FDF's initial pioneers have joined the RDB.

"The thing which separates us from the FDF," he says, "is not the objectives--which are the same--but the strategy: There was a possibility of revitalizing FDF's paralyzing structures by accepting comprehensive negotiation...The FDF is no longer able to carry out its ideas... I do not have patriotism for structures but fidelity to ideas... If an instrument is no longer good for anything, there is no point in insisting on using it."

Resolutions

On the economic and social level, the RDB believes that the establishment of an autonomous region endowed with the financial means to which it is entitled will make it possible to restore the financial situation of the communes, take effective measures to stimulate Brussels' economy and bring about a reorganization of the region's social life.

RDB declares itself in favor of the communalization of education, tied in with a communal scholastic agreement assuring the protection of minorities and public instruction.

It insists that this communalization be made on an equitable financial basis with regard to the French community: 45 percent for the French-speaking and 55 percent for the Flemish-speaking people.

On the institutional level, the congress ratified the positions announced by the RDB during a recent press conference.

It proposes that special powers be entrusted to the central government, of restrictive interpretation, such as national defense.

The communities will have general jurisdiction over all cultural, personal and educational areas.

The regions will also have general jurisdiction over all areas of regional interest.

Thus, the following would be completely communalized: education, development cooperation (except certain aspects to be regionalized), participation in international organizations concerned with cultural or personal matters, etc.

The following would be completely regionalized: employment, the regional economy, foreign trade, public transportation and regional communications media, major projects of regional interest, energy and water distribution, environmental protection, the guardianship of subordinate powers relevant to the region, foreign policy relating to matters of regional interest, etc.

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POLITICAL

BELGIUM

SP'S CLAES ON ELECTION, COALITIONS, ECONOMIC POLICY

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 5 Jun 85 pp 18-20, 25

[Interview with Willy Claes, official of the Flemish Socialist Party, on 30 May 1985 by Chris de Stoop: "I Simply No Longer Eat Saturday Noon"; place not given]

[Text] Willy Claes is getting ready for his comeback. An interview about the decline of the West, the shifts in the political spectrum, and the inappropriate praise for Wilfried Martens.

In years past mentioned as a possible future prime minister, the socialist Willy Claes seemed to want to court the CVP [Social Christian Party (Flemish)], the coalition partner of his dreams, with a quiet charm offensive, but today even he has laid aside the old garments and followed his party in a more radical and aggressive style. The interview took place the morning after the blood curdling events at the Heizel stadium, and in spite of all the differences of opinion Claes definitely joins a number of Christian democrats in sharing a desire for a moral rearmament.

Willy Claes: The crisis lies in people, it is of a moral nature, and as long as we are searching only for a strictly economic answer we will not get anywhere. The reason is that the material has been put too much in the foreground and people have been pushed into the background. We have always been largely focused on bread and circuses, but yesterday evening's soccer scenes went further than that; they point to a decline of civilization. The damned winner's principle: the supporter identifies with his team and fights the opponent in order to contribute to the victory. Win, win, win, that is what it comes down to now. But winning is a material fulfilment whereby the spiritual is made secondary, and that is what characterizes the crisis of the West.

I am not an incurable pessimist; I don't belong to the school which says that nature made only one mistake, that is the creation of man, and that it will undo this mistake sooner rather than later. But I do say that the time is pressing, the normal relationships between man and nature are playing against us. And anyone who thinks that it is possible to remain indifferent about what happens far away from our bed, is mistaken; there will be only one future for all mankind. That soccer violence is only one symptom; there are dozens of them: militarization, threats to the environment, fanaticism and loneliness,

terror, the cleavage between exact and human sciences, the responsibility of the scientist, the giantism which characterizes the world, you name it.

The solution can only come from inside ourselves, it is dependent on what each one of us is willing to do for it. This may sound evangelical, but there are no ready made therapies. All kinds of organizations play a role in this spiritual renaissance, churches, parties, socio-cultural organizations, and of course education which should have somewhat fewer performance oriented and somewhat more humanity oriented courses. As former President Peccei of the Club of Rome said: this must be seen from the perspective of the population pyramid. The wide base, the billions of desperately poor people, cannot change anything about it; they are fighting to survive. And the top of the hierarchy will not do it either, they don't want to lose their privileges. Hence, action must come from the middle layers, those who have enough material standing to undertake cultural actions; they must make the world aware of this necessary evolution.

Not in Any Hurry

Question: Didn't the labor movement contribute substantially to putting the material element in the foreground?

Claes: All those responsible within the socialist flow of ideas were trapped by their carefully considered strategy: to grant material advantages in response to the laws of the consumer society. The central value is to possess, with as a result a neglect of ethical moral matters such as solidarity, respect for one's fellow man, and the like. This phase in the socialist movement has certainly not yet passed, but they are sending serious signals of alarm into the world today: Willy Brandt's North-South reports, for example, or the ecological and anti-militaristic movements, are signs that people are once again thinking about the sense and nonsense of life.

Question: You apparently have a quiet period of reflection in the opposition behind you. Wasn't that a frustrating time for you, and weren't you seized with nostalgia for government work?

Claes: No, and I still don't feel that today. After having been a minister for 6 or 7 years I know that that job is physically and mentally very demanding. I now realize that in the past I had sometimes reached the limit of resistance, and even went beyond it. I am 5 years older, more mature, and have also learned to see the relativity of things more. Five years ago I was more pre-occupied with my own small position, but now I would set a priority for the movement rather than the person. I don't want to hide the fact that I have always been one of the advocates of participation within the party, especially in periods of crisis. The SP [Socialist Party (Flemish)] must make a choice in favor of government work, not because of power for the sake of power but to assume its responsibility. If the SP had been in the government now, a series of asocial and unfavorable social reform measures would certainly not have been taken. But Claes himself is not in any hurry at all; in recent years he was finally able to do what he likes to do: reading, music, and so forth.

Question: And yet people always see you as the future prime minister, who is already putting together a shadow cabinet in secret.

Claes: Those speculations are very premature and I haven't lost an hour's sleep over it yet. I am not yet thinking about the structure of a government, and definitely not about names for ministers. Besides, I know from experience how small the decision making power of a formateur really is. What I have been working on is the question of how to come up with an alternative for that awful policy today, which is dragging us into a circular course of ever increasing unemployment and debts. But that is not prompted by an egoistic climber reflex on the order of now it is my time to aim for 16 rue de la Loi.

With the People's Union

Question: Van Miert likes to call you the godfather of the renewed SP. Yet, that more radical and more flamingant party does not seem to fit your moderate and Belgium oriented image completely.

Claes: Yes, perhaps there is a contradiction. I am proud of the fact that I broke down a few old walls and that I encouraged the young people to push through to the top, and I already knew then that they would stress different things and that they would take a more radical turn. I felt that this was normal at the economic-political level in a time of crisis, during which the right wing became particularly defiant with scientific spokesmen like Friedman and political ones like Thatcher and Verhofstadt. All of that was within my expectations when I was president. I am only surprised by the intensity of the peace movement. I must admit that I underestimated that factor.

As far as the Flemish issue is concerned, I also remain today someone who is moderate in terms of the community problems, partly because of my vision of life which has developed in recent years; I have become more and more of a European and universalist who believes that the role of national states has been largely played out. Just the same, I believe in all objectivity that the current situation is untenable; participation did not occur as a result of the state reform of 1980, and anyone who wants to turn back in a unitary direction is basically wrong. The regions must inevitably get more autonomy, but with maintenance of a strong central authority.

Question: Let us assume that the Socialist Party becomes the largest party; then you would at least be formateur. How would you untangle that stalemate? At the present time numerous shifts are taking place within the political spectrum: greens, dissident Christians, turncoats everywhere, polarization...

Claes: This may well be the most important election since the war. The current coalition should not entertain the thought of still being able to obtain a majority, especially because of the advances of the greens. Also because there will be a stronger socialist fraction to present itself, particularly in Flanders, with a radicalized program which will get the confidence of the young generations, and partly also the Christians, the real ones then. In Flanders the liberals, with their enormous gap between propaganda and achievements, will not escape their punishment. The Christian democrats will blow

all hands on deck, especially the catholic pillar which will make a desperate effort because its existence would be threatened if the CVP were to go into the opposition.

In Wallonia the power relationships on the left and on the right will not change. Gol will be able to stand his ground now, but in the long run he will not experience success either: nobody can bring together so many turncoats from so many divergent directions with impunity. Now only ECOLO [Ecology Party] will win at the expense of the PSC [Social Christian Party (Walloon)], which continues to act like a puffed up frog as if it didn't know what is going on. In any case, the situation after 8 December will be so hopelessly complicated that it would be best not to reject any formulas in advance. Indeed, there will be community obstructions, socio-economic obstructions, and obstructions related to the missiles, and those three obstructions will also be interwoven with one another.

Well now, I will in any case continue to reject asymmetrical formulas. Let us assume that the PS [Socialist Party (Walloon)] is in the government and the SP stays out of it; this would soon lead to serious conflicts within the socialist union movement. When I hear Verhofstadt carrying on I really don't see any possibility with him either. Is AGALEV [Live Differently] ready for government responsibility? When I look at their experiments in the municipalities, I don't think so. I don't consider the greens a deadweight, far from it, but a government with them cannot be achieved. When you add all this together you end up with a laborite formula with the CVP. But is that possible today? I can readily imagine that the SP would put water in the wine, but would the CVP be capable of serious flexibility? If I am a good observer, then it looks less and less so.

Question: Hence the country is ungovernable?

Claes: Miracles are not excluded. As a matter of fact, rightwing circles, especially of the CVP, are playing with a few hypotheses, which we are very well aware of and against which we will guard ourselves. The first one is to take the People's Union [VU] into the boat, either through government participation or through a portfolio in the Flemish Executive. A great deal of work is being put into this now, and I know that for some people in the People's Union this idea is not unwelcome, but it would be a very unhealthy story. It would strengthen the separatist reflex of the Walloons even further, because then they would no longer speak of a "Belgo-Flemish government" but rather of a "Belgo-Flamingant" or "super Flemish" one. And the VU would have to sacrifice so many holy principles that this is guaranteed to be the beginning of the end.

Breakthrough

The same rightwing circles are also thinking of a lengthy government crisis, whereby Wilfried Martens would continue to handle current affairs and after about 5 months would say: you see, this country cannot be governed without a strong center. Finally they are also playing with the idea of involving the socialists in the government -- just as they want to include the VU in order

to strangle it --, to make a whole bunch of concessions to them, and then rather quickly let the boat sink. That is one of the big risks for the SP, especially in terms of the missiles: if they take too long for that, then it would not be unimaginable that they might close the books to argue that the SP has just been pretending all those years.

Question: Whatever the case may be, in your opinion the only refuge remains with the CVP then? Why attack it so much then? Aren't you better off with a strong partner?

Claes: True, but pushing the center away is only possible if that center itself allows it to happen, and it did this by making a choice in favor of the right. The unmasking is in full swing now, and the ACW [General Christian Workers Association] and ACV [Confederation of Christian Trade Unions] leaders especially will have to look into their own hearts. The stake of the elections is whether or not a significant faction among their dissatisfied rank and file workers will definitely leave the center. Our objective is a strategic one, specifically the question of whether we can structurally strengthen and broaden our range, and whether in the long run we can turn into a broader party like the PvdA [Labor Party of the Netherlands] or the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany]. If you are a democrat it is not all that easy to set aside a party which obtains one-third of the votes. But the polarization is due primarily to the CVP itself, which has given up on the center and chosen the right. Hence, I will not fail to tell the voters that a vote for Martens is a vote for Verhofstadt.

Question: But your Progressive Agreement of Christians and Socialists [PAKS] came like a declaration of war, didn't it? But is the game really worth the candle? After all, it is only a marginal group; you stir up the CVP because of it, you experience opposition within your own party, and you run the risk of once again obscuring the clearer profile of the SP.

Claes: The initiative came from them and we have taken it up because it fits in our broadening trend, the breakthrough philosophy. The ACW does not need to act so darned surprised; it is reaping what it sowed by blindly supporting a rightwing policy with fiscal amnesty, new poverty and the reintroduction of a need test. If our motivation were purely electoral, then we might have been better off not doing it, but that proves that we are precisely striving for a thorough structural change. It is a new image building for the SP, aiming for a broader base and directed toward breaking through the nonsensical, cost devouring and conservative pillar support on which Flanders has been built.

Question: Says Willy Claes, while we are sitting here in the building of the socialist health insurance fund.

Claes: Yes, you are sitting in the socialist pillar, but it was born as a reaction to the other side. From my position at the health insurance fund I am trying to achieve a dialogue which should change the damned pillar structure in a structural and basic manner, if only to have better control over the budget.

Question: Doesn't expansion happen at the expense of ideological depth? After all, you have to spare a number of Christian sensitivities now. Should the abortion bill be put in the drawer?

Claes: Certainly not. Although, if you want to remove the pillars from a society you do indeed have to find a compromise for some issues. Socio-economically speaking there are no problems for PAKS. It is somewhat more difficult at the ethical level and in matters of education. But let there be no misunderstandings, the SP will stick to its own program and our congress will definitely not handle any PAKS amendments. I do hope that a structural dialogue will develop which will bring believers and non-believers closer together. Even though Dehaene is always talking about reviewing the agreements, this can only be done through such a dialogue. Well, I hope that in the upcoming decades the SP will be able to fulfill that bridge function, as the SPD has done.

Question: Let us assume that you had been prime minister over the last 4 years; how differently would you have handled it? After all, you would also have had to make budget cuts. And Martens receives a great deal of international praise.

Claes: (scornfully) International praise? The right adulates the right. The IMF is conducting an incorrect policy in world events, deepening the cleavage between rich and poor, and causing the banking system to shake on its foundations: I don't call the fact that it praises Martens a reference. I want to give Martens a good mark in one area, that is to say where he has restored the balance of the current account. But after all, things would be pretty bad if he had not done so after a devaluation, after an international recovery, after massive income cuts and enormous tax presents. But aside from that, any praise is misplaced. Unemployment rose by nearly 200,000 units in spite of all his famous plans. Indebtedness has doubled to 5 trillion francs by the end of this year. The budgetary deficit is above the 500 billion franc mark, while the socialists were called names when they produced a 250 billion franc deficit.

I am still sorry that I had to break my silence a few times in recent years, because the prime minister sinned gravely against ethics, against the solidarity of his previous administration, by laying all the blame at our door; I felt that that was beneath everything, low. Where lies the praise? Inflation is remarkably higher now than for our main competitors; we had to give up our privileged position at the head of the European team and ended up in the middle. Recovery of confidence in our currency? That is the least that can be expected after such a devaluation, and now that everything is concentrated around the dollar. If the dollar falls, then we will follow the downward movement. And speaking of confidence, each year there is still a flight of capital of more than 100 billion francs!

And one of the ugliest stains on the Martens picture is the new poverty, all the people who are falling through the holes in the social security net: look at the increase in OCMW [expansion unknown] interventions, forced sales of social housing, overdue credits, the altered pattern of consumption. Just ask the butcher at the corner store what kind of meat he is selling now and what he sold 4 years ago!

Question: You have a strong constituency service record; do you feel that new poverty there?

Claes: (vehemently) I simply don't eat Saturday noon anymore. The misery I have to listen to every Saturday morning, the women who burst into tears, there is no comparison with 4 years ago. That is my basic accusation to Martens: it is true that he didn't sit still, and that things perhaps had to happen, but the authoritarian manner -- with special powers and Gol laws and who knows what else -- with which he pushed the less well off further down into the pit, that I will never forgive him for, that is unworthy of a Christian democrat. Yes, he did conduct a social reform policy, but in a rightwing, inverted and conservative direction, and that must be turned around; we are compelled to do that out of respect for our civilization which is built primarily on solidarity.

It is my conviction that in the West a whole generation, which left the school benches with the same ambitions we had but only got to see the unemployment office and the OCMW, is being wasted. If nothing is done about that, the bases of our democratic system are likely to be washed away. And then explosions would be inevitable. Large masses driven by despair can suddenly let themselves be tempted by the inducement of adventurers, whether they are of extreme right wing or of fascist inclination. The balance sheets of the enterprises alone are central to Martens, not jobs. And they are trying to drive a wedge between people: the young against the old who should simply go on relief; men against women, who should simply do the washing; the working against the unemployed. Workers can suddenly get all kinds of advantages from the employers now, preferably under the table, but on one condition, that they don't whine, by God, about additional recruitment. Martens doesn't even realize what he is causing.

Question: But in concrete terms, how would you have done things differently if you had been prime minister?

Claes: The difference lies in the basic philosophy. This government started with the opinion that through income cuts it could at the same time restore competitiveness and ensure budgetary cutbacks. But its deflationary approach only caused greater impoverishment and more unemployment. I would conduct a selective reactivation in which at well defined points stimulus is provided for the business world. It would be preferable for this to take place at the European level, but I am not hiding my bitterness about that. When I see that Thatcher and Kohl obsessively refuse to use their balance of payments surpluses to the benefit of their unemployed subjects and all of Europe, then I have doubts about the future of the West.

Furthermore, you cannot get out of it by implementing a shock operation of reduction of working hours, combined with "emergency" job measures. And I am not impressed by the counter-arguments of CEPESS [Common Study Center for PSC and CVP] Director Herman Van Rompuy, who likes to pretend that we are barbarians, but whose reasoning is comparable with past resistance to the elimination of child labor or the introduction of 8 hour work days. Labor ethics and sociology will change in the wake of onrushing technology, and the socialists will also have to accept new types of labor but then via open dialogue and not unilaterally imposed as Hansenne does.

Thirdly, more than 10 percent in purchasing power has been taken away from the people, and for this I would introduce socio-fiscal corrections, certainly for the lowest incomes. It is a scandal that today labor can be taxed up to 85 percent, but capital only up to 25 percent; that is why those incomes must once again be globalized. But they haven't reported those bonds and shares anyhow, they say then. The least that can be done about that is to register documents of ownership of personal property, as is the case in the United States and most of our neighboring countries. But no, that is not possible; the French Monory law was transcribed, except for a single small article to the effect that shares must bear a person's name!

Question: One should not expect any presents from you either. Won't this cause a conflict with the ABVV [Belgian General Federation of Labor]? And aren't you afraid that your rank and file will develop a hangover as was the case in Mitterrand's France?

Claes: It is of course human that, after so many years of income cuts, one would also like to have a taste of a wage hike; and I can understand that someone who sees Agfa-Gevaert making billions in profits would like a share in that. Union leaders today are also often faced with difficult choices in this rapidly changing society. But we cannot allow ourselves to be reduced to small egoistic and corporatist organizations; all efforts must be combined to the benefit of the unemployed. In addition, I know that governments must work with compromises, and that a small country like ours has its limitations, and that it can easily have a policy imposed from the outside; therefore we must, as a matter of fact, build the risk of a serious hangover into our tactics.

8463

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POLITICAL

BELGIUM

SCHILTZ VISIT TO CSSR, FOREIGN POLICY ROLE

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 5 Jun 85 pp 16-18

[Report by Frans Verleyen: "I Think, Therefore I Am"]

[Text] Minister Hugo Schiltz (Finance and Budget) was able, not without deftness, to make his recent visit to Czechoslovakia a success. Also at home in Flanders, the thought of having its own international role continues to increase.

The diplomatic doctrine with which Schiltz regularly travels abroad is known: under international law, regional governments are able to conclude agreements or treaties with each other, and in practice they actually do that more rapidly and with less fuss than do the traditional services of Foreign Affairs or Trade.

From 22 to 28 May the Flemish minister was in both Prague and Bratislava, the capitals of Bohemia-Moravia and Slovakia; the two "republics" make up the two federal states of Czechoslovakia. According to a constitutional revision carried through there in 1958 right after the Dubcek events, they have their own government with everything attached to it, and they spend almost half of the government resources in the country itself. Moreover, Slovakia's position somewhat resembles that of Wallonia: this federal state comprises only one third of the national population (five out of fifteen million), but it enjoys very advantageous budgetary distribution bases. Compared to the traditional Bohemia (and its Prague center), it can expect an economic upturn. Large urban projects are being carried out, newer industries developed, and there is close supervision on "equal treatment, both judicially and actually, vis-a-vis the Czechs. Slovakia moreover enjoys the special political protection of the Soviet Union, in any event dating back to 1968 when the political rebellion took root there less than in Bohemia.

Tatras

At meetings and at the dinner table, where the complicated Eastern European art of toasting is widely practiced, the Flemish minister revealed himself as a seasoned, and yet principled, diplomat. He clearly came to plead for his own economic interest--the establishment of a Flemish House for industrial and commercial contacts in Prague--but he did not let himself be needlessly

impressed by the sometimes emphatic marxist and bloc-oriented priorities of his discussion partners. Everyone remained calm, courteous and outspokenly friendly. Both parties were able to indicate without batting an eye how small their political margins are both domestically and abroad.

Thus Schiltz visited a great part of the country, followed by a little caravan of black Tatra's. From time to time his hosts stressed the importance of the success of the Czechoslovak agricultural policy. For that matter, the success of the gradually-developed cooperatives is being recognized internationally, in contrast to the miserable situation in Poland, for example. There were also visits to the university, a remarkable center for wine cultivation, political and cultural museums, concert buildings, and even a health spa. Toward the end of the trip a confidential discussion was arranged with a few top people of the Czechoslovak communist party. As semi-official guardians of both the national and regional political institutions, they are the most important body of authority in the state.

The King

With considerable effort Schiltz obtained a decision of the party on the establishment of a Flemish House: such an initiative is not contradictory to the party's legal or political views. Thus the light was green for an interesting final communique, in which the demarche of the Flemish Economic Alliance (merely under Schiltz' patronage, but of some diplomatic importance) was clearly reported. At the last moment one had to look for the correct judicial responsibility of the Flemish regional government in this type of matter. The Czech negotiators also tried to get a passage inserted on the withdrawal of the missiles from Belgium. Reasoning that this could cause an internal diplomatic incident in Belgium (Schiltz really has no authority in this area), the requested taking of a position was ultimately watered down to "the affirmation of our mutual desire for peace."

In between, Schiltz had to call the home front from time to time, amongst other reasons in order not to take the words out of the mouth of Minister Jacky Buchmann, who is theoretically in charge of the international emanation of the Flemish Community. As yet that did not cause any problems; both gentlemen are from Antwerp and know their world. The VU [People's Union] minister was less sure, however, of the reactions of President Gaston Geens who seems to be very sensitive about the honors accorded to his eight colleagues but possibly not to the president of the Flemish Government.

The most ticklish problem for a Flemish minister who is steering toward more or less autonomous political activity abroad is, however, his Belgian colleague in Foreign Affairs. That was also noticeable in Prague: Ambassador Hugo Walschap tried very hard (and not always in vain) to participate in the discussions between Schiltz and his Czech political colleagues. In doing so, he reasoned that formally speaking he was not representing Tindemans, but the king. But surely he must previously have thought of the directives which Tindemans delivered 2 years ago to his ambassadors abroad. They are not allowed to offer aid, certainly no financial aid, to "missions" of municipal, regional or subordinate governments which had not made a prior agreement on that with Foreign Affairs. Since that time our diplomatic and consular posts

abroad have regularly been finding themselves in delicate positions. Suddenly a Dehousse, a Geens or a Schiltz turns up, and then what? The VU politician insisted on autonomy for himself and his following, because he wanted to act outside of the established political channels. Hence the two gentlemen sought and found a compromise, and therefore Walschap was not absent from the airport at the departure, and he even offered a convivial drink at his residency.

In the meantime the Flemish pressure toward a more international legal status continues to increase. In 1982 Foreign Affairs still tried to curb that process on the basis of a text drawn up by constitutional lawyer Professor Robert Senelle. This author saw in article 68 of the Constitution a total block to any opportunity for the communities or regions to break out on their own diplomatically in Belgium. This article states that the king leads the army, declares war and, subject to approval by parliament, concludes international treaties.

Happy about this position, Tindemans then published his letter to the ambassadors, but he immediately met with adversity, also on the part of his party associate Gaston Geens. The latter pointed out that according to the constitutional revision of 1980 the regions and communities indeed have authority in a number of foreign matters, not only in matters of culture and personal rights, but also in specific tasks such as searching for foreign investors and conducting trade canvassing. For that matter, in the Flemish government there is one member who is specifically in charge of international relations. Originally that was Karel Poma, but he gave up his authority to his party associate Buchmann.

Shortly afterward Geens concluded a practical agreement with the former EC commissioner Etienne Davignon. The Flemish government and the commission would have regular contacts and have discussions on, amongst others, the European input in the DIRV [Third Industrial Revolution] campaign, participation of Flanders in the electro-technological ESPRIT [European Strategic Program for Research and Development in Information Technology] program, and the granting to Flanders of money from the EC Fund for Regional Development.

In those days, by the way, it still was notable that Geens announced his agreement with Davignon the day after King Bouduin had pointed out in his postponed New Year's speech that he himself (thus the national executive power) could be the only discussion partner at the international level.

Footnote

That is the reason there were a few depressed faces in the little cabinet world which supports the tender Flemish diplomacy, such as in the case of the General Commission for International Cultural Cooperation, still being headed today by Mrs Diane Verstraeten (CVP [Flemish Social Christian Party]). For about 2 years now there have nevertheless been attempts to strengthen and expand this institution into a General Commission for simply International Cooperation. But it was Schiltz who retorted at two levels simultaneously. First he published a thorough lawyer's paper in which he showed, with the code of law at hand, that Senelle was judicially and constitutionally in error.

From the recent texts it is very clear to him that, as a body corporate, the Flemish Community is completely authorized to play an international role. He also pointed out that the Flemish (or Walloon) members of the Executive are not royal ministers in the sense of article 65 of the constitution. The head of state cannot initiate actions or conclude treaties in their name. They are coordinate, but not subordinate, to the national ministers. Only the latter have the usual constitutional tie with the king.

The fact that he has persisted in his attempts to outline a general Flemish foreign strategy and to make the Flemish Community more identifiable abroad may be seen as a historic footnote under the first legislature of the Flemish government. If later on, after New York and perhaps Paris, there will also be a Flemish House in Prague and thus Eastern Europe, it will not have come about all by itself. But that deed has no significance whatsoever.

8700

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POLITICAL

CYPRUS

CYPRIOTS URGED TO REFLECT ON OWN RESPONSIBILITIES

Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 10 Jul 85 p 3

[Article by Savvas Iakovidis: "Pirandello's Syndrome"]

[Text] It seems that the tasteless, childish same old song will not end. Faithfully copying the president's well-known, well-worn statements, the government representative said yesterday: "There will only be progress in the Cypriot problem if those who are in a position to convince or pressure Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to abandon their expansionist and dichotomist plans against Cyprus in order to allow the continuing initiative of the UN secretary general to succeed, exert their influence in this direction."

This has been the only refrain for the past 25 years: Whatever happens in Cyprus must be blamed on the foreigners, the Turks, the Americans, the Greeks at times, the Middle East problem, the topical and international events, the Russians, the Jews, etc. How about us? We are not to blame for anything. This SIMPLISTIC way to face reality and specifically the Cypriot issue has led to political misunderstandings and Manichean explanations. On the one side, there we are, the victims of plotters, of machinations, of conspiracies. And on the other side, there are all those who have nothing better to do than think of ways to destroy us, to defeat us politically, morally, financially and militarily.

We are not to blame, in this simplistic view, about the thirteen points. We are not to blame if the Turks provoked the revolt. We are not to blame if we were led to the coup d'etat and the invasion. We like to take the part of the constant victims, the constant defrauded and the constant confused. The government's representative's statement that those who are in a position to influence Turkey must do so is naive. As is also the position that the Turks could ever possibly abandon their expansionist aims on third parties' pressure.

We are suffering from the syndrome of Pirandello: We must find someone responsible for our errors and our bad luck... When has a Cypriot leader dared to proceed to self-criticism and to admit he made mistakes in the handling of the Cyprus problem? When has a political leader told the people that he erred or that he omitted certain things, or that he showed

indifference toward the decision-making process for the country's salvation? Makarios used to project the impression that we were the center and the navel of the world. And his so-called follower dares to pretend he possesses king-like attributes. Even if it is well known that the country has lost half of itself through the former's handling and from the latter's errors and pettiness. A dramatic 25-year period, full of errors, superficialities and amateurish moves has not yet convinced us to come back down to earth.

We ask third parties to do--indeed, with what authority and with what stakes?--what we should be doing OURSELVES. We ask them to pressure the Turks. But the Turks and the third parties are only doing what is good for them and are only looking out for their own interests. What are we doing? We should be the ones to pressure and convince the Turks. But how can we pressure them when, for 25 whole years, we are still seeking a common policy and common lines of conduct? How can we convince them when we still don't know what we want and how to go about it? How can we convince them that we mean what we sometimes say, since divisions and our politico-diplomatic weaknesses are our only givens? And how will our adversary take us seriously when we are only using slogans, when we are willingly blinding ourselves?

Cyprus has so far paid a heavy price for all the idiotic moves of its leaders. It has paid with blood, with money, with pride, with honor and with FREEDOM. It is thus revolting to hear the same confused mumbling after so many evils. But at this point in the situation, nothing surprises and everything is possible...

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POLITICAL

DENMARK

POLL SHOWS PRESENT COALITION MOST FAVORED CABINET ALTERNATIVE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 21 Jun 85 p 5

[Article by Helle Ravn Larsen: "AIM: Four-Party Coalition Most Popular"]

[Text] About every fifth Conservative voter wants a governing coalition with the Social Democrats following the election. Nonetheless, the four-party coalition is the favorite among voters.

The four-party coalition government is more popular than a coalition government between S [Social Democratic Party] and SF [Socialist People's Party]. Twenty-eight percent of the voters prefer that the four-party coalition continue following the election, while 22 percent of the voters prefer an S-SF coalition. Other conceivable governing constellations receive under 10 percent support.

The foregoing is shown in a survey which the analysis institute AIM A/S undertook in April among 1,300 voters. It also appears that 22 percent--or more than every fifth Conservative voter--would like to see a ruling coalition between the Conservatives and the Social Democrats. The most loyal voters to the four-party coalition are within the Liberal Party, where 69 percent want a continuation of the four-party coalition, as opposed to 52 percent of the Conservatives who want a continuation of the present coalition.

It also appears that the more urban the environment in which one lives, the stronger the support for a Labor government. The farther one gets from urban areas, the stronger the support for the four-party coalition.

At the same time, it is noteworthy that only nine percent of the voters want a pure Social Democratic government, which is less than half as many who point to a government with the Social Democrats--either together with the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party or the Radical Liberal Party--with 20 percent total.

Among Social Democratic voters, 39 percent want an S-SF government, 24 percent a pure S government, while every tenth Social Democrat would vote for a government with the Social Democrats and either the Liberals or the Conservatives as partners.

12578
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POLITICAL

FINLAND

PAPER VIEWS OTTAWA STAND, NEUTRALITY 'CONTENT'

Finnish Delegation Acted Properly

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 19 Jun 85 p 2

[Editorial by Rafael Paro: "Echo from Ottawa"]

[Text] Rafael Paro comments on charges that Finland acted timidly and split the group of experts from neutral and alliance-free countries at the meeting on human rights.

The meeting of experts in Ottawa on the subject of human rights ended Monday without being able to agree on a final document. The meeting began on 7 May and dealt with one of the most controversial issues in the so-called CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] process. There are substantial differences of opinion between East and West with regard to respecting human rights and basic freedoms. Eastern countries like to say that the most important human rights are the right to work, the right to have a place to live and the right to live in peace. Western countries put special emphasis on freedom of religion, opinions and speech.

According to the meeting's mandate from the follow-up CSCE meeting in Madrid the purpose of the Ottawa meeting was to discuss all aspects of human rights and basic freedoms in line with the final document from the 1975 Helsinki conference. The experts were then supposed to reach some conclusions and make recommendations that would be presented to the governments of all the participating nations.

There was a sort of balance at the difficult Madrid meeting. The Warsaw Pact countries wanted progress in the military area in the form of an arms reduction conference. The West wanted the Eastern bloc to show respect for human rights first and made the meeting of experts in Ottawa a sort of precondition.

Recalling the bitter debate in Madrid stemming from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, events in Poland and the shooting down of the Korean passenger plane, one could also expect the Ottawa meeting to be characterized by hard controversy.

Under the CSCE process it has been part of the role of the neutral and alliance-free nations to try to even out the differences in the views of East and West so that a consensus, a broad agreement expressly required by the CSCE process with regard to decisions and documents, can be reached. In especially complicated situations it has been the lot of these countries to "water down" texts so that they do not run into categorical opposition from any of the 35 participating nations.

On Sunday the leading daily newspaper in Norway, AFTENPOSTEN, published a remarkable report that said that in this coordination aspect Finland had divided the ranks of the nonaligned nations in Ottawa and had displayed timidity. "The country has lost a good deal of the trust it acquired in connection with the CSCE process," wrote the paper, referring to sources from western and nonaligned countries attending the meeting.

On Tuesday AFTENPOSTEN returned to this theme and wrote that statements "from several delegates, including Richard Schifter of the United States" left no doubt that Finland, from a western as well as a neutral viewpoint, should think things over very carefully before the compromise proposal is issued. Then came the reservation to the report: "It was stressed by diplomatic sources that it was an exaggeration to say that Finland was acting for the Soviet Union when it presented its proposal."

On the editorial page the paper commented on the "sensational" reports from Ottawa by pointing out that "these are very strong charges against a country that throughout the postwar period has fought to convince the world of its integrity with regard to its powerful neighbor to the East."

It is natural in this context to note another surprised and doubtful Nordic voice. On Sunday DAGENS NYHETER in Stockholm wrote concerning the neutrality discussion in Finland in recent weeks that "if it were not for Finland's historic brave and persevering struggle for its existence and its territory many more people would have a hard time acknowledging its neutrality claims."

DAGENS NYHETER concluded its article by noting the distinction Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen made recently between 1) Finland's own definition of neutrality, 2) the Soviet use of the word and 3) joint Soviet-Finnish statements. The newspaper noted that many Finns are probably inclined to accept and approve of this distinction but added: "The problem is that the difference between what Finland itself says and what it endorses should not become too great--if it is to preserve its credibility."

If one adds up the recent comments on Finland's neutrality one gets the impression that the criticism AFTENPOSTEN's reporters described with regard to Finland's actions in Ottawa does not really fit into the picture except as an expression for a more general critical attitude toward Finland. The echo from Ottawa has a broader note than that.

The charges that Finland displayed timidity and split the ranks of uncommitted nations in Ottawa can be dismissed as unfounded. The Finnish

delegation took on a thankless task when it found a lowest common denominator between East and West for a final document. Not many countries in this situation could make a contribution. The criticism that has now been expressed in roundabout ways suggests that critically-disposed diplomats in the western camp as well as in the ranks of alliance-free nations found a suitable opportunity to voice their frustration. What is cause for reflection is the fact that they have taken out their dissatisfaction on Finland's concern for the continuation of the CSCE process. It would not be a good thing if people get in the habit of seizing this kind of feeble pretext to cast doubts on the credibility of Finnish neutrality.

Vayrynen's Pragmatic Neutrality Viewed

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 30 Jun 85 p 2

[Editorial by Jan-Magnus Jansson: "Neutrality: What the Word Means"]

[Text] Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen stirred up a debate with his remark that there is no concrete definition of neutrality and that different terms can be used in different contexts. Jan-Magnus Jansson examines this statement here in light of our historical experiences since World War II.

The concept of neutrality as applied to Finland continues to invade our public debate. In many ways this is natural, partly because neutrality is such an important part of our foreign policy and partly because neutrality in its Finnish form is not entirely free of complications.

The matter was taken up most recently in a big article by Professor Raimo Vayrynen, Social Democrat, in the newspaper KALEVA. Vayrynen took up the conclusion of Professors Anckar and Stahlberg concerning the changed status of neutrality in our foreign policy, which we commented on earlier (4 June). But the main focus of Raimo Vayrynen's article was a statement made by his namesake, Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen. In an interview in the newspaper KESKISUOMALAINEN some time ago he said that there is no concrete definition of neutrality and that different expressions are used in different contexts. One should be especially careful to distinguish between how Finland itself defines its neutrality policy and how the Soviet Union uses the word. A third distinction is how we use the word in joint statements with the Soviet Union.

In view of their different political backgrounds we might expect that Raimo Vayrynen would sharply criticize Paavo Vayrynen's statement. But in fact the professor's criticism is quite muted. He is content to say that the foreign minister's statement about the possibilities of freely interpreting the concept of neutrality is probably realistic but "not without problems."

He also accuses his namesake of making the content of foreign policy so flexible "that in the end it can be adapted to any situation."

Raimo Vayrynen is seeking, perhaps somewhat lackadaisically, a formula for our neutrality policy that can be regarded as a constant in any situation. He finds it in the phrase "an active and peace-promoting policy of neutrality," which of course has been part of our standard diplomatic vocabulary since the end of Kekkonen's period in office. But in our opinion this does not solve the problems which the foreign minister somewhat surprisingly brought up.

We commented on Paavo Vayrynen's remarks on 4 June and stated our opinion that Vayrynen's thesis of a flexible use of the concept of neutrality was pragmatic and that it probably often guided our foreign policy in concrete situations but that international credibility does not permit too much leeway in different interpretations of the words one selects. Since the discussion has continued both inside and outside this country there is reason to return to the question here.

Let us go back to the origin of our present foreign policy, to Juho Kusti Paasikivi's historic speech on Independence Day in 1944. It is in the basic interests of our people, the old statesman said, "that in the future Finland's foreign policy is conducted in such a way that it does not go against the Soviet Union."

These are perhaps the most important words that have ever been uttered publicly in our recent history. At the same time there is a certain lack of precision here that may have been intentional. Not "going against the Soviet Union" would not of course have meant to Paasikivi that we should follow the same line as the Soviet Union in all situations and in all circumstances, in other words act like a satellite. But his words can be interpreted as meaning that Finland's basic foreign policy line should be formed in such a way as to avoid serious and systematic conflicts with the Soviet Union.

The same temperate but at the same time suggestive way of expressing himself also occurs in Paasikivi's next most important speech, the comment on the just-concluded friendship and mutual assistance pact on 9 April 1948. The president commented on the words of the preamble that Finland strives to remain aloof from the conflict of interests of the great powers with the words, "a principle that the people of Finland unanimously endorse." The man who was reluctant to use the word "neutrality" about Finland's position given the circumstances of that period at the same time described the desire of the people of Finland to remain outside international political conflicts in words that could not have been more categorical.

Let us look a little more closely for a moment at the way in which the famous, concrete and unambiguously-formulated words about Finland's efforts "to remain aloof from the conflict of interests of the great powers" have been put into practice. Above all else they have served Finland's desire not to "go against the Soviet Union" in awkward situations. This was the case with

the votes in the United Nations on Hungary and Afghanistan. But the most important application has occurred in our foreign trade policy in connection with the western integration efforts. Finland's neutrality and determination not to consistently take the side of one bloc against another have especially affected our relations with EC and were expressed in the meticulous balancing policy that was pursued in the early 1970's under Kekkonen's leadership before the final free trade agreement was negotiated.

One can sympathize with the standpoint that the "neutrality clause" in the preamble could have been applied more often to the benefit of the other side, for example in the vote on the fairly limited Grenada affair, in order to increase our national credibility in the West as well. In any case it is vital to determine how the clause has been used at really decisive moments.

From the concrete phrases in the VSB [Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance] pact Kekkonen boldly and deliberately created the neutrality policy that has become our international hallmark. Kekkonen certainly used many terms but the key phrase was "neutrality policy." A term which in contrast to "neutrality" describes a process, not a condition. It recurred in the so-called neutrality oath of 1961 as well as in the book he wrote in his old age, "Ekudden."

Internationally no one, not even our critics, seriously questions our membership in the so-called N + N group, meaning the group of neutral and nonaligned nations. Since the word "nonaligned" is foreign to us and is not applicable to our political position for many reasons, we are assigned without question to the neutral group.

In the Soviet Union today the word "neutrality" is seldom used to describe Finland's position or if it is it is hedged with certain reservations. For the most part other words are used. As we all know, in the early 1970's a change was made in joint Soviet-Finnish communiques to the term "striving for neutrality," which undoubtedly is supported by the phrases in the preamble to the VSB pact, and these words became the norm. In communiques from recent years the invariable formulation has been "Finland's neutrality policy which benefits international peace and security and the preservation of peaceful relations with all nations."

As we see it, this formula gives a satisfactory picture of our policy while at the same time we can reasonably use other and simpler expressions in our internal discussions in line with the Kekkonen tradition.

Thus from a practical point of view the observations of the foreign minister are acceptable. Of course one can question the appropriateness of a person in such a sensitive position bringing up the problem (the words in the interview are said to have been a trifle sharp). But there is nothing to get upset about here, although our original reservation remains, namely that there should not be too much of a gap between the various formulations. And if anyone asks what we mean by "too much," our answer is that this is a question of judgment and must be determined separately in each case.

6578

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

PCF DELEGATION TO POLAND REPORTS SHARED VIEWS

PM221421 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 13 Jul 85 p 6

[Unattributed report: "PCF Delegation in Warsaw"]

[Text] The PCF delegation headed by Politburo member and Central Committee Secretary Paul Laurent (Footnote) (The delegation comprised Central Committee members Mireille Elmalan and Antoine Gomez and Central Committee staffer Jean-Charles Negre) and which visited Poland 8 through 11 July at the PZPR's invitation, had a lengthy meeting with PZPR First Secretary W. Jaruzelski.

The delegation also met with J. Czyrek and T. Porebski, both members of the Politburo and Central Committee secretaries.

During its visit the delegation had numerous talks with PZPR officials, government members, and the chairman of the National Trade Union Accord. It visited an enterprise in Warsaw.

These meetings made it possible to exchange information about the development of the economic, social, and political situation in France and Poland, and about the activity of the PCF and of the PZPR on the eve of the Sejm elections and preparations for the 10th congress.

The two parties' representatives examined international questions, especially problems of peace, disarmament, and security in Europe.

This question is highly relevant at a time when the 40th anniversary of the victory over Hitlerite fascism is being celebrated. The common struggle of the two people's communists, democrats, and patriots in that period against the invader wove indestructible ties in the history of the two countries. Polish emigres, resistance fighters, and soldiers fought alongside French patriots for France's freedom and independence. The French and Polish Communists will never forget this chapter of history. They condemn those who, like Reagan at the Bitburg cemetery, try to rehabilitate the Hitler SS.

The two parties share the view that the decisions taken at the last Bonn summit of the seven more industrialized capitalist countries increase tension and bring about a deterioration in the international situation.

Indeed the leaders of these countries asserted their intention to call into question the political and territorial situation in Europe. They support the negative U.S. proposals at the Geneva conference. They are part of the Reagan plan to militarize space, which opens up a new spiral in the arms race. This is a serious threat to the security of peoples in Europe and in the world.

In view of the fact that the Helsinki conference's Final Act will be 10 years old in a few days' time, the PCF and PZPR confirm the validity of all the principles and decisions adopted and their relevance for security in Europe, economic and cultural cooperation, and human rights in all spheres.

The French and Polish Communists resolutely oppose the militarization of space, and advocate the balanced reduction of arms to the lowest possible level with security for all. They advocate a freeze on the deployment of all new missiles and mass destruction weapons in East and West during the Geneva negotiations, and a freeze on all research and testing with a view to the militarization of space.

The two parties made a positive assessment of the proposals for a "moratorium" made by Mikhail Gorbachev on the Soviet Union's behalf.

All these proposals are part of the search for positive solutions to [the problem of] disarmament.

The PCF and PZPR stress the need for all the different political, trade union, and religious forces which want peace and disarmament to unite.

They noted that the existing relations between France and Poland have seriously deteriorated.

They do not now correspond to the normal ties which should exist between these two European countries.

The relations between France and Poland which have been established over the centuries have proved extremely fruitful for the two peoples, the two countries, and for security and peace on our continent. It is a matter of great regret that the French Government is destroying this inestimable achievement for petty political reasons.

The French and Polish Communists are not resigned to this new state of affairs. They stress that there is potential for serious relations with mutual respect. Cooperation between France and Poland can be favorably developed in the most diverse political, economic, scientific, technical, and cultural spheres. This cooperation is an essential factor in our continent's peace and security. The two parties resolved to make every effort to strengthen relations between France and Poland.

During this visit the two parties examined the state of--and prospects for--their relations.

They reaffirmed their common concept of relations between communist parties based on the assertion of each party's opinions even if they are different or opposing, and the implementation of cooperation and mutual solidarity on the communists' main objectives with independence, mutual respect, noninterference, and strict equality of rights. The two parties agreed to develop their friendly relations, their bilateral cooperation, their joint action for peace and disarmament, and cooperation between the two countries and the two peoples for social progress, democracy, and socialism.

CSO: 3519/258

POLITICAL

FRANCE

KUWAITI PAPER VIEWS ARABIC, FUTURE ISLAMIC RADIO STATIONS

GF191538 Kuwait Al-RA'Y AL-'AMN in Arabic 18 Jul 85 p 18

[Article by Durriyah 'awni: "Free Radios: France; A Broadcasting Revolution and Cultural Ferment in France"]

[Excerpt] Paris--Europe's increasing need for self-expression and communicating with others free from state control, and the great technological development that has occurred in the audio means of expression have led to a revolution in the world of direct broadcasting in many European countries, a cultural ferment across the airwaves, and a step along the long road of dialogue among cultures.

Such a pressing need in European public opinion has led France, since the 1970s, to see the emergence of a number of pirate radios that operate outside the state's sphere of monopoly. The present French president, Francois Mitterrand, used one such radio to express his political views when he was Socialist Party leader, and his election plank included a pledge to allow private radios to operate if he was to come to power. Thus, a law in this regard was enacted in November 1981, some 6 months after the socialists came to power. For the first time the law broke the state's monopoly on the means of audio expression. Discussion of the draft law in the national assembly brought heated arguments, most of which were on the means to finance such stations and on how to prevent them from falling under the influence of another kind of monopoly, that is, the monopoly of commercial capital.

As soon as the law was enacted thousands of groups submitted applications to the Higher Authority for Audiovisual Methods [HAAM], which was charged by the government with the task of studying the applications and granting licenses for the establishment of free stations. After months of continual and lengthy discussions HAAM granted licenses for 1,000 stations operating on 900 frequencies on the FM band. Some of these stations were forced to join together and transmit on the same wavelength. According to the latest statistics there are at present 1,400 private stations in France--that is, there are about 400 stations operating without a license and liable to be closed down at any moment.

There are about 10 Arabic radios or radios beamed to immigrants, the overwhelming majority of whom are from the Arab Maghreb. One-half of these radios are operating without a license. HAAM officials say that when issuing licenses they wanted to enable all cultural, religious, linguistic, political, and musical trends to express themselves and represent a culture different from that presented by the state radio or commercial stations. Apart from the state radio there are three commercial radio stations in France.

There are religious stations: Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant. So far, there is no licensed radio that speaks for Islam despite the fact that Islam is the second religion in France after Catholicism: There are more than 2 million Muslims in France, most of them Arabs. There are several reasons for the absence of an Islamic station, the most important of which is that when HAAM began to distribute licenses there was no unified Islamic body to request a wavelength for an Islamic station. From among the scores of applications submitted by Arabs and Muslims HAAM gave preference to applications for stations that speak for immigrants in general, taking the view that such stations speak for Arabs and Muslims.

There are several unlicensed Arabic radios that speak for Islam and which are fiercely competing with each other to obtain a license in the name of Islam in France, now that HAAM is convinced of the need to allocate a wavelength for an Islamic station following numerous interventions by Arab and Muslim governments and following the dispatch of many protests and cables to the president. It clearly appears from the statements by HAAM officials that it will be Radio L'orient [Idha'at al-Sharq] that will win the license.

CSO: 4404/411

POLITICAL

FRANCE

PCF DELEGATION REPORTS ON VISIT TO NORTH KOREA

PM241353 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 20 Jul 85 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Korean Visit and Talks"]

[Text] At the invitation of the Workers Party of Korea [WPK], a PCF delegation headed by Maxime Gremetz, member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee, visited the DPRK 15 through 19 July.

The delegation visited Pyongyang, Mount (Baiklov) in the extreme north of the country, Kaesong, and Panmunjom. It was received by Kim Il-song; it had several meetings, especially with Hwang Chang-yop, WPK Central Committee secretary for international affairs, Kil Chae-Kyong, deputy director of the WPK Central Committee international section, and (Seuk Yeung Pyo), head of the Western department of the international section.

These talks enabled the delegation to familiarize itself with the WPK's activities. The French and Korean delegations also had the opportunity to exchange information on the economic, social, and political situation in the DPRK and in France. They examined international questions, especially the problems of peace and disarmament, at the international level and in Asia.

This question is highly relevant because of the implementation of the American plan to militarize space as a new stage in the arms race, and because of the strengthening, under U.S. impetus, of an aggressive regional military accord in collusion with Japan and South Korea. In fact the United States and Japan are relying on the South Korean dictatorial regime, established by Washington, to implement this strategy.

The Korean delegation reported on the WPK's efforts to develop an original and independent Korean socialism which has had important results and successes in the economic, scientific, social, and cultural spheres. North Korea is taking action in the international sphere which, as a member of the nonaligned movement, makes it rank as a progressive force serving peace and the building of a new international economic order.

The PCF delegation expressed its great concern over France's policy in the region which gives preferences to the interests of the multinationals and which, particularly in South Korea, takes advantage of the harsh conditions of

worker exploitation and systematic and bloody repression; in this way it sacrifices respect for human rights on the altar of profit and the redeployment of French capital. In making its official attitude to the DPRK dependent on the goodwill of the Seoul leadership it is abandoning any independent attitude. On the other hand the PCF thinks that, in keeping with the pledges made by the president of the republic, France--which made the recognition of states and not governments a principle of its policy--must recognize the DPRK. Such recognition would contribute to the necessary development of cooperation between France and the DPRK in the direction of mutual respect and mutual interest. It would be an act of friendship toward the whole Korean people.

The PCF delegation reaffirmed its support for the aim of Korea's independent and peaceful reunification for which the WPK recently took new initiatives. It stressed the importance of friendship and cooperation between the PCF and the WPK in the interest of the two peoples and of peace and socialism.

CSO: 3519/259

POLITICAL

GREECE

SOVIET DEFECTOR ALLEGEDLY PROVIDES TERRORIST INFORMATION

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 15 Jul 85 p 3

[Article by Alex. Velios and Mikh. Ignatios]

[Text] Soviet defector Sergei Bokhan's statements are behind Reagan's travel advisory. A few days before the [TWA] hijacking, the U.S. President had received the full report of the interrogation of the Soviet "diplomat" (who was then at the U.S. base in Wiesbaden). What he learned about Athens having become in recent years a "knot" in international terrorism was the drop that made the water in the glass run over (it is known, of course, that the Americans have been accusing the Papandreou government for some time of tolerating mainly Arab-inspired terrorism). The President's violent reaction was partially provoked by the Bokhan disclosures.

The revelations made the former first secretary of the local Russian Embassy who defected to the United States on 25 May especially focus on the subject of terrorism: As the Number 2 of the secret military service GRU (a branch of the KGB) in Athens, he was responsible for this sector in our country, and one of the competent officers for the same sector in Western Europe, He revealed that--at least in Greece--it is the GRU, and not the KGB, that is responsible for terrorism issues.

Secrets Revealed

The Soviet defector provided a great deal of data about "certain"--more details are unavailable--bombing incidents that occurred in Greece in recent years, as well as about the recent attacks against NATO targets, especially in Brussels. Moreover, he provided data on some very frequent passages (that were not monitored) of Cuban, Eastern bloc, and Arab "delegates" through Elliniko Airport... It is also said that he named some politicians, official or unofficial, whose tolerance permits such moves. In sum, he described the entire Soviet network in the field of international terrorism and arms traffic through the bridge between Europe and the Middle East that Athens has become.

Bokhan also provided very important information about the local Soviet intelligence activities (as well as disinformation through press organs). It is worth mentioning that doubts have often been expressed in

behind-the-scene diplomatic circles about the fact that NATO secret documents systematically flow from Athens to Moscow. It should be considered certain, moreover, that at least some information does not reach Greece from Brussels.

A third part of the Soviet diplomat's disclosures, in which he proved to be a rich source of information, deals with the peace movements active here in Greece and in Europe. It is reported that he described in detail how some meetings in Athens were manufactured with a Soviet "patent."

List of Names

All the information provided by the Soviet diplomat was accompanied by a long list of names that were... very easy to read. This list is considered extremely "inflammable" by the Americans and could become dynamite in the present phase of Greek-American relations.

As it is being said in Washington, Bokhan was a "gold mine" of information about Soviet activities in Greece... However, the repercussions of this "extraction" could also be unforeseen! Already, Reagan's reaction seems to have been the first explosion in what could become a chain.

Who the Defector Is

Sergei Bokhan, 44, was the second-in-command in the GRU (a secret military service somewhat akin to the U.S. DIA) in the Soviet Embassy in Athens. He came to Greece for the first time in 1974, right after the fall of the junta. At the time, he was responsible for the sector dealing with supporting the "anti-West" and "anti-American" current in our country. He returned to Moscow in 1978 and came back to Greece in 1982. His new, wider duties included, beyond the terrorism sector, also the sectors of the peace movements and the mass media. He speaks Greek fluently and was in charge of the NOVOSTI articles that were distributed to Greece newspapers for publication. He was also in charge of the disinformation sector. He defected on 25 May through the Elliniko Air Base and remained for some time in the U.S. base at Wiesbaden in Germany.

CSO: 3521/306

POLITICAL

GREECE

KKE URGED TO ACKNOWLEDGE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 9 Jul 85 p 7

[Article by "Dialeitikos": "They Awakened Too Late..."]

[Text] Only now are the two KKE's beginning to recognize Mr Papandreou's true motives! Now that the KKE (int) has been humiliated, and the KKE has been transformed from a party to a mere parliamentary group. So they are protesting now, because the prime minister has concentrated all into his hands through the governmental structure that was announced.

RIZOSPASTIS writes: "The ministerial council is being debased and degraded, it becomes an executive organ (if not a mere adornment), surrounded by other executive organs which supersede it or even replace it. The ministerial council's meetings are just ceremonial performances... Decisions are made elsewhere. Instead of decentralization, there is increasing centralization. Decisions are increasingly more distant from public control, from parliamentary control..."

Yes sir, gentlemen of the RIZOSPASTIS! This is how things are and they will become much worse. But who helped Mr Papandreou to become the absolute ruler of public life to disregard the Chamber of Deputies, and even the ministerial council? The KKE, of course, and no one else! Before Karamanlis was set aside, there was at least someone in the presidency who restrained the PASOK's hegemonic tendencies, who prevented, as much as possible, its arbitrariness, both in the domestic and the foreign sectors. And when Mr Papandreou decided to rid himself of his "tutor," it is you, the KKE, who helped him to bring the anti-Karamanlis figure into the presidency, and it is you who allowed him to abolish the famous "superpowers" of the president, only to grab them for himself. You were naive enough to think that he would obtain a small majority and that he would be compelled to cooperate with you. But you forgot something! Your common slogan "Never Again the Right" inspired fear to your followers and they voted for the PASOK. Now you will pay for that with your complete marginalization, and your only way out will be the beginning of a new struggle against a personal regime which will be much more dangerous than the 1967 dictatorship, because it will not be founded on tanks, but on the disinformation of the Greek people...

"Wake up, Mr Florakis! Get hold of yourself, Mr Florakis!" So shouts the victor on 2 June to the KKE leader. And he is right. This party contributed more than any other to its own destruction. And since I cannot believe in its naivete, I maintain the doubt that it received orders from "above" to follow the road it did. Perhaps it was not led astray as much by Mr Papandreou as by Moscow. It is not the first time, actually, that this happens... However, at present, RIZOSPASTIS expresses its bitterness in an agonizing way:

"...The shout "wake up" tore the breast of our comrades like a Venetian stiletto... According to the prime minister's wisdom, those on his left were fools. They gave everything without getting anything in return. The clever ones took everything without giving anything in return..."

But he gave you Karamanlis, gentlemen of the RIZOSPASTIS! Isn't this what you wanted? You got it. Now, enjoy a few years of Mr Papandreou's personal power. If the Right is what you say, it should be happy because you were marginalized. But the Right prefers democracy with a free communist party to a dictatorship (even with a parliamentary cover) with the KKE marginalized. If Mr Florakis had understood this, he would never have accepted to undergo the tribulations that the PASOK is reserving for him...

RIZOSPASTIS admits also that "it was through cleverness that (Mr Papandreou) remained unnoticed during the years when the people were writing history and that, years later, he came to accuse both the dead and the living of their errors." But your greatest error, dear comrades, was your vote against Karamanlis. What is the use at this time to admit that you were foolish and that Mr Papandreou was clever: are we now proceeding to the self-criticism of foolishness?

CSO: 3521/305

POLITICAL

GREECE

COLLECTIVE INDIFFERENCE, SMUGNESS OF GREEKS SCORED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 23 Jul 85 p 8

[Article by Nikos Politis: "But at the Point That We Have Reached..."]

[Excerpts] If I were asked which, in my opinion, is the most representative phrase that reveals and characterizes today's Greeks, I don't think I would have to think very hard about it, and I would have no dilemmas. On the contrary, I would answer immediately and without hesitation, that we use this phrase daily, that we utter it on a thousand and one occasions, and what is even more surprising, that we are not even aware of how much it describes us.

As has become obvious, I am referring to the phrase: "But at the point that we have reached..." This phrase is usually the conclusion after a description referring to faits accomplis, where guilt is collective, the motive is general and the responsibility is shared by all. Or, to say it another way, where collective behavior and the general stance have led us to results that are either sad, either inadmissible and sometimes catastrophic. In two words, where our dear little country's image appears disheartening and gloomy.

"But at the point that we have reached..." What merits attention in this phrase and is at the same time admirable, what deserves research by sociologists and analysis by "Hellenologists" for further proof of the uniqueness of our race, is that it is uttered as a typical ending for accepting illegality, as a recognition of arbitrariness, and even as the acceptance of amoral selfishness and unbridled egotism. That is, as a mere shrugging of the shoulders in the face of events which, however, are not fated to be, as closing of the eyes vis-a-vis situations that are in no way unavoidable. "But at the point that we have reached..." With this sentence, cunning and knavish Greeks prepare the absolution of their sins, the pardoning of their illegalities and simultaneously ready their appetites for new injustices and their road toward new slips. If I could draw them, I would show them with eyes downcast, with an absolutely humble stance, with their hands crossed on their chest as a sign of utter repentance, while at the same time the expression on their faces and the pursing of their lips would betray the lie in their promises and the hypocrisy of their artifices. "But at the point that we have reached..." I have collected some excerpts of editorials in newspapers, some letters from readers, some comments in various publications, as well as some excerpts of talks, discussions and conferences. One indeed

must admire the casuistry, the slyness and the sophistry of the people in question and of their arguments. Specifically, a recent editorial thundered against illegal construction, stigmatized the destruction of nature and the downgrading of the standard of living, but still concluded: "But at the point that we have reached, it would be silly not to acknowledge the facts..." It ended up by proposing that these buildings be made legal. Everywhere in the civilized world, when the determination would be made that things have reached a dead-end, the same phrase would be used as the beginning of an attempt to remedy the situation and as an initiative for improvements. But in our country, our vaunted Greek cleverness works in the opposite way. We use the phrase as the end of a course toward the worse and as a beginning toward the worst. Of course, the worse and the worst refer to the public interest, while we shall always come out the winners. This is what makes us different and in which we take pride. That is why the proverb "a thousand sheep can die, as long as I am all right," fully describes us.

CSO: 3521/311

POLITICAL

GREECE

BRIEFS

SOVIET WORKERS' PRESENCE--We received a telephone call from Ptolemaida:
"Doesn't Greece have an unemployment problem?" "Of course it does." "Then
how is it possible that many tens of Russian workers are working here in
Agios Dimitrios?" "We don't know. Are they perhaps special technicians?"
"No, they are just workers. And they are even driven to work in Russian
buses..." ...We shall just note that we would only have had street
demonstrations if the Russians were Westerners!... [Text] [Athens
MESIMVRINI in Greek 15 Jul 85 p 9]

CSO: 3521/304

POLITICAL

ITALY

PCI'S NAPOLITANO SEES IMPROVED POLITICAL CLIMATE

PM021101 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 27 Jun 85 p 4

[Interview with PCI directorate member Giorgio Napolitano by Mino Fuccillo in Rome; date not given]

[Excerpts] Rome--[Fuccillo] The DC has covered a great deal of ground.... You have always been one of the best advocates of voting for [President] Cossiga and have always been considered one of the least obstinate of communist leaders. Pardon me for asking, Deputy Napolitano, but what has the PCI gained from this election; what new friends has it gained and what former allies has it rediscovered?

[Napolitano] The main thing to have benefited is the democratic system and the general political climate, which we hope can be cleared. Things proceeded exceptionally straight forwardly and everyone accepted a unanimous solution. This could produce positive repercussions: It is a possibility which we shall watch out for. As far as we are concerned, we have a strategy: It is called the alternative. This strategy will be tested in the 1988 general elections. With an eye to that date we must develop a more concrete definition of our proposal in terms of government alliances. In the 3 years ahead, whether the present government survives or another one is formed, the PCI will try, from the opposition, to build the foundations of an alternative government alliance. By means of both proposals and deeds. Meanwhile the way in which the president's election took place shows how matters of an institutional nature can be resolved. It was not supposed to serve any other ends.

[Fuccillo] Perhaps it did enable the PCI to catch its breath; perhaps the grand truce attracted you following your defeats [in local elections and referendum]. What was your decision on political investment or a display of exhaustion? [PCI Secretary General] Natto observed resignedly: "Now nobody can accuse us any longer of being entrenched."

[Napolitano] I see that certain misunderstandings remain, and it would be as well to dispel them immediately. We do not intend to encourage any confusion between majority and opposition. We do not intend to abandon our right and duty to criticize and counter government orientations and conduct. Our vote for Cossiga is simply a consistent proof our determination to seek unitary

solutions on institutional matters and to shoulder our due responsibility as a major constitutional opposition party.

[Fuccillo] Deputy Napolitano, we have both been talking about the past. Is it perhaps because something has changed since Monday?

[Napolitano] Something has changed, as I have said: the climate. And there is something else that we also expect to happen--work in three directions. First, the adoption of a new course in institutional policy. Second, a more open-minded and constructive dialogue among the forces for reform, whether in government or in opposition. Last, the complete recognition of the status and potential government role of the major opposition force. On certain major topics, it is also necessary to ascertain the possibility of points of contact between the majority as a whole and the opposition.

[Fuccillo] Are these political checks that the PCI expects to cash following its vote for Cossiga?

[Napolitano] There are no checks. These are the political results that can stem from the adoption of a correct method and from the establishment of more relaxed relations among the parties.

[Fuccillo] With whom and on what can a constructive dialogue be conducted?

[Napolitano] With the other left-wing and reformist forces particularly on economic and social matters, fair taxes, employment, and the fair distribution of income. The socialists, republicans and some sectors of the DC should be particularly sensitive to these requirements.

[Fuccillo] Does this mean a new climate and different relations irrespective of what government is in charge through 1988?

[Napolitano] We will contend with this government and with any others that may follow it. We challenge orientations and methods of the present government but we are not inhibited from acknowledging positive aspects of Craxi's international action. And I take this opportunity to state that it is important now that government commit itself seriously to ensuring that the Eureka project materializes in relation to the U.S. stance on the space shield. But to return to relations with the government and the majority, it is possible to go beyond foreign policy. For instance, do they really want to conduct a dialogue with us on the problems of public finance without awaiting the fall? The loosening of the grip of the public deficit is a major national issue. Do they really want to tackle the problem of relations between government and parliament? It is not simply a matter of too many decrees. What I want to know is this: How much heed is paid to parliament in a matter such as the European Monetary System? Parliament should not discuss labor contracts but it certainly must discuss what the government holdings minister does. And we would like to ask Darida to account for his actions, for the entirely arbitrary elements that he has introduced, including very recently with his decree.

[Fuccillo] Are you saying that the PCI is willing to pursue a blanket policy, that it is abandoning the strategy of destruction?

[Napolitano] What I am saying is that it is possible to make the political interplay more constructive for the country's sake--but there must be correct rules. And they must be observed. For instance, we want to establish minimum requirements of impartiality in the public media. Would they care to explain to us, for instance, why the PCI should be excluded from bodies such as the EEC commission, while other opposition forces of other democratic countries are represented within it? In other words, we have shown what constitutional opposition means; let the others show they know how to play fair from within the majority.

CSO: 3528/85

15 August 1985

POLITICAL

ITALY

PCI'S OCCHETTO URGES IMPROVED TIES WITH PSI

PM191521 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 17 Jul 85 pp 1, 16

[PCI Secretariat member Achille Occhetto article: "Concerning PCI-PSI Relations: Well Said, Mr Ruffolo: Split on the Left Benefits on the DC"]

[Excerpts] Has the time come for the PCI and PSI to break off their duel and to ask themselves: Whom does it benefit?

The only possible answer to this question--raised with much feeling by Giorgio Ruffolo in two articles appearing in LA REPUBBLICA--is "Yes." And we answer thus with conviction because we too have often felt an imminent threat that the word "left" could be deprived of any real political significance. But also because, considering the question of whom it benefits, in our analysis of the election results we have concluded that it basically benefits the DC. But precisely because a new dialogue, rather than a "futile brandishing of banners," is needed, as Ruffolo himself suggests, before discussing the prospects there are certain points that must be made.

Let us leave recriminations aside and talk about the present. Do the formulation of a blueprint for reform, its updating, and its sharper definition necessarily require the abstract assertion of an option for or conversion to reformism? I would add at once that I ask this question in the name not of orthodoxy but of a genuine concern about the left's real ability to seize the radical novelties confronting it, which really do require a fundamental reappraisal of the traditional categories of the workers movement. For our own part, we are indeed aware--and I hope Comrade Ruffolo is aware--that there is a great deal that needs to be changed within the political culture of the left because there are major and unprecedented novelties to be tackled and mastered. In this question in unknown territory at the start of a new technological era during which profound changes will occur in the stratification of society, in relations between the various classes and sectors, and in the means of production, the chief problem, as regards method too, concerns not so much conflicting demands for conversion to specific views of the world as the real test of the confrontation with the challenge of real conditions. We need a kind of stocktaking that does not presume to deny the role of the PSI's political and cultural tradition--but not the PCI's either. Perhaps it would be more correct to talk in terms of a new phase of political and cultural investigation capable of leading both traditions to a higher level of

synthesis. Actually current transformations are creating problems for and demand a comprehensive reappraisal of the old conceptions of "revolution" and of the kind of role within it that the working class should perform. But at the same time they also pose a challenge to reformism as an ideological option, a cultural and political definition.

And it is no accident that Ruffolo himself, with intellectual honesty, poses the question of the "identity" of reformism. Indeed, what kind of relationship should exist between the reformist and the "social nucleus"? Should it relate primarily to production or to the environment, or should there be a combination of the two, or should it be of different kind altogether?

The actual decrease in the numerical size of the working class within the context of the present social complexity poses serious problems regarding Marx' conception of the revolutionary process within the framework of a radical polarization of society, but it also poses problems regarding the tradition of reformism which, failing any evidence to the contrary, has found its most solid foundations in the capitalist West in the workers movement and the big factories system. The factory worker throughout the West--including the communist worker--has always been dominated by a strong sensitivity to immediate forms. The diminution of the industrial working class does not, as some maintain, itself tell us that we are witnessing a weakening of the contradictions created by the present social system; indeed, it could open the way to a phase of even sharper conflicts possibly centering on different representatives of the same working class--especially if one considers the worsening situation regarding technological unemployment. The preeminence of the factory system was at the root of the culture of both the Second and the Third Internationals. Today we are facing a new phase which--as the productive debate within the major social democratic parties of the North shows--requires everyone to make a thorough reappraisal, starting with an analysis of the driving forces behind the process of change.

But why, within the context of this reappraisal--which we must conduct with a great sense of mutual tolerance and respect--should there not also be room for those who maintain that, while still working within the real movement of capitalist society and its contradictions, it is necessary to acknowledge the qualitative advances necessitated by that same contradictory movement and by the answers which the capitalist system fail to provide?

The very issue that has occupied Comrade Ruffolo for some time--namely, the fact that it is increasingly difficult to create additional jobs because increases in production are no longer connected to increases in employment--poses disturbing qualitative problems concerning the essence of the social order and the relationship between work and non-work.

The political and social scene is indeed increasingly complex, but at the same time it is increasingly populated by a multiplicity of agents who permeate the whole of society and who will have to be involved in a profound process of transformation extending far beyond mere "meliorism." And the radical nature [radicalita] of the situation could actually be favored by a lesser presence

of the traditional factory worker. It could even be portrayed as a radical nature no longer guided by the traditional forces of the left, unless a major change occurs in the overall political outlook of the forces of reform.

So this is the real issue facing us: Let us allow the various cultural tendencies that exist within the left--including the Catholic Left--to develop, to compete, and to compare ideas in the quest for the European Left's new frontier; let us not compress this vast latent energy within Italian society into a mold; let us free it from mutual mistrusts and subject it to the test of practice. Yes, let us proceed from platforms, not from formulas; let us proceed from reforms, not from reformism. And this, Dear Mr Ruffolo, is where our lines of argument coincide and can converge in a new and fascinating endeavor. We agree: Let us talk about "a comprehensive proposal of major reforms capable of tackling at source, rather than stemming at the surface, the major problems of the Italian Left." The list supplied by Mr Ruffolo in this connection is long and demanding. The problem for the left is how to make it a reality, the subject of real political initiatives extending beyond retrospective debate in which everyone feels obliged to defend their own stance. Do we really want to resume discussions on a specific platform of reforms? Let us do so, let us begin. Especially since I seem to perceive an innovation in Mr Ruffolo's proposal. Mr Ruffolo is no longer asking us to provide subordinate support for the government. He tends to draw a distinction between the socialists' function of guaranteeing governability (and, if forced to, to guarantee it even without the premiership and by means of abstention) from its function of initiating within the left a broader and forward looking dialogue on a blueprint of reforms. This is a specific way of proceeding from platforms. But the point is not to wait any longer for the DC to show the PSI the door. There must be no more submission to the hegemony of moderates. An attempt must therefore be made to introduce an initiative of the left and of the progressive forces as a whole.

But once again our readiness must be matched by encouraging deeds.

CSO: 3528/90

POLITICAL

ITALY

PCI THEORIST DEFENDS CRITIQUE OF PARTY STRATEGY

PM181834 Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 14 Jul 85 pp 15-16

[Nello Ajello report: "Comrades; Everything Must Be Changed"]

[Text] Rome--It is no heresy, or at least its author does not regard it as such. It is obvious, nevertheless, that Aldo Schiavone's pamphlet entitled "For a New PCI" is making it difficult for the Botteghe Oscure [address of PCI headquarters] to decide what stance to take. The 40-year-old author, a professor of ancient history, is no upstart. He is director of the Gramsci Institute, the PCI's best known cultural body. Published by Laterza, his volume seems unlikely to become a clandestine work. On the contrary, while still at the proof stage, leaks about its substance were already circulating. By then the escape route of silence was blocked. Either the party talks about it or others will, which could be worse. So it cannot be ignored. What about punishment? The time does not seem ripe for that. Should the criticisms be notes, discussed, accepted?

Obviously Aldo Schiavone is in favor of the last idea. "I realize," he said, "that I have turned down a very narrow path. But I insist that as a communist and director of the Gramsci Institute I can write a book like this and talk about it in the newspapers and in public without automatically being labeled a heretic. In fact I believe that this 'incident'--if indeed it is an incident--is good for the party."

There can be no doubt that Schiavone's initiative does constitute an incident. Rarely before has such a merciless indictment hit the PCI and its policy. From the historical compromise to the alternative and from Berlinguer to Natta, via all the middle- and high-ranking members of the communist leadership, the pamphlet spares nobody. It subjects 12 years of communist life to a severe and detailed disputation. Though expressed in a somewhat obscure scholarly Marxist style, the verdict is: Everything wrong--disastrously so.

At the beginning there was one thing that was not wrong--the idea of the historical compromise. "It was the result," Schiavone argues, "of two very strong demands emerging from communist supporters in the early seventies--for an end to the DC monopoly on government and for a modernization of the country. Since that time both these demands have been partly satisfied: The

DC's monopoly has been challenged and the country has unquestionably changed. But it is not we communists who have done all this. It has happened in a way that we did not envisage. We were working on something different. We believed that in a fortunate place called Italy the impossible was possible, namely, to establish a new kind of socialism in a single country in the West. This ambition has now be shown to be spectacularly unrealistic."

And yet to many people the historical compromise seemed like the most perfect achievement of Communist Party policy. Something with distant origins, rooted in Togliatti's "new party".... "It is true," Schiavone replied. "The historical compromise was entirely consistent with our tradition. It was a broad blueprint, a serious and flexible hypothesis. Consequently its failure is no less serious."

We started off with a quest for grand ideals and now here we are sitting on a pile of rubble: This is the basic message of the pamphlet. But what in particular failed to function in the years 1976-79, when the PCI seemed to have achieved its dream of governing? Where did the sin or the error lie? According to Schiavone, the PCI lacked the ability to link its overall strategy with specific objectives. Through very strong on ideology and convinced of the validity of their "general line," the party leaders failed to go further than theoretical pronouncements of (as Schiavone himself puts it) the "philosophy of history." As for the rest, they let it pass, putting off until a better day.

So in contact with the day-to-day practice of government the historical compromise displayed its limitations. The PCI's hegemony within this alliance with the DC proved to be a mere mirage. Consequently the PCI found itself imprisoned by its partners, who derived all the benefits of the operation.

Schiavone does not confine his criticisms to the "politicians," that is, Giorgio Napolitano or Aldo Tortorella, for instance, the most skillful authors of the PCI's connections with representatives of the cultural world. He also sets his sights on the pure intellectuals belonging to two groups which he identifies explicitly: the "pro-worker" group of Mario Tronti and Alberto Asor Rosa and the Bari group of Biagio De Giovanni and Giuseppe Vacca. They also suffered from the same contagious disease: abstractness.

At that time (the national solidarity years) the PCI reasoned in terms of broad areas. It ridiculed anyone who dared to suggest practical reforms or urged incisive action. Even those who fought for the introduction of what Berlinguer called the "elements of socialism" was liable to be accused of pursuing petty, unimportant, shortsighted parochial interests instead of concentrating on the general plan. It was a disastrous mentality.

What about now? "Now," Schiavone said, "here we are faced with an unforeseen situation. Let us consider the effects of technological evolution--what I call the 'post-mechanical' era in my book. Who forecast that? It is a new chapter in the history of capitalism that has taken us by surprise. Here is another example: Until a few years ago we continued to repeat to the DC and

the PSI: Either you govern with us or the country will go to the dogs. Instead this has not happened; history has proved us wrong. Another example? For many years we in the PCI marched behind the banner: 'Politics is beautiful,' imagining that the plethora of meetings, discussions, and debates would eventually bring us victory. So now we are finding it difficult to realize that politics has not brought us luck. What we have before us--I repeat--is a new country. In order to understand it, to 'cope with it,' our traditional culture is no longer any use."

So, Mr Schiavone, what do you propose should be done? Should [PCI Secretary General] Alessandro Natta be replaced? Should the PCI--and the whole of the "historical left--be transformed into the single party dreamed of by Amendola? Should you draw closer to the Social Democratic Parties? "I am no politician. I am a historian of the Roman world. I say this because in the past there has been too much confusion of roles between intellectuals and political leaders. But intellectuals too face a substantial task: They can attempt to discover and to convey what kind of skills are needed to govern the new society. They can help the PCI to provide itself with a new strategic outlook of government, taking account of the obstacles that any policy of reforms will encounter. It is necessary to establish objectives and to choose allies accordingly. In the event of our entering the government we must not confine ourselves to resignedly managing the existing situation, as the PSI is doing. It is necessary to reflect on what has happened in some of the major cities under our administration. In Naples, for instance. There, during a decade of left-wing administration, our inability to exploit the intellectual energies which assuredly existed there has been glaring."

In other words, everything must change. One of the things that the party must reconsider, the communist historian explained to me, is the very concept of the working class. It no longer exists in the traditional terms enshrined in Marxist texts. A system of alliances built around "that" working class would be rather pointless today.

So what about the revolution? "Let this be clear," Schiavone replied. "When Berlinguer saw himself forced to break off the policy of the historical compromise, at that very moment he abandoned the idea of the revolution in the West. That farewell to the revolution is a permanent factor, not a temporary one." Will it be easy to convince communist supporters of this? "By no means. But without this conviction there is no future for the PCI."

CSO: 3528/89

POLITICAL

ITALY

PCI'S ANDRIANI ON 'SHORTCOMINGS' OF HISTORICAL COMPROMISE

PM230702 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 18 Jul 85 pp 1, 16

[PCI Central Committee member Silvano Andriani article: "Let Us Take Stock of the Past 10 Years"]

[Text] I am convinced that an early congress must serve to bring about certain changes, on the basis of a stocktaking of the past decade. Some 10 years ago we represented 35 percent of the electorate and our political influence was enough to force the DC to form a majority with us and to permit the establishment of left-wing councils even where left-wing majorities did not exist. Now the situation is very different. And it is not just a loss of electoral support but above all a loss of power, in terms of the ability to represent and manage real processes, strengthening our own establishment in society and the institutions. The trade unions' power has been reduced by the crisis in the trade union movement; there has been a crisis of regional and municipal government and in the experience of left-wing councils; even the functions of parliament have been limited; and the media system has changed profoundly and our representation in it is smaller. It seems to me that our main problem is to seek to understand why all this has happened and to equip ourselves to provide an adequate answer to it.

In the early seventies we extensively represented that which was changing in Italy.

I do not believe that our electoral support was the result of capricious fluctuations connected with the defense of individual interests. We proposed certain key ideas to the major movement of that time. Eurocommunism, which was above all the only decent foreign policy proposal made in Italy in the past 20 years. The political reform to be carried out by means of a strategy of institutional decentralization. The creation of the welfare state. A trade union movement based on local councils. The question of ethics. These substantive issues were later joined by the attempt to alter the state's decisionmaking procedures by means of a series of "planning laws." The combination of these ideas did not yet constitute a consistent platform: There was still a tension between the strategy of decentralization and the persistence of our old ideas of centralization. Be that as it may, those ideas brought us closer to the European Social Democratic and Socialist forces' experiences. But we brought our own contribution to that rapprochement. In foreign policy

our new Atlantic stance was accompanied by the proposal of a role for Europe and the left-wing forces extending far beyond the traditional Social Democratic conformity with Atlanticism and which was linked specifically with the swing taken by the SPD with the Ostpolitik. We were late arrivals with regard to the creation of the welfare state, but our experiences in Emilia and Tuscany and situations characterized by the expansion of systems of widespread enterprise tested out new and more flexible procedures of social integration and political intervention which to some extent transcended the rigidity of the models of mass-production society. These are just some examples. But I believe the factor of greatest "diversity" with respect to other European experiences lay in the political solution envisaged in the historical compromise. And it seems to me that, while emphasizing an Italian "diversity" and the need for a process of transformation which remained largely undefined, it partly diminished and rendered ambiguous the value of the ideas on which we were specifically working.

What went wrong with all this, leaving aside what we can blame on others?

I believe there were intrinsic shortcomings in our proposal, which became compounded by a profound change in the situation, which made it partly irrelevant. The intrinsic shortcoming was the failure to propose a line of reform that would make it possible to transform the increased participation into increased real power. This problem raises that of relations between the bodies that represent the people and the structures of government and management, but it also involves the issue of the formation of majorities and of platforms in a situation like Italy's, where the citizen has largely been deprived of the ability to vote for a specific majority and platform as well as for a party. In my opinion the proposed political solution was a shortcoming. The experience of the Center-Left had already shown that reforms cannot be carried out without a government and a bloc in favor of reform. The "national solidarity" government showed that a 90-percent party majority including the DC and PCI does not possess the strong decisionmaking capacity that a strategy of reform necessarily implies. On the other hand it is true that a majority for reform that gained little more than 51 percent of the vote would inevitably have to try to involve Catholic and non-Catholic forces in the process of reform, and it is true that the specific creation of the conditions for rotation in government implies a regeneration of all the political forces and the definition of new ground rules regulating relations among all the parties, especially between the PCI and the DC.

The advance of the crisis radically altered the context within which our proposals came about. We talked about a welfare state and then found ourselves handling a crisis of the welfare state, while economic development ceased to be a certainty and became a problem. The priority long given to the interpretation of the crisis in terms of stagnation did not improve our ability to respond and to recognize and represent innovation; and in this context it really does remain to be seen who can lay the first brick.

Technological innovation, rising unemployment, and a falling growth rate; economic growth and the destruction of the environment; and the exacerbation

of imbalances on the world and national scale: These are the characteristics of the present crisis, which the neo-derestrictive response is exacerbating but which can cause conflicts between the potential components of the bloc for reform. I believe that for the Left it is a matter neither of simply brandishing the banner of innovation nor of allowing itself to be persuaded by zero development hypotheses but of giving meaning to the present technological and organizational revolution by specifically redefining the objective of full employment and social policies and restoring a specific meaning to words such as "participation" and "solidarity." This, and no other, seems to me the decisive issue of our platform: To impart an identity of reform to the party and to the Left by attempting to define specifically what kind of society and political system we propose for the Italy of the years ahead. And it seems to me that relations with the movements with the other political forces can thus be built within a context that is not solely tactical, though this dimension does exist and is important.

With regard to these topics, I believe that the question whether we are willing to manage the capitalist system seems obsolete to me. Above all it presupposes a judgment on the social democratic experience similar to that which we issued in the fifties. But if the welfare state led to the political management--that is, divorced from the market--of over half the national product, this means that the system was already to some extent transformed. Now that experience is partly in a state of crisis, and it is necessary to find a new relationship between state and market, to define a new social commitment that will make possible a further transformation of the system in line with the needs of the labor world. This seems to me the valid nub of the historical compromise proposal.

The above-mentioned issues concern the whole of the European Left. But there are also specific problems and lags of our own--a lag compared to the capacity for response which at other times--in 1954 and 1956 for instance--we ourselves displayed in connection with the crises of the trade union movement and of de-Stalinization, demonstrating our ability rapidly to renew our policy line and leadership groups.

This brings us to the question of the party itself and necessarily to the issue of its internal democracy. I do not believe it is a matter of demanding the rights to freedom of speech or to dissent, which already exist. It is a matter of deciding whether our decision making processes are based on an exchange of information from the bottom up and vice versa, which permits the comparison of different viewpoints and experiences as an essential factor inherent to the making of correct and efficacious decisions. And since we have frequently considered this issue--in Central Committee sessions devoted to the party and its relations with culture and at the last congress--and have also established rules to facilitate democratic decisions and since these have not been adequately implemented, the need now is not to repeat that there must be more democracy but to ask ourselves why we have not succeeded in implementing the good rules which we unanimously laid down. In view of this question I do not believe the issue can be reduced to the level of a "yes or no" to democratic centralism, that is, to factions. The ban on factions has

over the course of time characterized such different entities as the Bolshevik party, the SPD, Togliatti's "new" party... I believe it would be much more fruitful to adopt an approach of analyzing specifically what our party has now become, what cultural and institutional bottlenecks are preventing the multiplicity of opinions, situations, and experiences represented within it from expressing themselves in the decisionmaking processes and in the formation of the leadership groups. To ask ourselves whether we are not in the presence of several organizational models whose coexistence threatens to paralyze us.

The reform of the party of reform could--together with the idea of our platform--be one of the objectives of the next congress. And how could we ever believe, in a situation that is changing and that we wish would change more profoundly, that only the party of reform must remain unchanged?

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POLITICAL

NORWAY

SOVIET APOLOGY FOR CABLE CUTTING INCIDENT ANALYZED

Apology Accepted, Explanation Doubted

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 20 Jul 85 p 7

[Article by Morten Fyhn: "Norway Accepts but Doubts Cable Explanation"]

[Text] Norwegian authorities are very skeptical concerning the truth of the official Soviet explanation for the cable cutting incident in the Barents Sea. But since one had not expected a Soviet admission that the cutting occurred willfully, and because one is satisfied with the fact that Moscow has apologized, the matter is considered closed.

There is satisfaction within the Foreign Department with the manner in which the case was handled on the Norwegian side. The "crisis plan" which was followed worked as it should have. If Moscow had not sent its regrets, we were prepared for the fact that serious consequences would result regarding the relationship between Norway and the Soviet Union. This was made very clear to the Russians in connection with the presentation of Norway's protest.

Despite the fact that Norway has not received a credible explanation from the Soviets, as Anders C. Sjaastad, who was acting foreign minister a week ago, stated it officially, the Foreign Department is very satisfied that the matter was resolved in the manner in which it was. Many sources have emphasized to AFTENPOSTEN that permanent secretary Torbjorn Froysnes clearly asserted to the Soviet charge d'affaires Alexandr Smirnov on Thursday that there were different opinions on the Norwegian and Soviet sides regarding the actual course of events in the Barents Sea a week ago.

In ordinary language, this means that Norway officially has acknowledged that it does not believe the Soviet version that the cable to "Malene Ostervold" was cut accidentally by a Soviet ship. This is a notation from the Norwegian side, it is asserted, in addition to the assurance that from the Norwegian perspective, the matter is closed.

There are several elements which according to the Norwegian authorities clearly and unambiguously show that the cable was cut intentionally. First and foremost, from the Norwegian side, it is pointed out how the Soviet ship maneuvered in to "Malene Ostervold" and the buoy which marks the cable. This maneuvering, according to the Norwegians, could not have been unintentional. In addition, one is reminded that the frigate remained by "Malene Ostervold"

for 40 minutes, that a signal was sent from up the Norwegian ship, and that it hardly is believable that it should have been impossible to contact the frigate by radio.

All of this resulted in the Norwegians believing that they had a solid basis for acting in an official and clear and unambiguous manner toward the Soviet Union. As concerns the supposed radio failure on board the Soviet ship, the Defense Supreme Command advises that there normally are no difficulties in communicating with Soviet ships. The Foreign Ministry has taken the matter up with both the Norwegian trades authorities and with the Russians with a view toward preventing repetitions of the supposed communication failure at sea. It also was made clear to the Soviet charge d'affaires that Norway looks with skepticism and alarm at the failure on board the Soviet ship.

"Malene Ostervold" attempted to make contact with the frigate over the international calling- and receiving-frequency on VHF 16. Even though it is not required that ships also listen to this channel, it is very normal to do so.

Despite the fact that it is summer vacation time with many key personnel away, the Foreign Department believes that it is possible to state that there were no problems. To the contrary, it is maintained that the case was handled very thoroughly and properly.

At 8:30 in the morning on Thursday of last week, the Foreign Department was advised concerning what had occurred in the Barents Sea during the course of the night. A special committee of civil servants organized for handling unexpected situations was summoned, and the government was thoroughly briefed at 11:30. A couple of hours later, Smirnov was summoned in order to present the protest. Within the Foreign Department, analyses were made of the international legal and political aspects of the case, which analyses were completed the same day. Thereafter, a "script" was worked out for the future, and that required, among other things, that a Soviet response be made within one week, which also happened.

But with the exception of the debate concerning minister Kare Kristiansen's statement about a possible extraordinary government conference concerning the affair, the Foreign Department believes that the summer's little crisis was handled in a very successful way.

Firm Asking Damages Paid

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 20 July 85 p 7

[Article by Morten Woldsdal: "Geco Demand for Two Million Kroner for Cable Episode in Barents Sea"]

[Text] Geophysical Company of Norway (Geco) will demand nearly two million kroner in compensation from the Soviet authorities following the cable episode in the Barents Sea. The compensation demand will be forwarded through the Foreign Department, probably next Monday.

15 August 1985

The compensation is to cover the loss of the 1,300 meter long towing cable which the exploration ship "Malene Ostervold" had cut by a Soviet frigate in the Barents Sea during the night of 11 July. During the discussion on Thursday between permanent secretary Torbjorn Froysnes and the Soviet charge d'affaires in Oslo, Alexandr Smirnov, the matter was reserved on the part of the Norwegians whether a possible demand for compensation would be made. After Geco has presented its bill to the Russians via the Foreign Department, the Foreign Department will, according to AFTENPOSTEN'S understanding, take the matter up with the Soviet authorities. Since the Soviets have expressed their regrets for the cable cutting, it is assumed on the Norwegian side that the Russians also naturally will pay for the damage without protest.

Attorney Halvor Bjerke from Geco advises AFTENPOSTEN that the company now is working on the formation of the compensation demand. "It will be just under 2 million kroner, and that will cover our total loss from the cable cutting," Bjerke says.

According to him, Geco will discuss the details of the demand more thoroughly with the Foreign Department. "We are aiming at forwarding the demand through the department on Monday," he states.

Bjerke does not wish to speculate over how the Soviet authorities will react to the demand for compensation. "We assume that it is unlikely that the episode will repeat itself," he says.

The cut cable is not viewed as being particularly advanced. The cable is made such that the majority of the necessary electronics are located on board the mother ship--in this instance, "Malene Ostervold." In more advanced towing cables for seismologic exploration, much more of the advanced electronics are placed in the cable itself. Such a cable would have been much more valuable--both technologically and economically.

Apology Seen as 'Promise'

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 20 Jul 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Acceptable Apology"]

[Text] The Soviet explanation for the cable cutting in the Barents Sea is not generally believable. An admission that the cable of "Malene Ostervold" was cut knowingly and willingly also was not reasonable to expect from our neighbor to the east. Permanent secretary Torbjorn Froysnes has made clear to Moscow that there are different opinions on the Norwegian and Soviet sides concerning what in fact happened. One will not come any closer to an official admission--at any rate, not in the language of diplomacy--that it is not believable when the episode is presented as an accident which easily could have occurred. Considering that a Soviet apology has been made, there is nonetheless no reason to pursue that aspect of the case. This is all the more so since the present admission also must be interpreted as a promise that there will not be a repetition. It also must be very clear that we cannot find ourselves in a repeat situation.

In addition, Norway is in the unique position of having received two official apologies during the course of seven months. The first time that occurred was, as is known, after a Soviet cruise missile went off course over Norwegian and Finnish territory. It is partly the new tones from Moscow, where it is not the practice to make apologies if they are not warranted.

We see no purpose in speculating over the background for the new tone. But it is worth noting that the Soviet authorities on both occasions have found it necessary to apologize in order to avoid a worsening of the relationship between our two countries. It is very clear that the Norwegian government has demanded an unconditional apology. It is equally clear that the episode otherwise would have had very serious consequences for the relationship between our two countries.

It is the results which count, and the Foreign Department has every reason to be satisfied with the manner in which the issue was handled on the Norwegian side. We should not linger over this incident by reason of the minor stir which was caused last week by acting prime minister Kare Kristiansen's impatience. All parties are best served by us putting this incident behind us.

For the Norwegian part, we obviously have made reservations that the injured party, Geophysical Company of Norway, possibly will make a demand for compensation. According to our understanding, the Foreign Department will take this aspect of the case up with the Soviet authorities as soon as Geco has presented its bill. Considering that the Soviets already have accepted responsibility and transmitted their official regrets, there also can be no doubt about liability for compensation.

This matter ought to be able to be resolved in a business-like manner, without political overtones. At the political level, it is in neither the Norwegian nor the Soviet interest to become further involved. Norway made a demand and received an apology. Without fear of similar episodes, Geco should reasonably be able to continue its activity in the Barents Sea.

In this manner, we can calmly count on Moscow knowing what is in the Soviet's interest. Our neighbor to the east obviously wants the best possible cooperation with Norway as concerns future oil activity. The super power has various things to acquire from a technological point of view through a closer cooperation with Norway. Our pioneer efforts farther south have made us an interesting partner in this regard. Irrespective of what in fact occurred in the Barents Sea a week ago, the delayed apology confirms that Moscow felt the need to bring an end to the matter. From the Norwegian viewpoint, there was every reason to protest in clear terms, but we have no reason to find ourselves dissatisfied with the final result.

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CSO: 3639/143

POLITICAL

NORWAY

BUFFER ZONE FOR FLIGHTS NEAR SOVIET BORDER PROPOSED

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 20 Jul 85 p 8

[Article by Hakon Leitvik: "Ban Proposed on Flights to Soviet Border"]

[Text] Consideration for the Soviet Union has forced the airline company Norving A/S in Kirkenes to keep from between three and five kilometers away from the Norwegian-Soviet border on its charter flights with tourists. The reason is that Norway's border commissioner for the Norwegian-Soviet border believes that flights close up to the border may irritate the Russians and because there can be a danger for unintentional border violations. He recommends a five kilometer security zone in the air around the border.

"We share the border commissioner's fear," states acting press spokesman Jon Ramberg of the Foreign Department.

The move by the border commissioner comes as a surprise. Norving has flown in this area for 25 years without problems, May Britt Hauffen, the secretary of the board of Norving A/S told AFTENPOSTEN.

Norving wants to show tourists and local people Ost-Finnmark and the Norwegian-Soviet border during 20-minute flights. There is room for seven passengers on each flight, and the first tour was arranged for last Monday. A flight into the area also is planned for next week.

The border commissioner, Colonel Inge A. Torhaug, told AFTENPOSTEN that he gave an order to the airline to change its routes because it was going to fly close up to the border. It is not in Norwegian interests for this to occur. "We do not know how the Russians would interpret such activity. The possibility for navigational errors can also cause a danger since it is not always easy to see where the border is," says border commissioner Torhaug.

Torhaug says that he now will propose to the legal authorities that they evaluate a five-kilometer zone being closed to ordinary flight traffic. He believes nonetheless that an exception should be made for necessary commercial flights in the border area.

[Question] "Would such a zone not be an unnecessary concession to the Soviet Union?"

[Answer] "It is correct that Norway must assert its sovereignty on land, at sea, and in the air. And we are doing this today. Among other things, military helicopters fly daily all the way up to the border in connection with our border stations. It is something completely different to fly with tourists in the same place," the border commissioner states.

Board secretary May Britt Hauffen says that Norving proposed a compromise which in essence was to keep the planes on the west side of national highway 858 between Kirkenes and Nyrud at the top of Pasvik Valley, in order to be able to commence making its offer to the tourists.

The Foreign Department has given the border commissioner support in his evaluation of the matter, and believes that flying activity up close to the border may be in conflict with the treaty of 1949 which governs the situation near the border. The department assumes that flights can be restricted legally by the prohibition against irritating expressions and dealings toward the other side.

The Norwegian authorities have not been contacted by the Soviet Union, nor have they made any overtures in the opposite direction concerning the matter.

Chief flight leader Knut Kristoffersen at the Kirkenes control tower tells AFTENPOSTEN that no navigational errors of significance have been reported and that flights up to the border are made only in clear weather. Unknown fliers also are cautioned by the control tower to exercise caution near the border.

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POLITICAL

NORWAY

NONSOCIALIST PARTY LEADERS DISCUSS ELECTION PLATFORMS

Willoch Gives Welfare State Views

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 15 Jul 85 p 3

[Article by Alf B. Godager]

[Text] "Assertions that the welfare state is in danger are totally unfounded," Prime Minister Kare Willoch told AFTENPOSTEN. "It will be expanded in the future," he added. He pointed to the government's long-range program which shows that appropriations for health services and care for the elderly will continue to rise more rapidly than the average rate for public budget items. "Along with an active effort to make things more efficient, this will allow for a better offering of services," the prime minister said.

Willoch feels there is a special need to improve the situation for older nursing-home patients, the mentally impaired, the physically handicapped, psychiatric patients and primary health services generally. Continued growth is needed in the municipal health care system in order to strengthen preventive efforts, not to make use of the supply of new doctors that will become available in the future. The prime minister added that there is a clear need to have more people treated by the hospitals. To achieve greater fairness it is necessary to continue to try to reduce geographic and social differences in the availability of health care.

Too Strong

"The previous government's long-range program, which covers this 4-year period, said that 'it can be good health policy to keep health costs down in order to finance measures outside the health sector that are more important as far as health and living standards are concerned.'

"The wording is a little too strong. But economic limits will always put a ceiling on what health services can be provided for the funds available. The health system has now become so large with over 140,000 full-time workers and a budget of close to 30 billion kroner that it must be constantly adapted to the general economic growth.

"Reality imposes limits. One must choose between two main lines. Either well-considered growth that is good but still limited or stronger growth in kroner that are less valuable. I am afraid that the health system will be unable to do its job in either case unless at the same time we place more emphasis on a better utilization of the money that is spent. Experience shows that there is unfortunately no direct connection between increased funding and real improvements in the health system. Most of the increased funding in the 1970's was spent on other things, not on improved care."

Waiting Periods

Willoch reminded us that it was first in his government period that proper figures were provided on waiting periods for hospital treatment. Therefore we do not know if the waiting lines are growing or decreasing compared to the situation a few years ago.

"But we do know that there is a steady increase in the availability of treatment. And that has led a growing number of people to seek treatment for their ailments. This also involves illnesses that used to be regarded as incurable. Heart surgery and orthopedic surgery are two areas where new medical breakthroughs have created new demand, which means more people waiting for treatment," said the prime minister.

He added that it is of more interest to evaluate the length of the waiting period than the number of people who are standing in line. In this context it is interesting to note that several hospitals have reported improvements in capacity and reductions in waiting periods. Based on experiences with the so-called Action Waiting List, there is reason to point out that efficiency in the health sector is increasing.

Increased Efficiency

"In the period 1980-83 the number of patients treated per bed in somatic, i.e. regular hospitals rose 2.8 percent per year. This is a remarkable result since we must assume that the effort per patient has increased. This is partly due to the fact that we now treat many more people outside the hospitals, which means that the average patient admitted has more serious problems than used to be the case," the prime minister said.

He added that those who work in the health sector have reason to be proud of the results that have been achieved but that even more can be done. In this context it is interesting to look more closely at the obvious difference in medical practice on the part of different hospitals and institutions. There are many examples of an identical illness being treated quite differently by different hospitals. Health care institutions still have a lot to learn from each other when it comes to efficient operation.

Better Management

The prime minister added that there is a clear need for better management in this area of society, as there is in others, and said that the big

differences in competence, background and attitude among employees complicate the job of management. It is important to provide improved supplementary education for people in the field of health management, which the Doctors' Association is now addressing actively.

Financing System

Many people have complained about the hospital financing system, saying that it tempts counties to try to prevent patients from being admitted to hospitals owned by the national government or other counties.

"It does seem that the concepts of 'financing limits' and 'guest patient settlements' arouse aggression in some people. I agree that the system has had unfortunate effects when it comes to patient distribution. That is also the reason why the government proposed changes this spring that storing supports. Among other things we will subsidize stays in hospitals that are not owned by the patient's home county and we think this will eventually have a clearly positive effect."

State as Sole Owner

Would the solution be to have the state take over as owner of all public hospitals?

"I have serious objections to that. The state can hardly make a fair analysis of all the local demands that are made. The demands can also easily become unrealistic if local politicians do not have the economic responsibility for running hospitals. But it might be an idea to consider a combination of paying block grants to the counties and some payments from social security funds for hospital services that have been provided. This might stimulate the greatest possible level of service at the hospitals and at the same time make it less tempting to oppose the exchange of patients across county lines. I would like to stress that the improvements in guest patient settlements that have been made were not intended to be a final solution of the problem. But we hope that they will lead to a better flow in the stream of guest patients and stimulate rational operation to a greater extent than in the past."

Center Party Economic Planks

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 9 Jul 85 p 3

[Article by Alf B. Godager]

[Text] Around 7 percent of the votes and 12-14 seats are the goals the Center Party has set for itself in this year's election campaign. Party leaders believe they can retain all their present seats. They also think there is a good chance of making gains in counties like Akershus, Oppland,

Vest-Agder and Troms. The Center Party issued a political analysis yesterday which the leaders believe provides a basis for the desirability of 4 more years in a coalition government.

As expected the analysis was saturated with district policy problems but party chairman Johan J. Jakobsen is still unwilling to concede that progress in the area of district policy is the most important thing for the Center Party. He stressed instead the economic policy that the Willoch government has pursued which he felt forms a basis for improvement in local districts as well.

The political analysis stressed what has been achieved in such diverse areas as moderated price increases, increased employment, a greater emphasis on local districts, new benefits for agriculture, resource and environmental policy, more road construction, new and cheaper telecommunications services, research and education, culture, measures that benefit families with children, expansion of the primary health care system and increased municipal autonomy. Plus the Norwegian slant on oil policy and the use of tax policy to improve the finances of families with children and to strengthen the private business sector.

In this year's election campaign the Center Party will place special emphasis on these things:

Full employment and jobs in the areas where people live.

A family policy with caretaker wages for those who take care of the sick, the elderly and the handicapped.

A better physical environment and a campaign against pollution.

Culture with an emphasis on thriving local communities, artistic experiences and individual participation.

A growth of at least 30,000 new jobs in the private business sector over the next 4 years.

Party leaders rejected a demand from Center Youth chairman Steinar Ness that Kare Kristiansen be removed from the Oil and Energy Ministry, but they made it clear that this is a ministry the Center Party would like to have. The party leaders did not wish to discuss at this time how the government might be reshuffled after the election but they emphasized that it would be natural to consider this if the election results warrant any changes.

"The government has nothing to fear if the Labor Party decides to make Arne Treholt's acceptance at the Defense Academy a central campaign issue and there are several indications that this is what the opposition wants to do," said Johan J. Jakobsen.

Paper on Center's Platform

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 10 Jul 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Economic Recovery"]

[Text] In presenting the Center Party's campaign plan Johan J. Jakobsen stressed the Willoch government's economic policy as the basis for the economic recovery we are now seeing around the country. The party chairman is making a very important point here. We have begun to note that Norway is on the right course within most of the so-called problem areas and the reason is that the current government has started to straighten out the Norwegian economy. And let us not forget that this is due to a consistent and deliberate policy that the opposition has tried to combat throughout the current election period.

From the very beginning the Willoch government has stressed getting price and cost increases under control. While prices were increasing at a rate of around 15 percent in 1981 the rate is now down to 5-6 percent--a result that most people will undoubtedly admit is quite impressive. This has by no means been a simple political process. As we know the tight fiscal policy the Conservative government tried to implement was never received with great enthusiasm by the nonsocialist support parties--to put it mildly. Even so it was this policy of austerity combined with the necessary tax relief measures and other stimulating steps that gradually restored a better balance to the economy and laid the foundation for the prosperity we are now enjoying.

For a long time Johan J. Jakobsen has been making it very clear on behalf of his party that the fight against inflation is a major issue, for unless we have control over prices and costs it will be impossible to deal with a number of the social problems confronting us. Now we are definitely heading in the right direction and of course we have no objection to the Center Party, which has been part of the nonsocialist coalition government since 1983, taking the credit for its own policy.

The political analysis that the Center Party presented at a press conference on Monday pointed out that the government has provided "moderate" tax relief to insure real wage trends without excessive and inflationary wage increases. To say it even more clearly, perhaps more than anything else these tax breaks which the Center Party and Christian People's Party went along with somewhat halfheartedly have contributed to a moderation of price and cost growth and thus to the improvement in competitiveness that is of vital importance for our national welfare.

Against this background some people will probably be a little surprised that the Center Party--and the Christian People's Party too, for that matter--is cool to the idea that the Willoch government favors new real tax relief measures in the next Storting period. With respect to their own credibility these parties should consider the effect of their dualism on

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this point. They cannot at one and the same time oppose tax breaks and take credit for them in their political balance sheets.

Progressives' Chairman on Campaign

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 13 Jul 85 p 3

[Article by Morten Malmo]

[Text] "We have not been skillful enough ourselves, the mass media have not shown much interest in us and Conservative chairman Erling Norvik has issued propaganda on 'our' issues!" In the opinion of Progressive Party chairman Carl I. Hagen those are the main reasons for the downward slide of the Progressive Party in the polls. But he is counting on success in the election. "NRK [Norwegian Broadcasting System] TV broadcasts and a broad-based election campaign will take care of that, but we have no 'rabbits' hidden in our hats," said Hagen.

The Progressive Party chairman is now vacationing at the family's cottage in Skjellvika, one of the bathing beaches outside Sandefjord. The vacation is being combined with the campaign on the deck of the cabin cruiser "FRP [Progressive Party] Vippen." The fact that the Progressive Party has slipped from 6.1 percent in April to 3.3 percent in June in the opinion polls conducted by Gallup/NOI [Norwegian Opinion Institute]/AFTENPOSTEN has not dampened Hagen's enjoyment of his vacation. He simply does not believe that the June poll figures are an indication of the election outcome.

Then what has happened? Has the Progressive Party become tamer? Isn't it working hard enough? Is support for the Progressive Party declining because there is now a choice between two clear and well-established government alternatives? Hagen philosophized on these questions over a cigarette and a cup of coffee on his vacation veranda.

Norvik Stealing Issues

"It is easy to admit that we have not been skillful enough at etching our profile. And media interest in us has been low. The things we have done have not produced much media coverage. In addition the Conservatives are now confronting us in a new way. It looks as if Conservative chairman Erling Norvik has been instructed to win back the voters the Conservatives have lost to the Progressive Party.

"It looks as if Erling Norvik has collected all the speeches I made in Storting in the past year and now he is using their contents to promote the Conservative cause. Just look at what Norvik is talking about, namely that it should be easier to build summer houses, that there is too much bureaucracy, that politicians should have less power and that 18-year olds should be able to buy alcohol openly, that the horsepower tax on boat engines should be eliminated and that it should be easier to establish new businesses."

Could Norvik manage to make the Progressive Party superfluous?

"No! What the voters should note is that the Conservatives pursue this line in the campaign. But the Conservatives do not vote the same way in Storting as Norvik talks in the campaign. The fact that the Conservatives have not given their support to many of our proposals proves this. Therefore only the presence of a Progressive Party that is as large as possible will force the government to take the correct positions. In other words, it is a positive sign that the Conservatives are adopting our standpoints, but the voters should remember that the only time the Conservatives do that is during an election campaign!"

Can the Progressive Party win votes by spreading discontent and painting a bleak picture of things, as the Labor Party is doing?

"No, I don't think so. It is true that things are going better for Norway. We think things should get even better. This is possible if instead of just making 'cosmetic' changes in policy the government starts a true desocialization of Norway. People think things are better even though the actual changes are not that great. So it wouldn't do any good to bank on discontent as the Labor Party is doing.

"People want an 'affirmative' society. They want to eliminate the barriers to establishing businesses and a myriad of concession regulations. People want less bureaucracy and lower taxes- We have always said this and in Storting we have also voted for big changes."

Heloe and Sjaastad

There are two current cabinet members Hagen would like to get rid of. One is Social Affairs Minister Leif Arne Heloe because--in Hagen's eyes--Heloe is just a Social Democrat who has practically copied Labor Party policy and because Heloe has not had a positive view of private medical centers and private hospitals. The other is Defense Minister Anders C. Sjaastad, who has not been forceful enough in Hagen's opinion. "For example a third of our F-16 planes are grounded because of the pilot shortage and the army does not have enough small arms. All Sjaastad has come up with is 'sermons,'" Hagen said.

On Monday, 2 September, Carl I. Hagen will be interviewed on TV. His behavior and replies will determine the election outcome for the Progressive Party. He admits that the "Election Review" coverage of other FRP candidates and the interview program will mean a lot. Hagen would like to "tip the balance." Today the Progressive Party has four representatives in Storting. After the election Hagen thinks there will be eight, but he is hoping for 10 and dreaming of 15.

"In the last three elections I have been right!" Hagen said.

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CSO: 3639/141

POLITICAL

NORWAY

NON-SOCIALIST PARTIES MAINTAINING LEAD AS CAMPAIGN NEARS END

Polis, Studies Confirm Trend

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 13 Jul 85 p 3

[Article by Bjorn Talen: "Government Safe--On Paper"]

[Text] The government is sitting safely--on paper. This is shown by all analyses and Gallup materials. But obviously, the voters can begin to stir while the polltakers are on vacation from now until the end of August. And with ever-increasing numbers of shifting voter groups which allow themselves to be influenced by the election campaign, it is only the very fewest within the government quarters who dare to claim victory in advance.

Willoch & Co. have the odds with them. A calculation which AFTENPOSTEN has made shows that the three opposition parties will not receive more than 72 of the 157 parliamentary mandates. The governing coalition will come out with 81 mandates (an increase of two), and will be able to continue to govern the country without assistance from the Progress Party, which cannot be counted on for more than the current four representatives.

Five-six of these mandates held by the government certainly are hanging by a thin thread, according to the calculations. But if the opposition should get wind in its sails, the possible victories will hardly be sufficient to return Gro Harlem Brundtland to power again. The difference presumably will be only that the advance for the left wing will result in the Progress Party needing to be included in a governing parliamentary majority.

Clear Trend

Professor Henry Valen nonetheless believes that the election continues to be wide open. But other election experts with whom AFTENPOSTEN has spoken believe that the way is open for a renewed contract for a three-party government even though nothing has been decided in advance. "I am surprised by Valen's statements that it is the most open election since the war," states Helge Seip. "There rarely has been such a clear trend. Not only is the non-socialist side leading in percentage support, but the chances for mandates are increasing in its favor," Seip believes.

Thor Bjarne Bore, the editor of STAVANGER AFTENBLAD, believes that Willoch will return. He emphasizes that the figure for uncertain voters is high and that party loyalty is declining. But the voters probably will give the non-socialist parties another chance. Many believe that four years is too short a time to really show what one is able to do, he says. Erik Dalen of the Marketing and Media Institute also believes that things are moving toward a renewed governing contract. He points out that this development goes against the trend in most other Western European countries where by and large the voters are turning against the governments.

Negative Effect

The experts assert that the government has not suffered any great losses and that the Labor Party is not thought to have found any particularly good issues. This has such a negative effect that the people are unable to recognize the issues. Health and social policies are the opposition's best card, but Erik Dalen believes that the debate is drowning in the numbers war to such a great extent that the voters are unable to develop confidence in any of the parties. And with the economic development being as good as it is at the moment, it also is not easy for the Labor Party to win with the slogan "New Growth for Norway."

"The political difference between the governing alternatives is so slight in Norway that the parties must exaggerate in order to distinguish themselves," states Bore, who also believes that the Conservatives exaggerate the dark colors of the opponents.

Forward and Backward for Parties

/Socialist Left Party/: The Gallup figures suggest stable support around 6 percent--that is, one percent higher than in 1981. But because of the election rules, this will produce no results other than a victory in Akershus and possibly in Hedmark. 5 mandates (+1).

/Labor Party/: Probably somewhat under-evaluated in the polls by reason of the weighting methods. Professor Henry Valen believes in a certain advance for the Labor Party, but even a result above the 40 percent figure hardly will result in governing power. The current level is around 38 percent, that is, in between the 1981 result of 37.2 percent and the district election in 1983 with 38.9 percent. Estimated mandates: 66--the same as today. The advance will not show any results in the number of mandates because of multi-party ballot groupings.

/Liberal Party/: The Gallup figures swing up and down, but the results probably will be about the same as in 1981 (3.9 percent). Nonetheless, this may result in no mandates. Both Hordaland and particularly More and Romsdal can show losses, while there may be increases in many areas in Nordland. It is not /completely/ unthinkable that party chairman Dorum will win the seat from Oslo. The course of the election campaign previously has meant much for the Liberal Party and likely will do so again. Estimated mandate: 1 (-1).


/Center Party/: Has been in steady decline since 1973 and presumably will end up with about 6 percent, which, in combination with election technicalities presumably will result in 13 mandates. The multi-party ballot groupings have a multiplying effect, Thor Bjarne Bore believes, and Valen also thinks that the center parties will acquire their mandates by reason of combined slates.

/Christian Democratic Party/: Support is thought to be quite stable around 8 percent, and this means a decline relative to the 1981 result of 9.4 percent. Joint victories in Vestfold and holding on to other places nonetheless will result in 16 mandates (+1). The possibilities of both losses and win are small.

/Conservative Party/: The Gallup figures suggest an advance and party loyalty is increasing. But the Conservative Party has done poorer in several elections in a row than the opinion polls have said. "I am surprised about how strong the Conservative Party shows in the polls, but do not believe that the party will do that well," states Henry Valen. Bore underscores the Conservative's moderate line in relation to other conservative parties in Western Europe and also believes that the cooperation with the Christian Democrats and the Center Party has given the Conservative Party increased support in centrist circles. Helge Seip correlates the Conservative's strength with the current economic progress and believes that the party will benefit from the election being viewed as a typical government election.

The Conservatives won many final mandates in 1981 and they have come a long way toward victory in most districts. Even a clear advance for the party will not result in very many additional mandates, but if support drops to the area around 30 percent, large losses could result. Estimated mandates: 52 (-1).

/Progress Party/: The poll figures show decreased support from the last parliamentary election and a good distance separates it from the "hurrah-election" in 1983, with 6.3 percent. It is surprisingly quiet within and around the party at the moment, but Henry Valen is convinced that an advance will occur when the party exposes itself during the election campaign. In contrast, Bore and Seip are not so sure. "There are limits to how many times Carl I. Hagen can be shown successfully on TV just before the election," says Bore, and Seip believes that it will be a sensation if the Progress Party increases its number of mandates. As with the Socialist Left Party, it has made great advances in nearly all districts. But the current four representatives sit quite securely in the halls of Parliament.



Key:

1. Districts which will have socialist majority
2. Districts with equal numbers of mandates for both governing alternatives
3. Districts where the majority of mandates will go to non-socialist parties

Key:

- | | | |
|----|-------|----------------------------|
| 1. | Ap. | Labor Party |
| 2. | SV | Socialist Left Party |
| 3. | V | Liberal Party |
| 4. | H | Conservative Party |
| 5. | Kr.F. | Christian Democratic Party |
| 6. | Sp | Center Party |
| 7. | Fr.P. | Progress Party |
| 8. | DLF | New Liberal Party |

FINNMARK: Ap. 3, H 1--as now. The ballot group of Sp/Kr.F./DLF will receive no mandates.

TROMS: Ap. 3, H 2, with the multi-party group providing the guarantee for Kr.F.'s one mandate. As now.

NORDLAND: The Conservative's double victory of 1981 is highly vulnerable. The Liberals can take one mandate, or else the Labor Party likely will do so. Ap. 5, H 3 (-1), and SV, Kr.F., Sp. and V (+1) will win one mandate each.

NORD-TRONDELAG: The multi-party group Sp./Kr.F./DLF will take Reidar Due. Ap. 3, Sp. 2 and H 1, as now.

SOR-TRONDELAG: Ap. 4, H 3, and one each for V, Kr.F. and Sp--as now.

MORE AND ROMSDAL: Ap. 4 (+1), H 3, Kr.F. 2, and Sp. 1. The Liberals likely will drop out.

SOGN AND FJORDANE: Ap. 2, one each for H, Kr.F. and Sp--as now. But an advance by the Conservatives can threaten the Center Party mandate.

HORDALAND: The ballot grouping will protect Sp. while the Liberal's mandate is in the danger zone here as well. The Labor Party has a western tailwind and could take this mandate or the Conservative's fifth mandate. H and Ap. 5 (+1), Kr.F. 2, and one each for Sp. and SV.

ROGALAND: The Conservatives are on the attack here, where they were cheated out of a mandate last time. The Center Party is in a serious danger zone, as is Kr.F. to some extent, while the most probable result will be the same status quo. H and Ap. 3, Kr.F. 2, and one each for Fr.P and Sp. Arne Fjortoft likely will win, but could ruin the chances for Kr.F.

VEST-AGDER: Here the Fr.P./Sp/DLF group is likely to do better than Ap., making Vest-Agder the only district with a single Ap. representative. H 2, Ap. 1 (-1), Kr.F. and Sp. 1 (+1).

AUST-AGDER: The ballot grouping of Kr.F. and Sp. will have no effect other than to protect Kr.F. against a Conservative victory. Ap. 2, and one each for H and Kr.F.--as now.

TELEMARK: Kr.F. is protected through the ballot grouping with Sp., while Ap. is threatening the Conservative's second seat, but the grouping with DLF can provide the couple of hundred extra votes which could rescue the Conservative's newly-touted Ingvald Godal from, for example, Sp. Nonetheless, Ap. 3, H 2 and Kr.F. 1--as now.

VESTFOLD: Here, Kr.F. either alone or jointly with Sp. will take the Conservative's fourth mandate. H 3 (-1), Ap. 3 and Kr.F. 1 (+1).

BUSKERUD: The Conservatives likely will get even for the loss in 1981 and take a mandate from Ap. The ballot grouping with Kr.F. will protect the Center Party's parliamentary leader Johan Buttedahl. Ap. 3 (-1), H 3 (+1) and Sp. 1.


OPPLAND: The Conservative's second seat is strongly threatened by both the ballot grouping between Sp. and Kr. F. and by Ap., but things likely will remain as before: Ap. 4, H 2 and Sp. 1.

HEDMARK: Both Ap. and SV can take the Conservative's second mandate, but Sp.'s Ranghild Q. Haarstad also is not completely safe. Ap. 5, H. 2 and Sp. 1--as before.

OSLO: Defense Minister Anders C. Sjaastad must fight hard here to save the Conservative's seventh mandate. Kare Kristiansen likely will be saved by Sp. and DLF. The Labor Party is in the attack position. H 7, Ap. 5, and one each to Fr.P. SV and Kr.F.

AKERSHUS: The ballot group Sp./Kr.F./DLF will win one of the two new mandates, and SV likely will take the other. H 5, Ap. 4, Fr.P. 1, SV 1 (+1) and Sp. 1 (+1).

OSTFOLD: With the assistance of Sp. for the Conservatives, the status quo is guaranteed: Ap. 4, H 3 and Kr.F. 1.



This is how the poll trends have been since last fall. The figures are based on the average of the four institutes' party barometers, with the exception of last month which does not include Norway's Marketing Data.

Paper Comments on Trend

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 15 Jul 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Government Election"]

[Text] All of the institutes' opinion polls point in the direction of a non-socialist party election victory in September and a renewal of the contract for the sitting coalition government under the leadership of Kare Willoch. What this tells us first and foremost is that the majority of the Norwegian people have confidence in the present political leadership. A steady course throughout the four years of the non-socialist government has produced results of which the average woman and man has difficulty avoiding taking note. Although we continue to struggle with problems which /must/ be solved, it is apparent that Norway is on the right path and that the government's policies will provide a surer and better basis for building the future than will the socialist alternatives.

Because this is, to a very marked degree, an election between clear political alternatives, people themselves are aware to a very great extent that we are confronting a /government election/--first and foremost. Thanks to a consistent and goal-oriented policy, the battle against inflation and expensive times has been won to a large extent. Optimism again has returned to the business community which is taking off like almost never before following a period of stagnation and pessimism. A policy which demonstrates confidence in the individual person and which endeavors to gamble on the individual's creative abilities stands in sharp contrast with a socialist, collectivist policy which means more power for the State and the politicians at the expense of individual freedom. And it is with a view to these issues, and based on fundamental economic and business policy methods, and on the individual person's role and opportunities in society, that the dividing lines essentially are drawn.

With great steadfastness, the Labor Party in opposition has gambled on a policy which includes the idea that the positive results which have been achieved during the current parliamentary session will be thrown away unless the Labor Party again is returned to power. Politics based on promises and higher bids--without parallel in our history--would result in the unleashing of a new wave of inflation and undermine in a dramatic way our possibilities both for safeguarding employment and for solving other demanding social endeavors. The optimism which presently dominates our entire economic life likely would soon be replaced by pessimism and a new stagnation. This would be unfortunate for the country and the people.

Thus, the election of 9 September is not just a government election, but a /directional election/ of decisive importance for the development of our society for several decades to come. The remaining weeks of the election campaign therefore must be used to further highlight the alternatives so that the voters are given the best possible basis for evaluating the political consequences which will flow from the election going one way or the other.

If we were to give advice to the non-socialist parties, it would be to strive to the maximum to market their own alternative and to concentrate totally on that. Next, the non-socialist parties should carefully bear in mind that which best can remain /unsaid/ in an election campaign which, at the least, involves avoiding strife and irritation within their own ranks. We hardly need specify what we have in mind here, but will content ourselves with noting that we could well have done without certain recent moves.

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CSO: 3639/140

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

POLL RESULTS: PSD ADVANCES, PS MAINTAINS LEAD

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 1 Jun 85 p 10

[Report by M.V. on NORMA/SEMANARIO poll of legislative candidates: "PSD Off to Recapture Lead with Cavaco Silva, Country Polarized, PS Still Ahead."]

[Text] It is like one of those exciting election nights when all the leaders go on television to proclaim victory: Soares because the PS [Socialist Party] continues in first place; Cavaco because, in finally stanching the hemorrhage of recent months, the PSD [Social Democratic Party] has recovered ground and regained the No. 2 position; Lucas Pires because the CDS [Social Democratic Centery Party] on the rise again, is the only party that has become stronger since 1983; and Cunhal because he would always find a way to twist the APU's [United People's Alliance] reverses into yet another April triumph. As for Herminio Martinho, all he would have to do is claim that the PRD's 4.4 percent is very encouraging for the future.

However, none of them would pass up the opportunity to make a scathing interpretation of the showing made by the others.

A PS victory? What victory? Resuming their traditional decline--only interrupted last month--the socialist lost 1.4 points from April to May and have been penalized to the tune of 11.7 points in relation to the last elections. Although generalized, the extent of the loss ranges from very moderate in Viseu to very severe in Lisbon.

Is the PSD rearing its head up again in its first test of the Cavaco era? Now--the 3.1 points it regained in May are not enough to make up for earlier damage, they frustrate the party's desire to rank as the largest national party, and the PSD is 5.3 points below its April '83 level.

Is the CDS continuing its historic march toward victory--1.5 points gained in May, and 4.6 since the elections? Well, don't let it take your breath away, the PSD is already retaking the lead (goodby, fleeting leadership of the right...) and the race for 3rd place against the APU (overtaken at the moment), hangs on tenths of a point. In Evora, the PRD is sending the CDS back to 5th place.

Is the APU firm and strong because it still ranks second in Lisbon? Let Dr. Cunhal say what he likes, the truth is that the communists' opposition to

the coalition has already cost it 2.9 points since 1983 (0.2 of those "paid" in this current month of May); that they're pulling back everywhere; and that their greatest losses are occurring at home, in Evora, where, for the first time, they've passed the 30 percent mark (on the way down.) In Viseu, the PRD is sending them back to 5th place.

Cavaco: The Takeoff---

The field work on this NORMA/SEMANARIO poll was done between May 20 and 27, that is, during the week following the congress of Figueira da Foz, so that the principal "suspense" lay in the reactions to the Cavaco leadership.

As a whole, as we have seen, there was satisfaction with the details, so instructive. Where the PSD revives--Lisbon (up 3.8), Porto (up 3.6), Vila Real (up 6.1)--the PS sags. However, don't lose a sense of proportion: while the revitalized PSD is 4th in Lisbon (where it has suffered a major decline since '83), 2nd in Porto and in Vila Real, the weakened PS comes out ahead in all the cities studied, except Evora.

Furthermore, the strengthening of the PSD is accompanied by a strengthening of the CDS in Lisbon and, especially, in Vila Real (where it rises abruptly in the standings by 9.6 points), while in Porto the centrists retreat before the advance of their former partner in the AD.

...and the Price

But what most gives one pause is the obvious hostility to the social-democratic shift manifested by Coimbra and, especially by Viseu. If the PSD, which was number one in the April poll with 30.6 percent, suddenly drops almost 11 points [as published]. Benefitting spectacularly--the PS (Viseu, by the way, supports Soares), which picks up 9--while another group of the disaffected rushes off to the CDS. For its part, if Coimbra is extremely angry about politics in general it directs a special fury against the PSD, which it has been punishing since the departure of Mota Pinto. With the entry of Cavaco, not only does a new decline reduce the party to 13.1 percent, but the PS suddenly makes an excellent showing--it gains almost 10 points!

And, just as in Viseu, the CDS gains something too.

These maneuvers are all the more curious because, according to NORMA's analysis of tendencies to transfer votes, those of the PSD merely go over to the CDS, except in Coimbra, where some reportedly escape to the PS. The PS, in turn, supplies voters to all competitors, while nowhere do the CDS voters shift over to the PSD, not even the Cavaco PSD.

The PRD certainly needs to cry for help--in May it lost half of its already not-too-numerous electorate, dropping from 8.8 percent to 4.4 percent (the most unsatisfactory poll yet.) Lisbon gave up. Evora almost did: bereft, at least publicly, of the affection of Eanes, the trickle which had at times threatened to become a torrent has been reduced to a mere drop. Or that's how it looks.

Technical Data

Universe--Portuguese citizens over 18 years of age and residing in the cities of Coimbra, Evora, Lisbon, Porto, Vila Real and Viseu.

Sample--605 people.

Sampling Method--random, stratified by city, non-proportional imputation.

Selection--random route for selecting the house, the Kish method for selecting the individual to be interviewed.

Technique--Direct personal interview, using a structured questionnaire, at the resident of the respondent.

Sampling Points--six cities in which starting points were chosen.

Field Work--Interviews conducted between May 20 and 27, 1985.

Margin for Error--At the overall level, the error is plus or minus 4 percent in a range of dependability of 95 percent for p = 50 percent.

Institution Responsible--The research was done by NORMA, SARL, a Portuguese affiliate of Gallup International.

	12. TOTAL DAS 6 CIDADES	13. Eleições Abril 85	14. Hoje	LISBOA Hoje	PORTO Hoje	COIMBRA Hoje	ÉVORA Hoje	VISEU Hoje	VILAREAL Hoje
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
2 Abstenção	19,0	19,6	20,9	22,8	15,9	21,6	20,6	20,9	21,2
3 Votação:									
4 APU	21,1	18,4	18,2	19,7	15,7	13,5	27,8	5,3	9,8
5 CDS	14,0	17,1	18,6	19,4	17,7	19,0	6,9	23,7	21,9
6 PSD	24,8	16,4	19,5	17,9	24,4	13,1	18,3	19,6	29,5
7 PS	35,0	24,7	23,3	21,3	26,8	28,0	19,0	31,6	31,6
8 PRD	—	8,4	4,4	4,0	5,4	1,5	7,9	6,5	2,4
9 Outros	3,2	6,2	3,5	2,5	4,1	3,9	15,0	9,1	1,5
10 Brancos/Nulos..	1,9								
11 Indecisão	—	8,8	12,5	15,2	5,9	21,0	5,1	4,2	3,3

KEY TO TABLE OF POLL RESULTS

- | | |
|---------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Vote in 6 cities | 8. PRD |
| 2. Abstention | 9. Others |
| 3. Vote | 10. Blank/Void |
| 4. APU | 11. Undecided |
| 5. CDS | 12. Total of 6 cities |
| 6. PSD | 13. Elections |
| 7. PS | 14. Today |

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CSO: 3542/198

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

SEARCH FOR SOARES SUCCESSOR BEGINS

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 1 Jun 85 pp 2-10

[Article by Margarida Viegas: "After Mario Soares, What Next?"]

[Excerpts] He is 61 years old, and convinced that his place in history is assured. Looking over his biography, he finds that his life has been closely tied to the decisive phases in the most recent decades of the life of the nation. His face has become a symbol of his party, which he has headed ever since its founding in a prolonged and intimate relationship in which affection has always triumphed over the stormy periods. He has been prime minister more often than anyone else in the present regime. He wants to be able to write, on the final line, "Soares, President of the Republic, elected in 1985."

And so the battle for succession in the Socialist Party begins.

To win or to lose--the latter being an outcome that Soares has only recently begun to acknowledge as actually possible--Soares decided to become a candidate: he will take the chance. Under the smooth surface, the waters are already beginning to swirl.

Without even dreaming of leaving the PS, Soares will, on his own initiative, relinquish his duties as secretary-general at a convention to be held, perhaps, at the end of this summer. This would leave management of the party to its permanent commission, headed by the chairman, Antonio de Macedo. Here is destiny's role in his independent and national candidacy.

And afterward?

At any rate, and regardless of individual wishes, the issue of succession in the PS is in itself a phenomenon conditioned by a whole tradition; a past, a history, cultural roots. It is conditioned by the party's ideological heritage--and by the specific leading role that the tutelary figure of Soares assigned to it. The PS is not the PSD, where mere will can be enough to enable one to reach the top of the heap. Culturally, what leader is the PS capable of producing? A second Soares? There is no such person. An anti-Soares--one capable of governing?

Furthermore, one must take into account the potential influence of outside forces. Masonry. Or the Socialist International--which has lavished praise on the merit of men of its ex-secretariat and on the superior qualities of the functioning of the IDE [expansion unknown], the foundation headed by Salgado Zenha, where distinguished Eanists have found a home. However, influential leaders of the Socialist International--such as the Spaniard Elena Flores, to whom Felipe Gonzalez listens so much, or the German Dingels--have stressed that they will only dialogue with the established powers of Portuguese socialism. The prevailing impression is that in projecting himself as the Americans' man in Lisbon, Soares has lost in standing with his peers what he has gained in power.

"Troika" in the Desk Drawer

In the midst of this intricate set of circumstances, what, after all, are Soares' own ideas for talking his way through it?

Those close to him have said that his original idea was that of the "troika": the much talked-about Almeida Santos-Constancio-Gama troika for which, by the way, none of the three expressed non-availability. Almeida Santos, the historian, the pillar, always at Soares' side--waiting for the right moment? Constancio, the technician to whom passion for politics in itself came with the force of love in one's sunset years?

Gama, a born talent, the cold strategist--that socialist of the 20th century?

However, Gama's star is waning in his boss's eyes. Soares, who in an unprecedented gesture gave him full responsibility for diplomacy as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and who broke the tie in Gama's favor in the battle between him and Ernani Lopes for leadership of future relations with the EEC, has begun to find Gama too indiscreet.

The relationship cooled. According to intimates of Soares, Gama might still be able to "redeem" himself by a clear and convincing dedication to his boss' candidacy. But didn't he warn, in an interview with EXPRESSO that Soares should only run if he could win? And doesn't he have good reason to believe that such a result is in jeopardy today?

So, without completely abandoning the solution of the "troika," Soares has probably begun to meditate on the virtues of the succession of a single person--Almeida Santos--who is, furthermore, the man whom he could trust for getting through that hypothetical interregnum until 1990.

But he knows that it is not enough for him to just point his finger and name someone. And there is Vitor Canstancio--the "critical Soarist" for whom the secretary-general feels special fondness, although he wouldn't stretch it to the point of giving him a blank check. It is true that, faced with a Soares defeated in the race for the presidential nomination, the ex-secretary-general and/or the entire ex-secretariat could venture to dispute the leadership of the party.

But it is generally believed that Constancio would never make himself available for such a role.

Furthermore, the various currents within the party are united in seeing Almeida Santos more as the leader of the transition than a successor to Soares.

Machiavellian minds don't hesitate, however, to see in this flag of transitoriness an expedient which Almeida Santos himself reportedly used in order to mollify Vitor Constancio during a period in which a certain degree of approximation between the two is becoming obvious. Having obtained, through Constancio, the compliance of at least part of the ex-secretariat, Almeida Santos (according to sources connected with said ex-secretariat) would be able to show, in a second phase, that he was definitely the boss. In fact he is already said to have declared, to a (chosen few), small circle, that he is not willing to share power.

A defeat, however, would--at least in theory--open up other possibilities. According to groups close to Soares himself, he runs the risk that Gama, anticipating the failure at Belem, is already distancing himself in order to reappear, fresh and unblemished, to confront Soares in the name of a different PS. A difference that would be a shock to the ex-secretariat, which would not only have to fear the indignity of seeing a social democrat at the head of the PS but would also have to attend the demise of its beloved banner of democratic administration versus a leadership based on personality.

Furthermore, Jorge Sampaio has made clear that he is unavailable to head up an alternative--while Zenha, an old-guard politician on whom the PC would be ready to bet right away, is said to be holding himself in reserve for other battles further down the road. Against Soares and his mistakes, which "one day he'll have to pay for."

Finally, we have the apocalyptic scenario in which--bewildered by the abundance of scenarios--the PS finds itself transformed into a second PSD.

12830

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

SALVATION SEEN IN 'RIGHTIST GOVERNMENT, LEFTIST PRESSURE'

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 18 Jul 85 p 8

[Article by Luisa Manoel de Vilhena]

[Excerpts] The Portuguese left of the forties and fifties was, for the most part, formed by partisans of the First Republic--the "democratic opposition"--that never became resigned to the autocratic Salazar regime. It bore no resemblance to the "existentialist" left that rapidly proliferated in post-war Europe, this left formed by young intellectuals and artists fascinated by charismatic leaders such as Sartre and Aragon, while writers like Miguel Torga and Aquilino advocated in Portugal their romantic leftist views, and others, like Antonio Sergio, their pragmatic opinions. The Portuguese left did not wear jeans and short jackets, did not wear its hair long, did not live a Bohemian existence. When leftists wore beards, they were usually well cared for. They lived regulated lives. The most representative among them were middle-aged men, more nostalgic than revolutionary, very conservative deep down, pure and puritanical, very distant from the ideology--and especially the psychology--of the processes and the style which characterized the European left.

These "revolutionaries" had become fixed in time. They did not notice the very rapid transformation that was occurring around the world, which was no longer measured in centuries, or even decades, but in the fast rhythm that was beginning to show itself in those years and is devouring us today.

I was closely acquainted with some personalities of this "democratic left," some of them professors, others friends I deeply appreciated in spite of their belonging to a generation that preceded mine. I always believed that these gentlemen were a lot more reactionary than my traditional family environment--democratic, liberal, monarchist--or than my tolerant and open school environment, and above all, than myself, who did not easily accept the learned truths, as befits any young mentally healthy person.

And the communists?

They lived in clandestinity and made themselves felt only in exceptional circumstances. Salazar's mild dictatorship was indeed hard in this respect.

The main accusation hurled by this "democratic left" against the Salazar regime focused exactly on the absence of democracy and on the then prevailing pseudo-democratic institutions.

But democracy does not separate the right from the left. There is a democracy of the right and a democracy of the left, just like there are dictatorships of the right and dictatorships of the left.

At the beginning of this century, the political frontier in Portugal was between the monarchy and the republic. The terms "right" and "left" were little used. When it was said of someone in the monarchist environment that "he is a republican," the classification bore the anathema equivalent to that of Salazar times when someone was termed "a communist." Salazarism and communism were two dictatorships, even if ideologically opposite and procedurally very distant.

No indeed, democracy and dictatorship cannot be used to separate the right from the left.

The hard left resembles more the hard right than the democratic left. And all democratic systems tend toward parallel solutions, as the right increasingly becomes aware of imperative social needs and as the left begins to acknowledge the inefficiency of its economic theories.

The democratic right is profoundly different from the hard right.

The distinction between the right and the left, at least in theory, is founded nowadays on the two fundamental pillars of modern civilizations: economy and social justice.

The great absurdity of the socialist left is in the paradox of having as an ideology an egalitarian distribution of the wealth and simultaneously advocating an economic system that invariably impoverishes those countries where it is applied, being finally reduced to the sad task of distributing poverty.

During the last ten years in Portugal when, according to the constitution, the country is journeying toward socialism, there has indeed been an important redistribution of the wealth, not so much for more equality, but especially through a different kind of inequality that has benefited a small group of new privileged individuals, plunging the general population, after a brief period of artificial economic euphoria, into a worse progressive poverty, proportional to the galloping impoverishment of the country.

We must however recognize that on the level of history, the left can be credited with the great achievement of having compelled capitalism to follow an increasingly more socialistic road. Because, if it is being proved that the only system generating wealth is the one based on private initiative, private property and private enterprise, it is also being demonstrated that capitalism, when it is not seriously controlled (as in social democracy or Christian democracy) or strongly pressured by the competition of the left in politics,

easily forgets its social function and becomes "savage," only concerned with its own profitability, which is fundamental but not sovereign.

It seems to us that, for the salvation of Portugal and of the world, for hunger to be exorcized both in the symbolical and the real meaning, it will be necessary for the right to govern and the left to pressure. A responsible, progressive and lucid right.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

ALMEIDA SANTOS SEEN IN CERTAIN ASCENDANCY

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 20 Jul 85 p 3

[Article by Jose Antonio Saraiva: "Politics Portuguese Fashion: Almeida Santos' Importance"]

[Text] Many people think that last Saturday morning, Almeida Santos won over Jaime Gama and Vitor Constancio in the race for Soares' succession at the head of a hypothetic future government with a socialist majority.

It is not true.

In the first place, it was not Almeida Santos, who won over Gama and Constancio--but Soares, who won over both of them; because, if Soares had proposed another name to the PS political committee, it would have been that one, and not Almeida Santos, who would have been elected.

What is not clear is whether we are witnessing an even more complicated process.

In other words: if Soares was compelled by force of circumstances to propose Almeida Santo's name and not another.

Stated differently: if Almeida Santos did not impose himself to Mario Soares, thus compelling him to take his side.

If that was the case, we are witnessing a totally new and never before pondered phenomenon.

We are facing a situation that can be defined thus: by himself, Almeida Santos could not easily have imposed his name to the PS. But, in light of the ascendancy he has acquired on the person who is still controlling the PS, he is in a position to implement his will through him.

We shall probably be unable to reach a definitive conclusion in the near future.

What can be said, at this time, is that Almeida Santos, by consciously and ostensibly effacing himself in front of Mario Soares--to the point of giving the impression of not possessing his own political personality, with everything

being decided by the secretary general--was able to gain such influence on him that it is now difficult to tell whether Almeida Santos is dependent on Mario Soares or whether Soares is dependent on Almeida Santos.

The impression at this time is that Almeida Santos effaced himself in order to intervene more efficiently, thus avoiding criticism.

He seems to be a simple secretary for Mario Soares, but a secretary who, through his knowledge of issues, through his technical competence and his capacity for work, become indispensable when decisions have to be made.

On this subject, it can be said that the difference between the new candidate to the position of prime minister and the adversaries he faced in the struggle for the election is flagrant.

Jaime Gama and Vitor Constancio never showed the lack of pride necessary to play the role that Almeida Santos assumed.

But at the same time, they never succeeded in being so close to Mario Soares, to influence so many of his decisions and make him so dependent.

Almeida Santos still needs Mario Soares to convince the PS and to impose on other leaders his way of conducting politics; but Soares needs Almeida Santos for practically everything else.

One can only conclude that if things are really like this, Almeida Santos will henceforth achieve everything he wants.

Thus, those who think that the great battle in the PS is still to come and that Almeida Santos won a minor contest and gained a post that others rejected, are wrong.

If things occur as it seems, that is, if Almeida Santos does exert the influence he appears to have, then the candidate to the leadership of the government has already won what he expected to.

His election last Sunday was not a circumstantial victory; it was the first sign of the power he holds.

And he will not be the party's secretary general only if he chooses not to.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

ABOLITION OF JURY SYSTEM ADVOCATED

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 16 Jul 85 p 2

[Article by Jose Miguel Judice: "Jury: Justice Raffled"]

[Text] A lot can be written on the administration of justice in Portugal, on its defects, its limitations and its virtues. One can talk about the delays and the postponements; one can discourse on the negation of justice, the lack of protection for the victims (there are also human rights concerning victims that are not always duly taken into account); one can inveigh against the almost total lack of protection of individuals vis-a-vis the state's arbitrariness and the none-existence of protection against the innumerable injustices committed by the state; one can protest the lack of rigor that allows legal incompatibilities to be respected.

But here and now I would like, above all, to reflect on the institution of the "jury" that may be charged with participating in the decision about the facts on trial in criminal courts. And this is especially relevant in light of the fact that the most important criminal trial in recent years will start soon (the trial of the FP-25 members, or, at least, of persons accused of being such). A jury has been required for this trial.

Without losing too much time in circumlocutions, I am convinced that the requirement for a jury is only a sign of the populist and pseudo-democratic demagoguery that has invaded Portugal as a reaction against the previous tight controls, and will hurt both justice and the economy. And I believe that one of the most important structural reforms to be implemented in Portugal is, once and for all, to put an end to this objective buffoonery of a group of citizens who, without specific preparations, without will integrated into a culture in which the concept of justice is not part and parcel of the current arsenal (as one can see in a simple soccer game) are thought to be able to determine with more rigor, objectivity and clarity the facts, in order to render a decision on what effectively occurred within a presumably criminal context.

This objective buffoonery is tied by some to the thesis that judges apply justice in the name of the people. But even if this formula possesses some relevance in juridical terms, it is unreasonable to use it as a basis to reach the depressing spectacle that the jury's activities always are, as well as the

gross errors caused by its lack of preparation and of sufficient civic sense. This is the case, even if the system were to function well and rigorously, because drawing lots could never be a valid criterion to select judges, at least as long as it is not considered a valid criterion to select legislators. And this is why it is reasonable to term the existence of a jury a buffoonery, just as much as it would be if it is claimed that deputies must be selected by drawing lots.

But unfortunately, the system works much worse than an ideal model would lead one to think. Portuguese society does not have a very developed civic sense, and, as a result, very few of those chosen by drawing lots view their legal selection positively. I feel certain that in general, they will think that this is perturbing their lives, creating difficulties for them, depriving them of their routine and earnings for an adventure that is both tedious and undesired.

And indeed, they are quite right, since life in a modern society is not consonant with a cashier leaving his cash register, a doctor his clinic, a student his classes, to confine them--for months sometimes--in a court, as if the world for them had come to a stop, where the cash register would have to be closed, the patients would have to find another physician and exams would have to be postponed. The results are evident and obvious: all those who can earn more (or lose less) than the compensation to which they are entitled will attempt to find an excuse and a pretext to be exempted. And those who do not, but value the loss at more than 20,000 escudos, will prefer to pay the fine for their absence rather than fall into the trap.

Who is left? Only those who believe that to be a juror is a sort of long-term advantageous contract: either because they are unemployed, or because they earn less, or because they can absent themselves from their work without difficulty. In the end, who is left are all those who, fortunately or unfortunately, constitute a distorted expression of the reality that is the "people," in whose name they are selected. All those who, because of their profession or otherwise, were "privileged" to participate in trials by jury or to watch them, concluded very rapidly that this is an erroneous process, dangerous or useless, expensive and long, a luxury for a country which needs good justice, rapid justice, competent justice.

It will be argued that there are other things in Portugal that need to be changed more urgently than the existence of the jury system. So be it. But this does not obviate the fact that everything must be done to put an end to such situations, which have no positive elements, which help to attribute to our justice an image more negative than it deserves and which confirm the continued tolerance of demagoguery, the total incapacity to abolish absurd and prejudicial schemes and institutions. Because, after all, it is demoralizing for the person whose duty and responsibility it is to administer justice--and only God knows with how many hesitations and how much difficulty at times--to participate in and tolerate the objective buffoonery of putting the sacred responsibility of deciding whether a human being is guilty or innocent into unprepared and unmotivated hands.

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

WIDER PERSPECTIVE FOR PRC DELEGATION'S VISIT

[Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 22 Jun 85 p 4]

[Excerpts] Always smiling, in dark suits with ties or Mao collars, four members of the Chinese Communist Party arrived at Portela Airport Thursday in a delegation headed by Qian Liren, Director of the Central Committee's International Relations Department, for a week's visit in Portugal at the invitation of the Portuguese Communist Party.

It appeared to be a routine event. At the airport VIP room, Albano Nunes, an official from the Portuguese Communist Party's International Section and Central Committee member, exchanged the usual greetings with his Chinese counterpart: "It is with great pleasure that we welcome your delegation and we are certain that our collaboration will be fruitful." Seeing the event, no one would say that he was witnessing a historic occasion. Everything took place as if they had last seen each other the evening before. But it was the first formal meeting in Portugal between the two parties since the Portuguese Communist Party was founded in 1921 and it was also the first time that representatives of Chinese and Portuguese Communists had sat down around the same table since the Sino-Soviet break in the early sixties.

Replies to reporters' questions were formal and terse. The two delegations apparently will not discuss Macau's future, "since this is a State matter," or a rapprochement between the two Communist giants, China and the Soviet Union, formerly at odds, in spite of the fact that the relations between the Portuguese Communist Party and the USSR Communist Party are known to be close. On this subject, Qian Liren would only say, "Our two parties set policy independently of each other, with no intervention from third parties or other countries."

Trial Balloon?

To some observers, EXPRESSO has learned, the rapprochement between the two parties could indicate, "a trial balloon, an important step toward reestablishing official relations between the Chinese and Soviet Communist Parties."

For his part, Domingos Lopes of the Portuguese Communist Party's Press Office, said that the purpose of the Chinese delegation's visit was " to make contact with Portuguese reality" and work together to "study the possibility of resuming relations between the Portuguese and Chinese Communist Parties." Following the talks to be held, the Chinese Communist Party delegation will visit the Setubal District and the Agrarian Reform region in Alentejo.

This visit closes the chapter on the last 20 years of quarreling.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

PRD'S EUROPEAN POSITION UNDETERMINED--The chairman of the PRD's directing committee, Herminio Martinho, declined an invitation issued by European Parliament deputies to join in the future a new parliamentary group in the Strasbourg Assembly to be constituted by centrist and ecology parties. The Arco-Iris Group includes these parties, which are attempting to form a new parliamentary group in Strasbourg; it recently dispatched two of its members to Lisbon to contact officials from the PRD, a party with which it claims to have political philosophy affinities. Herminio Martinho declared to the two European deputies --members of Belgium's Flemish National Party--that "at this time, I cannot assume any obligation concerning the formation of a new group within the European Parliament." The PRD chairman affirmed that his party "has not yet defined its policy in the field of foreign relations, as well as its position in the European political spectrum." [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 19 Jul 85 p 28]

NO CANDIDACY FOR MANUELA EANES--Manuela Eanes stated to our newspaper yesterday that she will actively participate in the PRD's campaign for the parliamentary elections, but that she will not accept an invitation to run as a candidate for the PRD. She also noted that her personal work occupies her full time and that she would not have the opportunity to devote herself to parliamentary duties. "I am not made to be a deputy," she added. [Excerpt] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 15 Jul 85 p 20]

CSO: 3542/223

POLITICAL

SPAIN

BRIEFS

NEW FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS--Madrid, 17 Jul (EFE)--On request by Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, the Spanish Government today approved the appointment of four high ranking officials in this ministry. Fernando Perpina has been appointed under secretary for foreign affairs; Santiago Salas has been appointed chief of the minister's staff; Jose Manuel Agueras has been appointed technical secretary general, and Rafael Munoz has been appointed director general of the foreign service. [Excerpt] [Madrid EFE in Spanish 2317 GMT 17 Jul 85 PA]

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POLITICAL

SWEDEN

VPK CHAIRMAN WERNER MAKES SPEECH ON ELECTION GOALS, PLATFORM

Seven-Hour Work Day Proposed

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 23 Jul 85 p 6

[Article by Claes Leo Lindwall]

[Text] Visby--"The important thing in this year's election is defending what the labor movement has achieved," Lars Werner, leader of the Left-Communist Party (VPK), said in Almedalen on Monday. "And I am an optimist."

Last year Lars Werner spoke in the icy rain to a small band of the faithful, but this year a warm evening sun shone down on Almedalen. Around 700 people had come to listen to Ann-Kristin Hedmark and Lars Werner last night.

Lars Werner radiated optimism even at the afternoon press conference.

"This spring I was doubtful," said Lars Werner. "But now I believe there will be a scant socialist majority."

Bet

He has made a personal bet that VPK will get 7 percent of the votes in the election.

"And if there are more VPK people in Riksdag it will strengthen the labor movement," Lars Werner said.

For VPK has climbed down from the revolutionary barricades and Lars Werner is now talking more like a negotiator than a politician.

It is through negotiation and cooperation that VPK is trying to get the Social Democratic government to lean more to the left.

"We have come a long way from the time when the Social Democrats said: 'We will present our proposals and VPK will then have to decide whether to support them or not.'

"Since then we have been given seats on parliamentary committees and there have been regular talks between the parties," said Lars Werner. "I do not think it is so remarkable that two labor parties come to terms.

In familiar negotiator fashion he admitted that one must be prepared to "give and take" in such negotiations.

Will VPK ask to be included in the government if there is a socialist majority?

"We do not reject government cooperation as a matter of principle," Lars Werner said. "But for two parties to share a government they should be more equal in strength. Experiences from other countries show that a government consisting of two parties, one with around 45 percent of the votes and the other with around 7, is not a good combination.

"And it is not certain that we can agree on government policy even though we are closer to each other today than we were before."

Lars Werner said that an important reason for the agreement between the Social Democrats and VPK is the "right-wing" attack on what the labor movement has achieved.

Not Satisfied

But that does not mean that Lars Werner is satisfied with Social Democratic policy.

"The fact is that the government is setting its sights too low in the fight against unemployment," Lars Werner said in his speech. "It is not putting enough emphasis on creating new permanent jobs.

"The government is pursuing an unfair distribution policy. It is reducing the taxes for well-paid workers instead of supporting the economically weak members of society.

"The government has put all its hopes in the big financial interests' export industry instead of attacking unemployment and economic crisis with a policy with a socialist orientation."

In the speech Lars Werner presented 10 points that VPK feels a socialist majority should act on.

They are a fight against unemployment, a 7-hour work day, higher taxes on profits and fairer income taxes, housing as a social right, more openings in daycare and after-school centers, a society that makes things easier for the handicapped, tighter environmental regulations, abolition of nuclear power and a "unified program for peace, arms reduction and solidarity."

Included in the demands was VPK's showcase issue: abolition of the value-added tax on food.

"If the value-added tax on food is abolished, food prices for a family with two children would decline by around 8,000 kronor a year," said Lars Werner.

And he was optimistic when he spoke to the press:

"More and more people support the demand for lower food prices," he said. "Eight out of 10 voters think this is the most important political issue. Even among Conservative voters a majority said it is more important than lower marginal taxes."

Paper Comments on Speech

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 23 Jul 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Risk of VPK Gains"]

[Text] No other Riksdag party has such a hard time lining up its ideology and its practical politics as VPK. To the voters it wants to appear as a party like any other, but with a program that benefits much larger groups of voters than the programs of its competitors. Abolition of the value-added tax on food is presented as the party's primary demand in the campaign

But internally, ideological conflicts still rage between groups with different views on issues as central to VPK as attitudes toward the Soviet Union and Leninism. In the latest issue of the socialist periodical ZENIT two articles describe how these internal conflicts paralyze VPK and prevent the party from mounting an effective left-wing opposition to a Social Democratic government. The authors, who themselves belong to the group that tried to liberate itself from communist dogmatism, say that the renewal once pushed through by C. H. Hermansson is coming to an end. With Lars Werner as party leader VPK has adhered to the traditional revolutionary ideology while voting for a Social Democratic austerity policy for the last 3 years.

In his speech in Almedalen Monday evening Lars Werner tried to bridge the differences by attacking the nonsocialist parties and talking about the need for a continued socialist majority on the one hand and criticizing the government's crisis policy and describing how VPK helped by means of compromises to eliminate the worst problems of this policy on the other. These compromises, where VPK had to abandon both a good many of its principles and its exaggerated demands in order to achieve practical results and prevent Social Democratic defeats in parliament, were to a large extent the result of Werner's own efforts. That is also the way the VPK leader wants to continue doing things if there is a socialist majority after the election this fall.

New possibilities will open up if VPK succeeds in strengthening its position so that a Social Democratic government is directly dependent on its active support in Riksdag votes that go along political bloc lines: it

would not take big changes compared to the election results in 1982 to give the Social Democrats no more seats in Riksdag than the number held by the nonsocialist bloc. Such a situation would be a triumph for Lars Werner, who at the VPK congress early this year was sharply criticized for the compromises he had made, which were too unfavorable for VPK in the eyes of many delegates. A stronger negotiating position would probably also give better negotiation results and--in other words--increase the party's chances of hindering the restoration of balance in the national economy due to its exaggerated demands.

6578

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POLITICAL

SWEDEN

POLL FINDS INCREASING BELIEF IN SOCIAL DEMOCRAT VICTORY

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 14 Jul 85 p 6

[Text by Sophie Petzell]

[Text] A growing number of people believe that the socialist parties will win the election. Last winter around half the voters picked the nonsocialist parties as the likely winners. Now only 36 percent believe in a nonsocialist election victory.

At the request of SVENSKA DAGBLADET, SIFO [Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls] asked around 1000 people to predict the winners of the election. In January/February 54 percent of those asked said the nonsocialists would win. Only 29 percent believed in a socialist victory and 16 percent were undecided.

But now things have changed. In June 36 percent believed in a nonsocialist victory and 46 percent thought the Social Democrats and VPK [Left-Communist Party] would win.

Negative Mood

According to SIFO surveys what the voters think will happen is extremely important. Negative feelings spread quickly and affect the actual possibilities in an election.

Next weekend the election campaign will get started with the traditional speeches in Almedalen on the island of Gotland. One of the important goals is to capture uncertain voters. In this group (116 people in the SIFO poll did not have a favorite party) a third now believes in a nonsocialist victory, a third thinks the socialists will win and the remaining third is not sure.

The best way to show how the mood has changed is to note that almost a third of the voters with socialist sympathies believed in a nonsocialist victory in January/February (30 percent). Around half (52 percent) predicted a victory for their own bloc. Now 71 percent of the socialist voters predict an election victory.

Uncertainty Increasing

Of the nonsocialist voters, almost 80 percent predicted victory last winter. The figure fell to 58 percent in June. Uncertainty about the outcome of the election has also increased.

The uncertain nonsocialist group has increased from 12 to 16 percent. On the other side those who were unsure declined from 17 percent to 14 percent.

The most confidence in a nonsocialist victory in June was found among Conservatives--61 percent predicted victory. Among Liberal supporters 55 percent predicted victory while only half of the Center Party supporters, 50 percent, believed in a nonsocialist election victory.

Only 24 percent of Conservative supporters believed that the Social Democrats and VPK would win while 31 percent of Center Party supporters made that prediction. There were also a great many doubtful Center voters--19 percent.

Only 14 percent of the Social Democratic supporters thought the nonsocialists would win.

But SIFO warned against reading too much into the figures that have been broken down to the party level--the margin of error is too great.

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POLITICAL

SWEDEN

MINISTER: SWEDEN READY TO STUDY NEUTRALS' SPY SATELLITE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 6 Jul 85 p 9

[Article by Harald Hamrin]

[Text] The Swedish government is ready to study a proposal that Sweden join other neutral and nonaligned countries in backing an "independent" satellite system for supervising arms control. The Swedish Esrange space center outside Kiruna could be part of this system.

Energy Minister Birgitta Dahl said this when she opened a 3-day conference Friday on the topic "Space Weapons and International Security" in Saltsjovarden near Stockholm. The conference was sponsored by SIPRI, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

In her opening speech Birgitta Dahl criticized--though indirectly and without naming it--the American space weapons program, SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative], popularly known as "Star Wars."

"What must be achieved now--and can be achieved--is an agreement between the concerned parties not to launch a new round of the arms race in outer space," said Dahl. "In my opinion this is the biggest challenge facing the international community today."

She also warned of the risk that research on space weapons could lead to the development of other new weapons systems.

At the same time Dahl stressed that nonmilitary space technology could "have many positive consequences for mankind." This has already happened in such fields as meteorology, telecommunications and charting the world's natural resources.

"The French government has already indicated the alternative content of this kind of peaceful research with its Eureka project," she said.

But at the same time she also said that supervision of international arms agreements via satellite and satellite supervision of political crisis areas

lay within the sphere the Swedish government considers appropriate for further space research.

It was in this context that the Swedish energy minister backed an earlier proposal from the government's research study committee for a "neutral spy satellite."

USA Dissatisfied

"The Swedish government regards this as an interesting proposal that should be looked into as a matter of course," Dahl said.

The SIPRI conference, which ends Sunday, attracted around 60 researchers, politicians and diplomats from both East and West as well as from a number of neutral and nonaligned countries.

But one could detect some disappointment in the SIPRI leadership over the fact that the Reagan administration in the United States had failed to send a sufficiently high-level representative. The head of the American SDI program, General James Abrahamson, Undersecretary of State Richard Burt and Defense Undersecretary Richard Perle all sent their regrets. DAGENS NYHETER learned that the Americans were dissatisfied at the large number of SDI critics who had been invited to attend the conference.

Some political sharpness could also be detected on opening day. In a speech Frank Gaffney of the American Defense Department accused the Soviet Union of violating the so-called ABM agreement of 1972 on limiting defensive missiles and of working on its own space defense program while at the same time criticizing the United States for the SDI program. He illustrated his accusations with drawings of Soviet radar stations and other space weapons systems.

Eugeniy Velichov, a member of the Soviet Academy of Science, retaliated by accusing the United States of aspiring to a so-called first strike capability, i.e. the ability to knock out the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear weapons in a single devastating attack.

He also looked pleased during an internal American exchange of words between the Pentagon's Frank Gaffney and Richard Garwin, a well-known critic of President Reagan's arms policy.

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POLITICAL

SWEDEN

PALME PROMISES PROTECTION OF WELFARE STATE IN ADDRESS

South Africa Remarks Applauded

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 26 Jul 85 p 9

[Article by Magdalena Ribbing]

[Text] Visby--The Social Democratic economic policy has increased freedom in Sweden, Prime Minister Olof Palme said prior to his speech in Almedalen on Thursday. He also said that the Conservatives had not come out on top in the freedom debate--people are starting to lose confidence in their ideas here, Olof Palme said.

When asked what the Social Democrats have done to increase freedom in this country, Olof Palme said that the economic policy that is putting the country back on its feet is a Social Democratic contribution. But did he have any concrete examples? With an easy laugh Palme parried with an example taken from former Conservative leader Gosta Bohman:

"People can now fish on the east coast too. Gosta Bohman thinks this restricts the freedom of those who own the water but we think it increases the freedom of the nation's fishermen."

Following a tradition that is now 17 years old, Olof Palme came to Visby from his summer vacation on Faro, tanned and relatively unprepared to give his speech in Almedalen. Before an enormous crowd of journalists and photographers from the United States and the Nordic countries, the majority from Sweden of course, he answered all kinds of questions a few hours before he delivered his speech. The situation in South Africa had been expected for a very long time, he said.

Despicable Government

"The opposition to apartheid comes from the oppressed people themselves, from inside the country, and it is directed against a despicable government. It is vital that the rest of the world react." There will be no intensification of the South Africa legislation right now nor will diplomats in South Africa be recalled--such measures are not very effective, in Olof Palme's experience. There is no general civil war in South Africa just now, he said.

Olof Palme had a definite opinion on the Baltic freedom boat trip. He believes in freedom of expression. While he did not feel he could comment on the opinions expressed by a single organization he pointed out that the government and the Social Democrats have been concerned about human rights violations in the Baltic countries and have kept a close eye on them.

"I believe in long-term influence. Various actions on behalf of the Jews have shown that this kind of influence can be effective." The Social Democrats protect jobs, Olof Palme said in his speech that evening. But can the workers at the Arendal shipyard feel secure about the Social Democratic job policy? The dynamics of the Swedish labor market would disappear if all workers at a particular plant felt their jobs were guaranteed at all times, in Olof Palme's opinion.

Cautious

In the current debate on what democracy means, while Gosta Bohman contrasted freedom and power in his speech in Almedalen a few days ago, Olof Palme said that democracy was simply popular rule, nothing else.

"Economic democracy is the right of a worker to have some influence over his job."

Social Democrats intend to be cautious about making "flashy election promises," Olof Palme said. The most important thing is to get the country back on its feet and the government has done a better job here than it thought it could, he said. If it is possible to improve things like partial pensions and conditions for the handicapped later on, that would be good. But no promises will be made now.

There will be no free car ferry for Gotland, Olof Palme said also. It would be much too expensive.

Conservatives Attacked

The speech in Almedalen contained a summing up of the economic policy pursued by the Social Democrats since they regained government power in the 1982 election. The national budget deficit has been more than cut in half during those 3 years, Olof Palme said.

"This has been done without cutting social welfare. Children's benefits have been raised, the buying power of pensions has been guaranteed and health insurance has been protected. These are the biggest success stories for the policy of the third alternative. While welfare is being cut and mass unemployment casts its long shadow over a growing number of people in the world around us, we have been able to protect jobs and maintain security benefits."

Naturally Olof Palme attacked the Conservatives in his speech, the party's demand for a change in the system means that society will no longer assume responsibility for unemployment, that labor unions will be "tamed" and that social gaps will broaden, the prime minister said.

"When leading Conservatives talk about Sweden as a 'haven for junkies' (vice chairman Lars Tobisson) or a 'root cellar' (party leader Ulf Adelsohn) it shows that they are alienated from important features of Swedish society," said Olof Palme. "A destructive and dangerous right-wing policy in a time when broad support is needed for the Swedish model."

A record audience of more than 3000 people applauded enthusiastically at many points and not just to keep themselves warm on the cool summer evening. The day's steady downpour had just stopped when Olof Palme appeared and there was even a little ray of sunshine. It has only rained twice in all the years that Olof Palme has delivered speeches in Almedalen.

One of the big rounds of applause came in response to Olof Palme's remarks about South Africa. He strongly condemned the policy there, said the present situation could be the start of something terrible and called for the South African government to end the state of emergency.

Condemnation of South Africa

"Release the political prisoners, especially Nelson Mandela, gradually end the policy of racial separation, let the United Nations intervene."

France's move to take up South Africa in the United Nations Security Council has Sweden's wholehearted support, said Olof Palme and there was a long round of applause from the audience.

In the grass in front of the Almedalen speaker's platform one could see, though at some distance back, both Foreign Minister Lennart Bodstrom and former Justice Minister Ove Rainer. Both are summer residents of Gotland. County governor Claes Elmstedt, a Center Party man, honored a speech in Almedalen with his presence for the first time and took it calmly when Olof Palme talked about the middle parties and wondered where they stood in relation to the Conservatives. He joked about the bruised Center and Liberal Party people but he went so far as to say that "some very nice people belong to the Center Party."

The Conservatives were the big target for Olof Palme's attacks in the speech and he urged his audience to reject the Conservatives' "change in the system" which would just allow class differences in Sweden to increase and to vote instead for welfare and allow the country to continue to have a government with a policy.

"We must develop what we have, I don't know of anything better anywhere else," said Olof Palme who departed with his arms full of red roses.

Paper Examines Palme Speech

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 26 Jul 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Palme in Almedalen"]

[Text] Voters' perceptions of political parties are usually stable from month to month. Real changes are long-term and are often visible long after the occurrence of the events that provided the first impulse for the change in sympathies.

Thus the fact that there has been a steady upward trend for the Social Democrats in the first half of this election year is a strong sign. In the spring neither the TCO-S [civil service branch of Central Organization of Salaried Employees] conflict nor the drastic rise in interest rates led to repercussions in voter opinion polls and they seem unlikely to have much effect on the campaign. By means of clever political footwork Olof Palme helped to dispel the clouds of doubt.

So it was quite natural that Palme should continue in Almedalen where he left off when politics took a vacation. The theme of his speech was also quite familiar: that the Social Democrats had succeeded in dealing with the economic crisis while guaranteeing welfare and protecting employment--in contrast to West European countries with Conservative governments.

The attacks on the major opponent, the Conservative Party, also followed the familiar pattern: the Conservatives were accused of wanting to carry out a change in the system that would mean among other things that society would no longer "assume responsibility for unemployment," that the unions would be "tamed," the public sector commercialized and the gaps in society broadened. The speech also contained the national tone Palme likes to strike--in an effort to link his own policies with the Swedish model of society which "so many people think is the right one for Sweden," while accusing his opponents of slandering the country and calling it a "haven for junkies" or a "dirt cellar."

Almedalen is the starting point, the basic outline will probably be about the same at one place after another that Olof Palme visits during the campaign. The Social Democratic campaign apparatus is geared up to pounding out a message that back in the spring led the Conservatives to start doubting the strength of their own ideas. The party debates in April seem to have marked the turning point when Conservative leaders realized that the talk about changing the system was more alarming than attractive as a campaign issue. But with so little time left before the election it was much too late for the previously successful party to tone down a view of society that is based on the convictions of party activists. The Conservatives cannot avoid a debate on what Palme likes to call a "change in the system."

But as soon as the Social Democrats stray from fixed campaign propaganda the vagueness is striking. Olof Palme's description of how the national budget

deficit will be reduced is based not on raising taxes or cutting social benefits but simply on continuing the "policy of the third alternative," which has been able to reduce the deficit in the past. That may sound credible to the voters but in reality it will probably be impossible since the market downturn and the resounding aftereffects of the devaluation will make much greater demands on policy than has been the case in the recent good years.

Presumably the Social Democrats are deliberately running the risk of a debate on betrayal after this year's election too.

And with regard to whether the directors of wage-earner funds should be selected through a general election--a sequel to Palme's press conference in connection with Almedalen--the answer was strikingly vague. Palme, who had previously stated his "personal opinion" that direct general elections would be preferable, referred now to a current study being made into whether the "election procedure could be of interest." Since the funds will be smaller in size than he originally thought, it would be hard to make elections interesting, Palme said.

He did not mention the possibility that the dividend requirement, which is given as 3 percent, will reduce the leeway for political stands by the fund directors. "Interesting" elections in which parties compete for places on the boards of directors could legitimize deviations from the dividend requirement and thus expand the aims of the wage-earner funds to their original more threatening objectives.

Does Olof Palme think in such basic terms or does he just make decisions on the basis of short-term considerations?

Tactics often took first place for him in the many rounds involving the fund issue. Palme's intervention in the TCO conflict and the scolding he gave the banks for their interest increases which were designed by the National Bank may have served their purpose for the party and its retention of government power but his behavior had decisive drawbacks as far as order in the labor and credit markets was concerned.

The day before Palme's appearance in Almedalen the Social Democrats held an economic seminar where the discussion revolved around the question of fixed norms in economic policy--something for which Kjell-Olof Feldt, among others, expressed a good deal of sympathy. But it is hard to believe that Olof Palme, who did not attend the seminar, would allow himself to be bound by any norms of this kind.

It is his personal leadership style to take part in the action while being able at the same time to change the rules quickly if necessary--and this style will not be changed.

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POLITICAL

SWEDEN

ENVIRONMENT PARTY URGES OBLIGATORY NONMILITARY SERVICE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 23 Jul 85 p 6

[Text] Obligatory national service should be introduced for all citizens. This proposal was made by the Environment Party, the Greens, in the social policy program which was presented on Monday.

At the age of 19 all citizens, both men and women, should be drafted for an obligatory social service job lasting 1 year, the party said. The current obligatory military service for men should be included as one of several types of obligatory service.

As far as possible citizens should be allowed to choose whether they want to perform their national service with gun in hand or in such areas as environmental protection, firefighting, civil defense, care for children or the elderly, agriculture, sanitation, etc.

Compensation

Compensation should be paid as it is for military service, which would make the system more expensive than it is now. But on the other hand all the social service would lead to incredible savings, the party maintained.

"We are concerned about the fact that many people today view society as an opposing force. Our hope is that such a proposal will make people feel more like participants," said Krister Hakansson of the party's representative council.

Participation is a keynote of the social policy program. The basic view that distinguishes the program from the programs of other parties, in the view of Environment Party members, is that the social network must be restored.

Another proposal in the party's program concerns parental leaves of absence. They should be extended to 2 years, 1 for the mother and 1 for the father and parents would receive compensation during this period. It should also be possible to hire parents as municipal daycare workers, even if they only look after their own children.

Abolish Prisons

When it comes to criminal care the Environment Party wants to eventually abolish prisons and introduce a kind of labor cooperative instead where people are reformed while at the same time doing something useful.

The current method of dealing with criminals is more apt to confirm criminality than to eliminate it, they feel. Criminals should also replace anything they have damaged and confront the people affected by their actions.

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SODEP ACCUSES ANAP OF ANTIDEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 30 Jun 85 p 3

[Text] Ankara - The Social Democracy Party (SODEP) Central Decision-Making and Administrative Council (CDAC) said in a statement released in connection with the 49-percent price hike on paper, "ANAP [Motherland Party] and Ozal are trying to waylay the fourth estate with price hikes."

The CDAC statement expresses the view that the price hike on paper has no credible rationale other than an effort to humiliate the press and disregard the public. "It is the common fate of the Turkish press and public for the distinguished prime minister to take 'revenge' in this way on the press for exposing his failures," it says. The statement contends that the paper price hike will also create great inequities in all areas in Turkey, placing on the families of millions of students an unavoidable and heavy economic burden, and expresses the following views:

"What has driven the ANAP administration into this route is the mentality we did not know about at the beginning and the fact that it has become exhausted after a year and a half. The administration has not been able to tolerate the routine criticism of the press and public. It thinks that the way to do things is to systematically subdue society and silence the press. ANAP has reached the point today where its only hope for staying in power is antidemocratic methods.

"Ozal and his party are trying to silence the press on one hand and brainwash society by taking over radio and television broadcasts on the other. The prime minister dominated the Turkish Radio and Television news bulletins for minutes at the time with the trips he was taking at the time the paper hike went into effect. What else could it mean when he grabs for himself the lion's share of the mass communications and broadcast media whose impartiality is a constitutional guarantee and allows the other parties a few seconds in the assembly as 'hush money'?"

The statement contends that yearning for a closed regime and bringing about oppression through use of the Police Act, silencing the free press and wiping out the means of literacy can be of benefit to no administration and concludes, "The Turkish people will teach the ANAP administration the lesson it must learn in the next elections."

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POLITICAL

TURKEY

BAHRI ZENGİN ON TENETS OF PROSPERITY PARTY

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 29-30 Jun 85 p 5

[Two parts of serialized interview with author and publisher Bahri Zengin by Ahmet Farsakoglu: "Political Life in Turkey Yesterday and Today"]

[29 Jun 85 p 5]

[Text] Who is Bahri Zengin?

He was born in Yavuzlu Village in Kilis in 1942. He was graduated from the Istanbul Technical University Mechanical Engineering Faculty in 1965 and began working in the private sector as a Master Mechanical Engineer. At the end of 1968, he went to the State Planning Organization Incentives Implementation Office as an expert. Here he found it possible to study closely the industrial and economic development of the country. He won a 2-year grant to go abroad for the study of industrial management and regional planning. Returning home in late 1972, he took a job in the Incentives Implementation Office of the Ministry of Industry, where he soon became branch director of that office. In 1975, he was appointed deputy general director and member of the board of directors at the Machine and Chemical Industry Corporation. His job at the corporation was to run the heavy industry projects.

Always intensely interested in our cultural life and public opinion, Bahri Zengin has had commentaries and scientific articles published in numerous journals. He translated Professor M.A. Mennan's book "Islamic Economy" into our language. He is now publisher of MAVERA magazine and is also the owner of a publishing house. Bahri Zengin is a member of the Central Decision Making and Administrative Council of the RP [Prosperity Party].

Question: Mr Zengin, would you summarize briefly Turkey's political life since 1980?

Answer: As you know, there was a hiatus in democratic life for a while after the events of 12 September. A new constitution was drawn up and, once the constitution was completed, preparations necessary for the resumption of democratic life

were made. This was a limited transition, however. Only a few political parties were granted the possibility of participating in the elections. Some political parties were unable to complete the formalities. Some, such as the Prosperity Party, despite completing the formalities, were unable to take part in the general elections.

The Prosperity Party is a party that came into existence in the new era following September 1980. However, it is necessary to say that the thought, opinion and mentality it represents are deeply rooted far back in the past.

Question: You say that the thought represented by the Prosperity Party has a deeply-rooted past. In this case, what is the Prosperity Party's position vis-a-vis the West?

Answer: It would be useful to say here that a single trend of thought has dominated our political life for a long time, even more than 150 years. As you know, Turkey has been open to the West since the time of the Tanzimat [Constitutional Reforms]. We see today where the ever-increasing dose and influence of Western thought, Western views, have brought us in our economy, education and political life.

When we made the transition to multiparty life after 1946, parties with different names were formed, but these parties worked essentially for the establishment and spread in Turkey of Western values, Western culture and the end-results of Western civilizations. They expended their political lives in this area. Perhaps they gave society the impression of having different approaches to problems, but we see that, from the standpoint of the goals and fundamental principles on which they were based, they did not go beyond the norms of the basis, opinion and [apparent omission]. When looked at from this angle, it is necessary to say immediately that the Prosperity Party has a structure very different from the political organizations established to date. This is because the RP believes that Western values cannot bring happiness to Turkey or even other countries besides Turkey.

The Western nations already have a great deal of discontent and unhappiness themselves today. Alcoholism has increased tremendously in the highly developed nations such as America and Sweden. Homosexuality has increased. Narcotics addiction has risen to levels unprecedented in history and suicide has also risen to the highest levels in these countries. People are suffering personal crises and, as a result, mental illness has steadily increased.

The goal of our short lives in this transitory world is to have a happy and peaceful life. It is now necessary to doubt the basic principles of a society that in the end has driven a great mass into misery, mental illness, alcoholism and drug addiction. Even if it has developed materially, this material worth has not brought happiness to humankind. The fact remains that there is absolutely no need to choose a route that is going to push mankind into total misery in order to develop materially. There are much better ways of material development.

The Prosperity Party believes fundamentally that Western standards of value cannot bring happiness, peace and liberation to humanity. From this standpoint, it is completely different from the Western political parties that have come about to

date. When we look at the Peoples Party, the Democratic Party and the other political groups that came into being in the old era, they are all parties that thought, at bottom, according to Western norms. They are political organizations that wanted to fit Western norms to Turkey. This is essentially what lies at the root of Turkey's continuing less-developed status. The Prosperity Party has a structure much different from the other parties in this respect.

I think this would be an appropriate place to mention a particular misconception. The United States and the Western world say that they developed in freedom. This is not true in our opinion. The Western world has made this claim and we have accepted it verbatim without thinking.

Yet historical facts reveal the exact opposite. India, Australia and many places in Africa were occupied by European nations. Their material riches and manpower were put to work without benefit of the least human rights and were used to build England and Europe.

At the foundation of the development of both Europe and America today lies the labor of people deprived of human dignity, deprived of freedom and working under the lash. Russia is no different. By the end of World War I, Russia had changed its model for development, but, unable to find any other place to exploit, chose to deprive its own people of their freedom and exploit its own people, forcing its own people to work under oppression. All of them have basically the same method of development. Enter at this point the Prosperity Party which has a method different from other political organizations and even from the method introduced by the two super powers.

Question: What kind of development model will you, the Prosperity Party, present? What are the priorities of the development model?

Answer: There are two major elements at the foundation of development: natural wealth and human endeavor. There are two ways of expending human endeavor for development. One is by force, the way of tyranny. It is the way that disregards human rights. And this way is the one that the present developed world, that is, the two super powers, have applied to date. Another way is one that comes from allowing people to have some moral value and provides for the productive use of human endeavor. It allows for the consciousness that people are human, that they have great worth and that giving is far superior to receiving. It is a way in which people strive to build the world through commitment, love and desire, strive to help other people and use their labor in the best and most productive way. Development within freedom is the only way. Not by coercion, but by persuasion, persuading people that human labor is precious, that human labor is sacred, that serving others is sacred. There have been nations that developed in this way. We see, for example, that while the Ottoman state was a very tiny entity, just a principality, a group, albeit small, of committed people, a small society which knew that it is better to give than to receive and considered service to others the greatest honor, soon established an empire and achieved a high level of development, whether economically, politically or culturally. And this is a way, a model, of development in freedom. The development model employed in the West is one essentially based on oppression throughout, deprived of freedom and at the

root of which lies the exploitation of human labor. And this is the fundamental principle that separates us as the Prosperity Party from other parties. We have chosen the model of development in freedom. To do this, we put moral development first.

The blessings of Almighty God combined in this way with hard work are going to be the basic cost of Turkey's development. We see, essentially, that the Western view that has been applied for 200 years, despite its implementation by a variety of groups, has brought us to a very backward state today, much less development. Even if we have no positive evidence, the point at which we have arrived after these 200 years must now be the most concrete evidence of the bankruptcy of the Western norms and the development models based on these norms.

Turkey is not an emergent state. Turkey is a nation with a long history. It therefore cannot be compared with certain Far Eastern and African nations that have recently gained independence. For example, when the first telegraph system came out in the 1860's, we see that Turkey had built a network of almost 36,000 kilometers in as short a time as 15 years. It was in third or fourth place among world nations in communications at the time; the same goes for transportation. When railroads were first being built at the time of the Ottoman Empire, transportation was swiftly brought to the Western level. Even when Turkey first occupied seventh place among world nations, it was a time when there were no railroads in China or Japan. That is, when we look as far back as the 1850-1860's, when we go back 100 years ago, we see that the Ottoman Empire held third or fourth place among world nations. In military power, in economic strength, in communications, in transportation and other areas. But we look today and the Republic of Turkey is in fiftieth or sixtieth place. These two figures show that the methods we have been using for 100 years have not propelled us forward, but backward.

[30 Jun 85 p 5]

[Text] Question: In that case, are you saying that there is no sense in further experimentation in imitating the West?

Answer: Look, 200 years is a long time. Turkey must now abandon this erroneous route. We see that some enlightened quarters understand these points. We see that some of them have been on the verge of understanding, but the result is the point that Turkey has reached in the past 200 years. That is, the position among world nations has dropped from fourth or fifth to sixtieth or seventieth today. If you look at it statistically, if you look at it scientifically, if you look at it politically, you can find no other explanation for this decline. You see that the Western value judgments that have been applied for 200 years and applied, moreover, with the support of the state in spite of the people and with the state marshalling all of its resources, have led not to Turkey's development, but to regression, but nevertheless have been the fashion among some of our politicians, or some of our intellectuals. (There are fashions among ideas and development models as well as in clothing.) The Western world draws up a development model for developing nations, and a new political troupe comes along and immediately accepts this model that the Western world has made and applies it in the country, thinking it will bring positive results in the struggle for development. I would like to mention one fundamental point here. I do not want to go into an argument

over whether these models are right or wrong and whether they have good or beneficial aspects, but it is impossible to get the right results when you take the problem out of its historical context.

They combined forces and cooperated for the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, to bring it to an end. They fought together. This being the case, one can hardly expect that they would hand to a state, which they had mobilized all of their resources and shed blood trying to destroy, a formula and say, "Here, take this formula and grow prosperous with it so that you might become more advanced materially and morally than we are." For 200 years, our intellectuals have been the victim of this kind of mistake. Even leaving the Ottoman Empire aside, we are witnessing today the designs of many world nations upon the Republic of Turkey. Most Western nations have supported, and continue to support, the Armenian terrorism being carried out against Turkey.

To us, it is absurd now that these nations, while desiring the partition of Turkey and its destruction by Armenian terrorism, indeed even actively supporting it, should on the other hand desire that Turkey become strong and powerful and be materially and morally influential by providing certain development models. The political preferences of these countries are as clear as the fact that they do not intend for us to develop with such a model.

We take a look at the Cyprus problem and see that, in the wake of it, all the European countries imposed an embargo on Turkey. What does America have to do with the Cyprus problem? What does Europe have to do with the Cyprus problem? So these developed nations that are doing everything they can in the likes of a Cyprus problem to weaken Turkey materially and morally and isolate it among nations are supposed to really and sincerely want Turkey to be developed? Certainly not.

The Prosperity Party differs in basic ways from other parties in this regard, also. The Prosperity Party will build its own model based on its own value systems. It will build new models of dough into which value judgments suited to our present circumstances, our own value judgments have been kneaded. This is what we call "national." We use the term "National Conscience," because it will be made of our own belief, our own terminology, our own efforts and our own heartbeat. This is the dough we will be kneading. In sum, then, we see two fundamental differences.

The two basic elements of development are the blessings Almighty God has provided and human endeavor. The highest return on human endeavor can be obtained in an environment in which human dignity exists in freedom, where there is no coercion and the freedom of belief and opinion exists.

Question: Might we have your thoughts on the freedom of opinion and belief in Turkey? How do you, as the Prosperity Party, look at this subject?

Answer: We do not believe that there is sufficient freedom of belief and opinion in Turkey. From the time we began westernizing in Turkey, freedom of belief and opinion has been granted only to the areas compatible with the Western norms of thought, and areas outside those have been deprived of freedom of belief and thought. Turkey has become today the country in which the most press crimes are

committed. We are studying the lives of some of our men of ideas. Many of them were people who recognized that humanity is holy, that it is exalted. But in spite of being people who believed that the existence, purity and honor of human life and property were sacred, we see that these men of thought and opinion spent a significant portion of their lives in prison just for spreading these thoughts, for expressing these thoughts and for defending the need for people to live in the dignity of the highest perfection possible, the need for accomplishment and the need to eliminate those factors in society that debase people. Turkey is in the top ranks from the standpoint of press crimes. Why is this? The reason is that freedom of thought and belief does not exist in the true sense. Now, if you do not have freedom of thought and belief somewhere, how can you set forth your views on development models in the clearest way possible? There is an effort to reduce history to a single, specific line. This is particularly the case with our recent history. There is virtually an immunity about it, you cannot touch it. So you are deprived of the ability to show even through historical documents what kind of place certain developments or certain practices hold in the course of history. Second, the basic tenets of Western thought have virtually been guaranteed by the law. Of course, certain laws are going to exist in all countries. We are not opposed to the formulation of laws, but the rights and freedoms granted by these laws must not be an obstacle to human betterment. For example, a citizen in Turkey today can come out for the season and say, "I am not a prostitute. I can sleep with whomever I wish and I even give money to the people I sleep with." She can inform everyone in Turkey of this through the press. The person having this right explains the act or crime that she has committed, that is, engaging in fornication, and can inform all Turkey of it in the press. But we never see any investigation anywhere about such a notice. Another example is the problem of whether tourists may go swimming in topless bathing suits, which may be taken by the press as a question of freedom and is defensible as such. What happens here is that people may sleep with whomever they wish and may go to the beach wearing whatever they wish. [We] may see this as a concept of freedom. This being the case, you look at another aspect. You know that offering sacrifices is a duty. You slaughter your sacrifice, but the people who perform sacrifices do not have the right to give the hides from these sacrifices to anyone they want to. You are told that you will give them to such and such an agency even if you do not want to. That is, a person in one place can commit fornication if she wants to, she has this right, but another person somewhere else cannot make a gift if he wants to. This is a distorted concept of freedom. Another person somewhere else is free to go topless, that is, wear a swimsuit without a top, if she wishes, but people elsewhere can be kicked out schools, universities and even teaching jobs for wearing head-scarves. Now, we are not opposed to freedoms. We have a political view that advocates the freedoms in the true sense. A distorted concept of freedom has developed in Turkey that accelerates human debasement. Freedom of opinion and belief must not be restricted so as to ensure human betterment and progress and spiritual and mental enrichment. It is the most natural human right to be able to give a gift. But we are seeing that in some areas our people's right even to make a gift has been restricted. We said an attempt is being made to express history in a single and specific line. In a way, it has been guaranteed. It is impossible for us to go into these points at the moment. So how can we talk of Turkey's problems without mentioning them? How can we ensure Turkey's development without discussing the basic mistakes with which our history has been studded for 200 years while the results of 200 years experience without exposing

them to the light of day are obvious? We therefore say that this lack of freedom of opinion and belief is at the root of Turkey's lack of development. From this standpoint, we, the Prosperity Party, are in favor of the freedom of opinion and belief totally and completely in the full sense. We are not afraid of this, because we believe that strong and deep thoughts, views and opinions based on truth send out deeper roots in such an environment. However, false thinking that fears truth, certain affected ideas and opinions that fear facts may seek to restrict the freedom of opinion and belief. This is how we look at this problem. We, as the RP, are not afraid of freedom of opinion because we desire that truth and justice prevail and because we believe that our own view is based on justice and truth. We believe that where the freedom of opinion and belief is absent, where there is oppression and tyranny and where there is coercion, the routes to human happiness and to material and moral development will be closed.

Actually, as we see it, every opinion and thought deserves respect. It may be wrong, it may be imperfect, but we must give a hearing to every opinion, because in the discussion of opinions and the expression of thoughts, truth is arrived at.

Question: How do you assess the changes our society has gone through in the past two centuries? Were all of the leaders in these times of change men of ill will and regressive? If not, how were they misled?

Answer: I would like to answer this with an analogy. Suppose there was a giant plane tree and a graft was made on this 200 years ago. That is, a graft was made on the Ottoman Empire. It was a Western graft. Because of the advantages that the Western nations acquired at that time from the exploitation I have just been trying to explain and the wealth other people took to their own countries from exploiting others, the Ottoman Empire [words omitted] to the second ranks.

So Western thoughts come in along with the idea that we should resume first place. That is, a Western graft is made on the plane tree. This Western graft remains in place for a while. We see that there is no progress. We are farther behind than yesterday. While, in this situation, attention ought to be paid to the original graft, it is directed instead to the branches of the tree. And someone says, "Let's prune this tree." The tree is pruned. This keeps happening every 10 or 20 years. It is as if there has been renewal...room for new hopes, for getting the nation to pursue new hopes. However, the graft is the same old graft. A Western graft was made. The pruning is done here to divert public opinion from the basic causes of, the major reasons for, our lack of development. One group of political parties goes and others come in. With a different group, new hope is given to public opinion in a different light. Yet, there is nothing in the basic view that has changed. The fundamental mentality continues just as it was. That is, the constitutional sultanate and the reforms in Ottoman times, these come in 20-30 year cycles one after another. Those existed at that time. Now, it is not that the interventions made both during the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic did not have some justification, it was just that the diagnosis was not accurate. And for this reason, the treatment was just to excise from political life the people who were responsible for that program. It was not based on the distortions in the thinking. In our opinion, the diagnosis was wrong. One cannot say that all of the groups that have been applying the different programs for

200 years have had bad intentions; one cannot call them all traitors. One cannot say they were all incompetent. Certainly there were some among them who were honest and had good intentions. But, despite this, the fundamental cause of our remaining developmentally backward and of our position among world nations gradually slipping backward lies in the thought and mentality that existed. It is because of this that despite the interventions every 10 years Turkey is still slipping steadily backward in the race for development.

We see permissiveness increasing. We see alcoholism, gambling and even mental illness gradually increasing in Turkey. That is, there has been a regression in Turkey from the standpoint of personal happiness and security socially. Economically, there has been regression in Turkey. The Far Eastern countries and even the African and Balkan countries that used to be Turkish provinces have outdistanced Turkey.

Turkey has steadily regressed both materially and morally in the hands of each political cadre. Now, the Prosperity Party is the only party that has soundly diagnosed this fact. It has discovered what the illness is. It is not the stock tree that is diseased, but the tree that was grafted on it was wrong. We believe that when we affix a graft consisting of our own value judgments rooted in our own history, that is, when we allow people to gain moral strength or a spiritual strength, Turkey will advance farther both materially and morally. This is the fundamental point on which we differ from all the other political parties.

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POLITICAL

TURKEY

IMPLICATIONS OF CYPRIOT ELECTIONS DISCUSSED

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 29 Jun 85 p 4

[Article by Abdurrahman Dilipak: "Who Won in Cyprus?"]

[Text] The results are in on the third elections in 90 days in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus [TRNC]. The latest elections were held to choose the members of the 50-seat national assembly. A total of seven parties participated in the elections, five left-wing and two right-wing. Three of the left-wing parties were winnowed out; they failed to pass the 8-percent barrier for the elections. The right-wing National Unity Party [NUP], which seated 24 national deputies, thus earned the right to form a government. However, the coalition it was considering establishing with the New Birth Party [NBP] is not expected to be long-lived. Can a partnership with the NBP and its four seats withstand the pressure of the opposition?

Another interesting aspect of these elections is that, if we were to look at the election results from the standpoint of votes cast, we would see that leftist votes were in the majority. If the other three left-wing parties had not participated in the elections or had made the cut-off, the situation would be very different. Present parliamentary arithmetic could have broken down 30/20 in favor of the left in that case.

The election results, actually, are very important from this standpoint. These are results which, in revealing the trend of public opinion in the TRNC, offer moral support to the left. This situation may well lead to intensification of left-wing pressure on the right-wing administration.

The TRNC electorate has said "Yes" to the constitution. It also has approved the presidency of right-wing leader Denktas. I would think the voters reached such a conclusion by way of Denktas' symbolic personality. However, in action, they expressed their concerns by supporting with their votes the left, which pursues an anti-American, anti-NATO policy.

In this aspect of the matter, the national deputy elections amount to a referendum.

Turkey, the United States, the parties that form the coalition partnership to be established and Denktas will need to add this fact to the account and be careful to formulate new policies within the framework of this approach.

Still it is hard to interpret these votes at bottom as a "leftist" preference in the true sense. But it is not as if Denktas' personality, or concern over U.S. and NATO relations did not have a share in the reaction to right-wing parties. And this is an important aspect of the matter. More precisely, it may be that they trust neither the right nor the left. This is the kind of controlled, dynamic balance the Cypriot people have voted for. At least such a balance is extremely important from the standpoint of learning what new formations are taking place on the public-oriented side of the political struggle and as regards forming public opinion. At any rate, if there were an administration that had taken office with a large majority of the vote, it would take the route of solving national problems behind closed doors without much regard for the views and tendencies of public opinion or by fait accompli. Now this is impossible.

There is also this fact, that the future is not going to be boring. It is said that the NUP will be hard put to find an administration partner. A broad-based right-left coalition or a national coalition, I would think, would be a situation that would be considered farther down the road. And could a national coalition halt or check the anticipated political undulations? It does not seem very likely.

We will all be watching developments. But it seems that the extensive recriminations would be quite fatiguing to the TRNC's young politicians. The diversity on the left and the fact that the DPP [Democratic People's Party], the CLP [Communal Leap Party] and the SDP [Social Democratic Party] split the left's vote will be among the principal topics of internal conflict for the left. It is also a known fact that there is conflict between the right-wing NUP and NBP over minimum participation. The NBP with its four members is not crazy about being the spare tire for the 24-member NUP.

The numerous advantages of being a partner in power may be dazzling, but one must also add to the account the heavy political pressure the NUP would apply.

From an electorate of 93,000 souls, 83,000 voted. This is a majority of nearly 90 percent. Certainly, it is a manifestation of the national will. I do not think anyone could pretend to ignore that.

This, too, is a fact, that from the standpoint of individual success, the NUP was in fact the most successful party in these elections. It proved its strength by winning 24 seats by itself. Even the NBP's four seats were won out of NUP votes. It is therefore necessary to attribute the NBP's success to a single party basis and this would give it the responsibility of sharing power.

The six parties besides the NUP are loudly proclaiming that the NUP will soon fall. Will the NUP form a minority government and, if so, what will happen? What is the alternative if the NUP falls -- a new two-party coalition? Would this coalition be a coalition of the right or a left-right coalition? Is a national coalition possible? We shall soon see.

On top of everything, there is now a TRNC that has written its Constitution, elected its president and established its parliament. It is a young Turkish Republic. We are now at a more advanced point than we were yesterday as to

guaranteeing the security and future of the Turkish people on the island. There is a state that has proved its existence for the peace talks or new arrangements or bargaining. The Cypriot people have the organs to determine their own future. This is a result completely separate from the election results. And this result is extremely valuable in this sense -- we are at a more certain point as regards reversal and compromise.

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POLITICAL

TURKEY

PROSPERITY PARTY CONVENTION DESCRIBED AS DIFFERENT

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 30 Jun 85 p 3

[Article by Zeki Ceyhan: "This Congress Is Different!"]

[Text] The Prosperity Party congress is very different from other party congresses,

--because the Prosperity Party is different from other parties.

For those who look at it only from the angle of the Parties Law, the Prosperity Party is a party like any other,

--but the Prosperity Party is not like any other party.

It is different.

The fact that it has no legal difference from the others does not make it the same as the others.

All of the others favor interest.

The Prosperity Party is opposed to interest.

All of the others are joining forces with the IMF and the EEC.

The Prosperity Party opposes them.

The Prosperity Party believes economic independence is imperative to political independence.

It therefore opposes the IMF mortgage on economic policies.

It is reacting to EEC faits accomplis.

An important feature of the Prosperity Party is that it is not supported by large capital circles.

The Prosperity banner rises over the shoulders of people who share like thoughts and beliefs.

Because of this difference in the Prosperity Party, its congress is different also.

It is quite impossible to see here the events usual at other congresses.

There may be some who find it hard to get used to this difference.

Nevertheless, they will have to adapt to it.

They must accept the Prosperity reality and try to adjust to it.

The Prosperity Party is opposed to the mistake that has been in the making for 40 years. It is exposing the deceit that has been practiced for 40 years.

What is certain is that there are a lot of circles that are upset by this Prosperity Party policy.

The big capital circles are upset.

Foreign powers are upset by the Prosperity Party's concept of national conscience and stance.

Those who have put their hope in interest are taking the front against the Prosperity Party because it has upset their complacency.

That is, the Prosperity Party is confronted by many obstacles.

However, the people who have given their hearts to the Prosperity Party are determined to overcome these obstacles one by one.

At least they will continue to march resolutely in this direction.

To assess the Prosperity Party congress, one must go beyond the conventional standards and set out resolutely to understand the message Prosperity is delivering.

The messages from a different party are going to be different messages.

It is necessary to take this differentness in stride and accept the difference.

Otherwise, there are going to be misconceptions and wrong interpretations.

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POLITICAL

TURKEY

PROSPERITY PARTY SAID CALLING FOR CHANGE FROM LIBERAL VIEW

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 29 Jun 85 p 1

[Editorial: "Enough Already"]

[Text] Liberal views, leftist views, that is what has been in office for years. All of them have been the same. All of them have been dependent on the outside. All of them have allowed anarchy to get out of hand and made oppression worse. And all of them have steadily impoverished the nation. They have all thought it wonderful to work with the IMF, the EEC and other international financial institutions.

And national problems have gradually gained new dimensions, reaching a completely inextricable and irresolvable point.

The transition to multiparty life was made in Turkey after 1946. However, the major-circulation press and the parties, some under the influence of foreign powers, have, with their false propaganda, pursued for 40 years the goal of only promoting a "cock fight" in Turkey. First they decked out a party in the garb of this propaganda, then praised it to the skies and brought it to power. When that party became tarnished and everything went bad, then they polished up a reserve party and brought it to power. They brought it to power, but so what? It performed not one whit different from the other. One was an obstacle to any kind of development and the other completed the destruction. In this case, what was normal? If one was as incompetent as the other, what was the need to say it was necessary to seek a different remedy, a different view? No such thing was done. The old party that had been at the bottom of the pile last time was put on top this time. The same game has been played over and over for 40 years. Every 4 years, the same tactics are used. Ten times, the propaganda wheels have been set in motion to go from one national disaster to another. Every time, the dose of oppression, impoverishment, external dependence and discontent has grown and grown. And each time special care has been taken in only one thing. "Don't let the national conscience into administration whatever you do," it has been said. So this is the game that has been played for 40 years and the inside story on the game that has become so boring today. It is because of this that what you hear more than anything else today is "Enough already." This cry, representing the view of the people of conscience who come from the heart of the nation, has two aspects. One is that it is a cry to the parties which, regardless of whether leftist or liberal, have no fundamental difference and to the press that conducts their propaganda. Be fair, this nation belongs to all of us. What are you applauding? The IMF is setting civil service salaries; is that what you are applauding? Freedom of thought and opinion is prohibited and people are being tried in special courts for their beliefs; is that

what you are applauding? While the national income per capita and prosperity of every country in the world doubles every 10 years, prosperity in Turkey is reduced by half; is that what you are applauding?

So these are the meanings bound up in the cry /enough already/ [in boldface]. Another aspect of this cry has to do with the country. Be fair now o country! For 40 years you have chased now one now another and what have you gained? What has changed at bottom? What difference have you seen between them? In '78, the leftist view came to power and devalued the lira from 18 to 47; in '80, the so-called liberals came in and devalued from 47 to 70. One favored interest; so did the other! One depended on the IMF; so did the other! What is the difference between them? You brought in one and you brought in the other, and what changed? Did you always have to choose one of the corpses? Is 40 years a short time? Can't you sit down one day now, take your head in your hands and think? Does this course have an end? Look, debts now are not expressed in thousands or millions, but in trillions. The time has long passed for you to stop and say, "Enough already." Therefore, stop, think, seek and find the truth! This is what the Prosperity Party is telling the nation when it says, "Enough already."

The Prosperity Party is saying "enough already" because this process has run its course and it is asking:

--We have tried this so far, and what have we seen?

What has the liberal and leftist view brought other than external dependence, oppression, anarchy and poverty?

The only thing to do about this course of events is to unfurl the battle standard proclaiming "enough already," renounce the mistakes that have been made and act along the lines of Prosperity Party proposals.

Liberation lies in the predominance of the national conscience and the initiation without delay of the national thrust. In order to do this, the Prosperity Party stressed these matters at its first regular convention and fashioned them into slogans.

Each of these slogans contains mighty truths. It would be quite wrong in approach to consider them as mere slogans. All of them have vital importance. Careful observation reveals that the Prosperity Party evokes a different structure from the others with its slogans.

Yes, the Prosperity Party is a very different party...

And when Prosperity speaks, one absolutely must listen...

Because the Prosperity Party is showing the way to liberation.

Until the Prosperity Party concept of true independence dominates national administration, it will be impossible to speak readily of either political independence or economic independence.

For 6 days, while the Prosperity Party grand congress has been in progress, we have tried in these columns to interpret the slogans the party used in connection with this congress.

We believe that in doing this we are performing an invaluable national service. A mosquito sounds like a musical instrument to a person of understanding, but a drum and fife are not enough for one who isn't.

For the openminded, all facts are enlightenment.

Every country gets the government it deserves.

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POLITICAL

TURKEY

BAR ASSOCIATION HEAD CALLS POLICE ACT RISKY

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 29 Jun 84 p 3

[Text] Ankara - Bar Associations Union President Teoman Evren said that the amendments to the Police Duties and Powers Act would carry some risks for Turkey and may lead to hardships.

In explaining his views, Teoman Evren asked which general standards might be applied in determining violations of general morals rules. Evren noted that implementation in the sense of police intervention in actions contrary to the general rules of good conduct and decency "could inconvenience every sector of society as well as permit unspecified and arbitrary abuse." Evren said:

"More important is the lack of recourse for damages that enforcement may lead to. Just as people's value judgments are different in this regard, the police also doubtless have different judgments. We also know that there are even differences between the geographical regions of the country. Beyond all this, thought is also being given to how harmful such a rule might be in that it is somewhat risky from the standpoint of Turkish tourism."

Meanwhile, the Populist Party [PP] will appeal to the Constitutional Court on Tuesday, 2 July, for the repeal of eight laws approved by President Kenan Evren and passed by the TGNA [Turkish Grand National Assembly].

The rescission appeal, drawn up by Populist Party TGNA Group Vice Chairmen Onural Seref Bozkurt and Seyfi Oktay, will list risks the eight laws will entail as well as objections to procedure and form.

PP Group Vice Chairman Seyfi Oktay said they would request annulment of the second law passed by the TGNA on zoning, mining, amnesty, smuggling, agricultural sales cooperatives, the police publicity fund and cooperatives. He said laws had a 10-day period after publication in the RESMI GAZETE. Noting that the legal period would expire on Friday, 5 July, Oktay said, "There is no need for us to dash off to the Constitutional Court before the matter becomes routine. We will appeal the eight laws on procedure and form also, not just substance. To do this, we are studying all of the TGNA's minutes on the laws."

Meanwhile, work has begun at the Security General Directorate on preparation of a new 6-article code specifying the bases for implementation of the Police Duties and Powers Act.

After passage by the TGNA and approval by President Kenan Evren of the bill envisaging amendment of some articles of Police Duties and Powers Law No 2559 and the addition of new articles to the law, for the law to be implemented, preparation of new guidelines is necessary, according to information obtained from Security General Directorate officials by a TURKISH NEWS AGENCY correspondent.

A committee has been formed at the Security General Directorate to draw up a 6-article directive for this purpose. The committee will complete its work within 2 weeks at the most and submit the directive it prepares to the Council of Ministers.

Circular Sent Out

Meanwhile, after PP Party Chairman Necdet Calp and his parliamentary colleagues announced that they would bring suit at the Constitutional Court for rescission of the Police Duties and Powers Act, the Security General Directorate sent out a circular to the security organization about avoiding acts that would confirm the anxieties expressed by various circles.

The circular requests in particular that the concepts of "decency" and "general morals" contained in the law be borne in mind and that police not exaggerate this matter.

A top officer of the Security General Directorate said another circular would be sent out to the police organization following preparation of the directive specifying enforcement principles for the Police Duties and Powers Act.

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MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

GREATER EMPHASIS ON RESERVE FORCE TRAINING, INTEGRATION

Reserve Obligations Detailed

Bonn HEER in German Jun 85 pp 8-9

[Article by Inge Dose-Krohn: "No Rest for Reserves"]

[Text] Even after their discharge from the Bundeswehr, draftees and long-term personnel must put on their uniform again from time to time to take part in military exercises as reservists. In the years to come, this will be taking place more frequently than heretofore. The army's efforts to cope with the personnel shortage will place an additional strain on our reservists.

At the moment, the Bonn defense ministry is still working on a redefinition and emendation of the 1980 reservists plan. Last month, when the Association of Bundeswehr Reservists celebrated its 25th anniversary, a number of speakers called for greater use of the reservist pool. The number of political figures attending the association's celebration attests to the organization's reputation. Among those welcomed at the gathering by the association's president, Dr Hans-Michael Moll, were Dr Philipp Jenninger, the president of the Bundestag, Defense Minister Manfred Woerner along with his parliamentary State Secretary Peter Kurt Wuerzbach; Alfred Biehle, chairman of the Bundestag defense committee, as well as Willy Wimmer (CDU/CSU), Erwin Horn (SPD) and Uwe Ronneburger (FDP), the senior members of the committee representing the three major political parties and newly appointed defense representative Willi Weiskirch.

Willy Wimmer cited the "obvious political goal" of reorganizing the work of the reservists "because this is in keeping with the defense policy requirements of this country." SPD politician Erwin Horn said it was a unique situation that an association was being told what to do by the parliament. Uwe Ronneburger stressed the "non-partisanship of this association of reservists" which was pursuing its aims in a responsible and dedicated manner.

Defense Minister Woerner characterized the association's function as providing a link to the federal government. This function was spelled out in the so-called "switching point directive" issued by the defense ministry in October 1984 which applies to all Bundeswehr reservists, whether they are members of the association or not. Woerner then proceeded to get down to specifics. "We will be doubling the number of military training slots by the nineties," he said, "and this means that the number of those taking part in exercises will also have to be more than doubled. Without the reservists, the Bundeswehr cannot maintain its combat effectiveness and without reservists, the FRG cannot be defended, nor can it make its contribution to the alliance."

By the nineties, 15,000 more training slots will be available each year and this means that between 350,000 and 400,000 reservists annually will take part in military exercises. In other words, anyone who has a friend or relative who is in his mid-thirties and who no longer has to put on his uniform after his discharge from regular military service should harbor no illusions about the fact that he will be as fortunate as they.

It depends on a variety of factors how many times a reservist will be called during the 6 years he presently spends on the mobilization roster. Reservists belonging to combat units will train more often than those who served in some logistics unit. The same applies to reservists who received specialized training while on active duty.

The two categories of reservists are assigned and non-assigned; but both are subject to the draft: ordinary soldiers up to the age of 45, non-commissioned and commissioned officers up to the completion of their sixtieth year.

The non-assigned reservists include those who have completed their military service but with regard to whom no decision has been made as to how they will be used or who are no longer needed, either because of their particular qualifications or a lack of demand. This group also includes those who have been deferred or are not available for military service for other reasons. All these matters are under review because by now there certainly is no lack of demand for reservists.

Assigned reservists are used in the standby readiness reserve and subsequently, if need be, in the alert or personnel reserves. The 12-month standby readiness status follows the term of basic military service or, in the case of long-term servicemen, the actual termination of their military service. They receive a notification of callup and are required to be reachable at all times so that they can also be called to take part in a military exercise. And they can be sure that they will indeed participate in such exercises unless they happen to be exempted from them by law. But the servicemen concerned are informed of all the pertinent regulations upon discharge.

At the end of the 12 months, the reservists may, if need be, be assigned to the alert reserves. This applies to those servicemen "who are needed to bring the armed forces up to full defense strength," as the reserve directive puts it. Once in this status, the reservists may also be called up for individual military training. This applies particularly to reserve commissioned and non-commissioned officers but also to certain enlisted men who have some specialty to offer.

These individual courses are usually in the form of assignments to staffs or training programs. If someone was a platoon leader while on active duty, for example, and he is to qualify as a company commander in the reserves, he will have to complete the appropriate training course. This does not merely apply to those who simply want to become company commanders because in some branches of service there is not enough available personnel to bring them up to required strength. And this means that even those who are not really interested are tapped for such a post.

The personnel office, which is responsible for assignments, may defer a man from military service because he is in the middle of his university studies or because he cannot be spared by his civilian employer at a given time. But the deferment will not be extended forever; there comes a time when he will have to do his military service.

As far as reservists' assignments are concerned, they do not have to be based on skills acquired during their basic military service. An infantryman may easily find himself assigned to security duty in the territorial army and an artillery officer may wind up as a security platoon leader in a Home Defense brigade. This may not make him very happy; but his qualifications as a platoon leader are being put to use just the same.

There just is no other way because the potential number of infantrymen is simply too small to bring the armed forces up to defense strength. And this applies to the ranks in particular.

Exactly how many times a given reservist will have to take part in exercises in the future is hard to say. That will depend on the mobilization cycle which in turn will be oriented, as it is today, to the different needs of different units—with some units having to exercise more frequently than others because they might be needed immediately in case of a national emergency. But since the personnel problem is primarily due to the declining number of men on active duty, the need for reservists is on the rise as is the need for individual reservists to take part in more military exercises.

For another thing, additional units have to be organized to provide for Wartime Host Nation Support, among other things. These units have the job of preparing for the military as well as civilian support system for U.S. units which would be sent into the FRG to reinforce the American units already there in case of an emergency. More reservists than heretofore are being assigned to this job now.

The problem also affects a number of reservists subject to call-up. On the average, they may be called back for up to 6 years; but these average figures must always be taken with a grain of salt. The 1980 reservists directive has this to say on the subject:

"The length of an assignment to the alert reserve will primarily be determined by age because of the strenuous physical activity required. Reservists may be assigned to the alert reserve...beyond a certain age or even beyond military age altogether, provided no comparable younger reservists are available.

Insofar as the manpower needs of the armed forces permit it, assignment to the alert reserve may be waived for enlisted men of age 30; for non-commissioned officers beginning at age 30 and for reserve officers depending on their usability in a post commensurate with their military rank and age."

Anyone in the reserves, in other words, may be taken off the list, if a replacement for him can be found among personnel in active service units.

This is more easily done in the case of enlisted men than among the higher ranks. Some reserve officers today have been on the list for as long as 12 years—and their case is not as unusual as one might think. But as we have already said, this applies for the most part to specialists in any of the three branches of service. Too few men who have undergone equal training—be they draftees or long-term servicemen—are leaving active service for them to take over so that the others might at long last be taken off the list.

In any event, the assignment does terminate simultaneously with the end of their military service, i.e. when they have reached the cutoff age mentioned above.

Improved Refresher Training, Integration

Bonn BUNDESWEHR AKTUELL in German 26 Jun 85 p 2

[Directive by Bundeswehr Chief of Staff GEN Wolfgang Altenburg: "Need for Better Training, Higher Morale—Reservists of Increasing Importance to Armed Forces"]

[Text] The reserve corps, which would make up almost two-thirds of the personnel strength of the armed forces in case of a national emergency, is assuming ever increasing importance for the Bundeswehr in view of the low birth rate age groups coming of military age at this time. The military establishment will thus be faced by major problems regarding the training, integration and supervision of the reserve corps. This was reason enough for GEN Wolfgang Altenburg, the Bundeswehr's chief of staff, to re-emphasize the importance of reservists for the Bundeswehr. What follows is the text of his "directive for senior officers" on this subject:

Reservists make up almost two-thirds of the personnel strength of the armed forces. Over the next several years, the number of assigned reservists will further increase because of the need to augment the Wartime Host Nation Support organization as well as the structured personnel reserve and as a result of certain structural changes within the Bundeswehr itself.

Reservists not only make a contribution to the defense capabilities of the Bundeswehr but also to the defense readiness within our society by serving as a link between their civilian environment and the Bundeswehr and acting as multipliers in many instances.

The dual role of the reservists must be appreciated and supported by those on active duty to a greater extent than heretofore. This is both a challenge and a task for all soldiers on active duty, but in particular for all senior officers.

The basic guidelines for the task-oriented utilization of reservists as well as their training and advanced training are contained in the Bundeswehr reserves directive dated 29 May 1980. The appropriate regulations are contained in additional directives, decrees and orders of the day.

Since August 1983, the deputy chief of staff of the ground forces has been coordinating all reservist affairs as my representative for reservist affairs. Under his direction, a number of additional procedures with regard to the utilization of reservists have been worked out and are at this time being transformed into directives.

It is our purpose to apply the existing guidelines giving due consideration to the requirements of the service and the personal circumstances of the reservists and to exercise control over them within the framework of command supervision.

Prior to the termination of their basic military service, draftees are to be informed by their unit commanders about the importance of the reservists as well as the support to be extended to them and the duties to be performed by them.

In their mobilization units, reservists are to find a military home. Targeted assignments are a crucial precondition for this and the establishment of mobilization camaraderie is another important step to be taken.

For this reason, commanding officers should exercise just as much influence on the selection of their reservists as on the selection of their personnel on active duty. Mobilization unit commanders are to be a part of the selection process whenever possible.

Qualified reservists are to be encouraged to volunteer for specific assignments. Assigned reservists should not be subject to age limitations which may be applied in a flexible manner depending on need and qualification.

The training programs which draftees undergo during their basic military service must already emphasize those factors which will be of importance for making proper use of a serviceman's qualifications under mobilization conditions. The content of military training programs is to be oriented toward its usability for mobilization assignments. The reservists have a right to expect that their basic and advanced military training be well prepared and that it proceed in a meaningful fashion.

No matter whether they are called up during a mobilization or not, reservists should be integrated into reserve activities in their home environment by territorial command authorities. This is of crucial importance for the motivation of all reservists and for their defense readiness as well as that of their immediate environment.

In the fulfillment of this mission, the territorial command authorities will need the resolute assistance of all branches of service and other agencies. The latter should also serve to enhance cooperation with the various chapters of the Bundeswehr Reservists Association, which in its turn serves as the link between the Bundeswehr and other organizations whose membership is composed at least in part of reservists.

An effort should be made to establish partnerships between active units and reservist groups on a voluntary basis.

Reservists organized in associations as well as individual interested reservists should be given an opportunity to receive support from units in their home area through the assistance of the Reservists Association and the territorial command authorities. They are thereby provided with a military home at their place of residence and should also be invited to take part in appropriate events.

The armed forces are to treat and support the reservists as equal as well as equally important partners of the soldiering community.

I expect all commanding officers to make the importance of the reservists emphatically clear to their subordinates; to provide for an equally orderly transition of their active soldiers to reservist status as in the case of the induction of recruits; to see to it that the support and proper use of reservists within their area of jurisdiction as well as their basic and advanced training be given even more careful attention than heretofore; to take all appropriate steps to instill more life into their mobilization units; to provide for reservist activities in their unit or agency and to do their best to support the reservist activities of the territorial command authorities; to invite the reservists to take part in community life at every opportunity and to put an end to problems with regard to reserve activities and the treatment of reservists by means of intensive supervision.

Employer Cooperation Sought

Bonn BUNDESWEHR AKTUELL in German 20 Jun 85 p 3

[Article by Gunter Kuhlmann: "Reserve Planning Calls for New Ideas—Army Deputy Chief of Staff Spells Out New Reservist Plan to Industry Representatives, Bureaucracy"]

[Text] The aftereffects of the low birth rate years which are causing grade school classes to become smaller these days and have led to school closures here and there will inevitably affect the Bundeswehr during the next few years as well. In just a few years, a great many fewer draftees will be eligible for basic military service. Some of the steps envisaged as a means to satisfy the Bundeswehr's manpower requirements include a proposal to lengthen basic military service from 15 to 18 months and to provide more training slots than before. The latter proposal would mean that more reservists from industry and the administrative sector would be called up for training than in years past. LT GEN Heinz Kasch, the army deputy chief of staff who has been given the job of reservist affairs adviser, recently started out on a trip which is to take him to all military districts throughout the FRG and the purpose of which is to ask the leaders of industry and government for support for the new reservists guidelines. Kasch's first stop was at the Schleswig-Holstein territorial command headquarters in Kiel.

To be sure, the defense ministry will have to engage in a good deal more public relations work to convince labor and management of the need to rely on the reservists' pool to a greater extent in the future. At a time when the labor market is tight, even a well-meaning reservist will start wondering as he opens the "blue letter" from his district selective service board whether he can really "afford" to be away from his job for one or more weeks. Even now, a fairly sizable number of mobilization-assigned reservists spend part of their annual vacation on reserve training programs.

But the majority of the reservists needed in future years will hardly be willing to do as much—the more so since this readiness to make sacrifices can hardly be brought in line with existing regulations, e.g. paragraph 8 of the federal vacation law which prohibits activities contrary to the need for leisure.

In drawing up their future plans, both the employers in industry and the agency heads in the bureaucracy will be looking out for their own, if they are asked to let more of their employees go off on military exercises. Industry in particular is likely to submit more requests than before to take time factors into consideration when members of their staff are called up, e.g. to call them up at times when they can actually be spared. Exemptions whenever the public interest or the position of the employer seem to indicate such or deferments from specific training programs whenever they represent personal hardship for the reservist concerned are possible avenues provided by the legislature to meet the private and public sector employers and their individual employees halfway.

At this time, after all, the reservists already make up two-thirds of the personnel required for our country's defense capability. In addition to the 495,000-man peacetime army, about 750,000 mobilization-assigned reservists are needed in case of a national defense emergency. Until 1987, another 83,000 reservists will be assigned to the Wartime Host Nation Support organization needed to support the U.S. reinforcement units.

In 1984, some 180,000 reservists took part in training programs which averaged 11 days in duration. The reservists are used both to augment active units and to serve in cadre-strength units which are to be fully mobilized.

As mentioned above, the FRG government plans to get a bill through the Bundestag by the end of the current legislative session which will extend basic military service to 18 months in order to be able to satisfy the armed forces' manpower needs in the nineties. By 1995, the number of military training slots will increase to 15,000. This means that it will be possible to call up a great many more reservists to such exercises than before. As the overall number of draftees declines, the growth rate

of the reservists' pool will decline as well. As a consequence, the reservists of the nineties will have to remain on the mobilization roster longer so that the defense strength of the armed forces can be maintained at the proper level. The individual reservist will therefore have to face the fact that he will be called back to duty more often during the course of his working life than before, insofar as he is physically fit for military service.

Faced with the prospect of being called up more frequently, the reservists themselves are calling on the Bundeswehr to make the service more attractive and to make improvements with regard to job-oriented utilization and training. On this subject LT GEN Kasch said in Kiel that studies are under way and that some qualitative improvements have already been undertaken. The general added that the reservists' function goes beyond their service in the Bundeswehr in that they serve as a link between the Bundeswehr and society, thereby enhancing the defense readiness of the entire population. As a trained soldier and "expert," the reservist is in a position to clarify the need for the defense effort in his capacity as a citizen and a member of the reserve. This applies in particular to informing young people and those about to reach draft age, LT GEN Kasch went on to say, and this in turn means that voluntary reserve activities should be intensified appreciably. There is a need for rethinking in our society, he said. We should not be asking what the country can do for its citizens but what the individual citizen can do for his country, the general said, in alluding to the statement made by former U.S. President Kennedy.

Newly Constituted Reserve Brigade

Bonn BUNDESWEHR AKTUELL in German 13 Jun 85 p 1

[Unattributed article: "A New Chapter"]

[Text] A new chapter in the history of the Home Defense Force has begun. In 1982, plans were drawn up to organize the 65th Home Defense Brigade, a companion unit to the 55th Home Defense Brigade in Boebling. The unit has now been turned over to COL Klaus Gottwald by MAJ GEN Frank Schild, commander of the 5th military district.

As distinct from the Boebling brigade, which is made up for the most part of active soldiers, the 65th Home Defense Brigade is made up almost entirely of reservists. Normally, only 50 soldiers and civilian personnel are on duty; but in case of reserve exercises or mobilization, the unit increases in strength to about 3,000 men. In an address on the occasion of the transfer ceremony at the Theodor Heuss barracks in Bad Cannstatt, MAJ GEN Schild emphasized the special significance of the reserve corps. "The reservists represent the most precious capital of the brigade," he said. "Their commitment provides the lifeblood of the 65th Home Defense Brigade."

The military district commander expressed his gratitude to COL Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg, the commanding officer of the 55th Home Defense Brigade, for his important contribution.

9478

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MILITARY

GREECE

ALLEGED PRESENCE IN AEGEAN OF FRENCH NUCLEAR MISSILES

Athens PONDIKI in Greek 12 Jul 85 p 3

[Excerpts] It wasn't enough to have the problems of the U.S. nuclear missiles in our country, but it seems now that we shall soon be compelled to deal with some... little missiles manufactured and owned by the French, which:

- are based in the Aegean!!!
- are aimed at the Soviet Union!!!

This information was published by the French magazine V.S.D., which wrote in its "Confidential column (N.D. - this magazine claims to have its own sources of information in the secret services) that out of the five existing French nuclear submarines permanently positioned around the world:

- one is located in Norwegian waters and its missiles are aimed at Moscow;
- one is located in the Indian Ocean and its mission is to destroy the USSR's industrial belt from Kiev to Central Asia;
- one is lurking somewhere in the Aegean, with its nuclear missiles targeted against the Caucasus!!!

As for the U.S. nuclear warheads in our country, we cannot tell you exactly how many there are.

Is that true? Is the French magazine right?

CSO: 3521/305

MILITARY

TURKEY

STATUS OF TOP-RANKING MILITARY OFFICERS UP FOR REVIEW

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 24 May 85 pp 1, 7

[Text] Ankara, Special - The status of eight generals is to be reviewed, and 74 generals and admirals of various ranks will be reviewed for promotion.

The Supreme Military Council, which is to meet the first week of August, will be chaired by Prime Minister Turgut Ozal and its work will be headed by Chief of Staff General Necdet Urug.

The generals and admirals who are at the top of their rank and whose tours of command are up are:

Gen Haydar Saltik (Ground Forces Commander), Adm Zahit Atakan (Naval Commander), Gen Necdet Ozturun (Deputy Chief of General Staff), Gen Halil Sozer (Air Force Commander), Gen Mehmet Buyruk (Gendarmerie General Commander), Gen Ismail Hakki Akansel (Aegean Army Commander), Gen Ragip Ulugbay (NATO Izmir Southeastern Allied Forces Commander), Gen Nusret Toroslu (National Security Council General Secretary).

The generals and admirals who are up for review for promotion are, by force command:

Ground Forces Command

Lieutenant Generals: There are six lieutenant generals due for promotion to general. They are Lt Gen Sabri Delic, Lt Gen Burhanettin Bigali, Lt Gen Kaya Yazgan, Lt Gen Dogan Gures, Lt Gen Ecmel Kutay and Lt Gen Edip Bayoglu. At most, three of those six lieutenant generals are expected to be promoted to the top rank of general.

Major Generals: There are nine major generals in the Ground Forces Command due for promotion, of whom five at most are expected to be promoted to lieutenant general. They are:

Maj Gen Hayri Undul, Maj Gen Sabahattin Akinci, Maj Gen I. Hakki Karadayi, Maj Gen Ekrem Dinc, Maj Gen M. Fikret Bilgiler, Maj Gen Ersen N. Kayra, Maj Gen M. Ilhan Atabas, Maj Gen I. Nihat Ozen.

Brigadier Generals: The names of the 25 brigadier generals due for promotion to major general are:

Brig Gen Bahattin Ortac, Brig Gen Aday Sakman, Brig Gen Teoman Koman, Brig Gen Turgut Toprak, Brig Gen Sadullah Ozbakir, Brig Gen Tacettin Baseren, Brig Gen Salih Acaarel, Brig Gen Hayrettin Akin, Brig Gen A. Kutlu Sekban, Brig Gen A. Riza Koker, Brig Gen Sadrettin Celikoglu, Brig Gen Hidayet Gungor, Brig Gen Ismet Avsar, Brig Gen Fikret Atun, Brig Gen Muzafer Sever, Brig Gen S. Ahmet Demiral, Brig Gen Gurbuz Aydemir, Brig Gen S. Nadir Guven, Brig Gen Necdet Ozcan, Brig Gen Y. Ihsan Babur, Brig Gen Sukru Yazirdag, Brig Gen Turhan Ozcelik, Brig Gen Cevat Temizer, Brig Gen Cevat Ulkekul, Brig Gen Erdogan Ererdal.

Only 12 at most of these brigadier generals are expected to be promoted to higher rank.

Naval Forces Command

One Vice Admiral: There is only one vice admiral in the Naval Forces Command due for promotion to admiral. That is Northern Sea Commander V Adm Orhan Karabulut.

Rear Admirals: R Adm Fuat Ugur and R Adm Fikri Topsever are due for promotion to vice admiral. Only one is expected to make vice admiral.

Commodores: Four commodores of whom at least two are expected to be promoted to rear admiral are:

Com Salim Dervisoglu, Com Raif Naldemir, Com Turhan Ozer, Com Yasar Onkal.

Air Force Command

Lieutenant Generals: There are three Air Force lieutenant generals due for promotion to general. They are Lt Gen Hikmet Kesim, Lt Gen Safer Necioglu and Lt Gen Ismet Caglar. Only one or two of these lieutenant generals are expected to be promoted.

Major Generals: The number of major generals due for promotion is four: Maj Gen S. Sadi Kaban, Maj Gen Hamdi Koseoglu, Maj Gen Fahrettin Tezel, Maj Gen Mustafa Koseoglu. Two of these are expected to be promoted to lieutenant general.

Brigadier Generals: Eleven officers are due for promotion from brigadier general: Brig Gen Ilhan Kilic, Brig Gen Uluer Ecerel, Brig Gen Erdogan Oznal, Brig Gen Vural A. Aktulay, Brig Gen Y. Baki Aydin, Brig Gen Cemil Tan, Brig Gen Unal Dereli, Brig Gen Zeki Ozdilekcan, Brig Gen M. Kamil Aydin, Brig Gen Erdogan Over, Brig Gen Nurhan Aydinalp.

Four or five brigadier generals are expected to be promoted to the next rank of major general.

Gendarmerie General Command

One Lieutenant General: Lt Gen Mehmet Kiral is the only one up for promotion to general.

Major Generals: Brig Gen Rifat S. Evcan and Brig Gen Adnan Coskun are due for promotion to major general.

Brigadier generals due for promotion to major general at the Gulhane Military Academy of Medicine are: Brig Gen Omer Y. Sarlak, Brig Gen S. Cengiz Alp and Brig Gen Cevdet Demirkol. Ercument Palabiyikoglu, now a brigadier general, and Brig Gen Fethi Sungu are expected to retire on age limit.

Brig Gen Hikmet Tarukcuoglu is the only one due for promotion on the Military Supreme Court of Appeal.

Colonels: The Supreme Military Council will also have to promote to brigadier general up to of the staff and class officers divided among the force commands.

Qualifications Sought

Supreme Military Council qualifications for promotion are:

- Character, honesty, poise and seriousness.
- Command, leadership and administration and follow-through capabilities.
- Knowledge of headquarters service and procedures and executive ability.
- Family and social status of self, wife and children.
- Compliance with principles of fairness and justice.
- Ability to articulate opinions pertaining to the service.
- Opinion of superiors and supervisors and their observations of appropriate behavior and conversation.
- Whether special effort has been made to obtain appointment.
- Solicitude and respect for subordinates and staff.
- His unit's Oversight Council score.

8349

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ECONOMIC

AUSTRIA

INCREASING UNEMPLOYMENT RATE CAUSES CONCERN

Vienna PROFIL in German 24 Jun 85 pp 23-24

[Article by Herbert Langsner: "Sleep Well, Comrades"]

[Text] OeGB [Austrian Trade Union Federation] and government are stroking industry and scratching the unemployed, who are multiplying merrily.

Vienna Printing firm owner Anton Tusch is plagued by peculiar worries. His company of 280 workers is "operating at full capacity," he says and is in urgent need of personnel replenishment, but "the people I need I cannot find." Tusch seeks printers, typesetters and maintenance men through constant advertising, offering good pay and retraining opportunities--all in vain. Overtime in his company has long since exceeded permitted limits.

So it was the last straw for the busy Tusch, who also produces international magazines such as the fashionable women's magazine COSMOPOLITAN, when of all outfits the Printers Union assumed the role of pioneer in seeking a shorter workweek. Since 1 April of this year, 25,000 workers of the graphics industry have worked no more than 38 hours a week, and at the same time the sugar industry too experimentally switched to a 38-hour workweek for 2,000 workers.

The only way left for printer Anton Tusch to react to the shortening of the workweek was more overtime, "though," he says, "I would have liked to hire new personnel."

Golden words for the ears of those who claim that even a small change in the workweek has an effect on employment! Only, Tusch is pretty much alone with his plans for expansion. While the remainder of his branch of industry deplores instances of unproductiveness resulting from idle machinery and organizational difficulties, particularly in the three-shift operation in effect since the 2-hour shortening of the workweek, hardly anyone is considering hiring new personnel. An investigation by the main association of graphics enterprises last December in fact established the following: The 252 companies polled, employing 9,700 workers affected by the shortening of the workweek (white-collar personnel continue to work a 40-hour workweek), planned to hire only 18 new workers--13 skilled ones and 5 auxiliary ones--because of the shortening of the workweek.

One reason why the result is so meager is that large newspaper companies like KRONE and KURIER for some time now have had their printers work only 36 hours a week anyway. Another reason is that a 2-hour shortening is easily offset by overtime or accelerated investment in rationalization or, if the company is not working at full capacity, is not offset at all.

In the sugar industry everything is quite different anyway. There only maintenance work takes place between January and October, with personnel constantly being laid off. "Possibly the reduction in the workweek will slow down this process of reduction somewhat," sugar spokesman Richard Skin estimates.

Even after a trial period of 12 weeks, it is still not clear whether the 38-hour workweek creates jobs. According to the secretary of the Printers Union, Franz Murmann, "no results are available as yet."

In the FRG, where 3.6 million metalworkers have been working 38½ hours a week since April, a lack of clarity prevails as well. Whereas 80,000 additional job seekers have found work in the German metal industry in the past few months (something IG Metall [Metalworkers Union] attributes to its success in having the workweek shortened), business counters with the argument that it is primarily due to the upswing initiated by the United States that the demand has risen again, particularly in the automobile sector.

No side has offered conclusive evidence, however. And there might be a Nobel prize available for any economist who solves the confusing question as to how many people are not laid off as a result of the shortening of the workweek. Actually only a couple of things are certain:

1. The conservative philosophy of propping up companies by forgoing a shortening of the workweek, by easing the tax burden, through wage restraint and a general policy of economizing with a view to increasing investment expenditure, has failed more or less as an instrument for fighting unemployment. In the FRG the unemployment rate has remained a worrisome 9.3 percent (2 million Germans without work), and in Austria an average rate of 4.7 percent is being predicted for this year. The trend is for an increase in each instance.
2. The Austrian trade unions and the Sinowatz-Steger government are not taking any steps to counter this trend forcefully. On the contrary, Finance Minister Franz Vranitzky caters to the applause of the industrialist chief Herbert Krejci for his actions in economic policy, Creditanstalt boss Hannes Androsch talks about retention [in insurance] in the hospital industry, and the municipality of Vienna is cutting social assistance.

Meanwhile labor is fighting strongly for a shorter workweek, as if this was a concern of business. Labor Chamber chief Adolf Czettel of the Metalworkers Union, for instance--just like the late Karl Sekanina at one time--is conducting "ongoing negotiations," and doing so "on the basis of the decisions of the 10th OeGB Congress," which in 1983 in principle provided for shortening the workweek in individual branches of industry. Though Czettel wants to include the question of the workweek in the fall collective agreement negotiations, he is not saying anything about the "when, how and how much." In other words, no real progress is being made.

The same is true of the white-collar workers of industry. Not quite a year ago their managing secretary, Heinz Vogler, already referred to "constant negotiations" which must not be disturbed by premature statements, especially at this time. Today Vogler says: "We are constantly negotiating." And this despite the fact that productivity in industry, with 5.5 percent in 1983 and 5.2 percent in 1984, has definitely increased more than the economy as a whole (2.5 to 3 percent).

Only the union secretary of the employees of the insurance industry, Helmut Mojescick, takes a harder line, saying that, if possible, he wants to obtain a "clear shortening of the workweek to below 38 hours" effective at the start of 1986, "with full wage compensation." According to him, the flourishing insurance companies, with growth rates of more than 10 percent annually and a constant or decreasing complement of personnel, can well afford it. The Wiener Staedtische [Vienna Municipal] insurance company in fact has already taken pertinent steps: since the start of April 1985, 20 minutes of the lunch break have been recognized as work time--a de facto shortening of the workweek by 100 minutes.

A little more aggressiveness would also be appropriate for the rest of OeGB chief Benya's crew, particularly since it has been shown that the "golden Austrian way" out of the economic difficulties, though conciliatory and without disputes, has not been necessarily as successful as those in power would have one believe. Austria is in fact considerably better off than average, in the Western world as far as unemployment is concerned, but says the party-politically neutral head of WIFO [Economic Research Institute], Helmut Kraner, showing those in power the way back to reality, "we went into the last recession with a much lower threshold of unemployment."

In other words, Austria's advantage dates back to the first economic crisis of 1974-1975. A greater need to catch up, particularly in the services sector, and the shortening of the workweek from 42 to 40 hours in 1975 made it easier for Austria than for other industrialized countries to weather the crisis at that time.

As for the crisis of the eighties, Austria did not react much better or worse than the rest of the countries.

This is borne out by the facts. The Reagan upswing has lasted almost 3 years, and the (absolute) number of employed is increasing. But along with it, unemployment too is increasing. For 1986 already, WIFO expert Gudrun Biffel forecasts a rate of 4.9 percent. Young people (between 15 and 25) are faring particularly badly. The share of youth unemployment increased from 27.7 percent in 1982 to 30.8 percent in 1984. This means that last year 41,500 youths applied in vain to the Labor Office. Finally, the particularly hopeless group of permanent unemployed (more than 6 months without work) increased from 16.1 percent in 1981 to 28.3 percent in 1984.

The future is not promising either. According to an economic law, the greater the unemployment threshold at the beginning of a recession, the worse the after-effects of the economic crisis. This threshold is already too high--at a time when the international economic barometers are already registering a slowdown of the upswing in the United States.

And pointing to fabulous new technologies (the catchword is protection of the environment) which will again offer work for everyone signifies wishful thinking. Lets us take a look at the nationalized Simmering-Graz-Pauker-Werke [SGP]. This company concerned itself in good time with environmental technology, and its turnover rose from about 500 million to 2 billion [schillings] through industrial catalyzers and detoxication and industrial waste disposal installations in a period of 2 years. In addition, SGP also manufactures the low-platform coaches which in the future are intended to transport the majority of the trucks rolling through Austria by rail. All in all, in other words, the SGP fits exactly the image of a forward-looking company concerned with "work through environmental protection."

Not so. While orders remained at the same level, SGP has laid off 600 workers (9 percent annually) in the past year and a half. "And the shrinking process will have to continue," conceded SGP boss Klaus Woltron.

So the 38-hour week, which the metal industry probably will have to swallow some time next year, will not be of much use either. The remaining unions also will have to plug more strongly for a reduction of the workweek if they want to escape the charge that their power is less than that of their counterparts in conservatively governed Germany. There the workers of the wood- and the plastic-processing industry and retail trade already have in their pockets their agreements concerning a reduction of the workweek by 1½ or 2 hours.

A more radical reduction which would destroy the strange solidarity between business and the employed, who are more interested in wage rises, in favor of the unemployed is not in sight anyway.

Even former radical Alfred Dallinger only cautiously advocates a 35-hour week for his private industry union as of 1 January 1986. And in doing so he even meets with skepticism on the part of his better-behaved comrades. His metal industry counterpart, Czettel, for example, says sarcastically: "What the minister for social administration thinks is his affair."

8790

CSO: 3620/383

ECONOMIC

DENMARK/GREENLAND

ECONOMIC CRISIS INCREASES PRESSURE TO TAKE OVER TRADING FIRM

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 3 Jul 85 Sect III p 11

[Article: "Home Rule Government Takes Over KGH"]

[Text] Greenland economy battered by inexplicably
serious decline in cod fishing

The catch, especially of cod, is catastrophically low in Greenland's navigable waters. The catch figures continue to decline and there still is no clear explanation of why, but this has occurred following three unusually hard winters. The result has been that the national treasury has been required to increase its subsidy for the Royal Greenland Trade Company (KGH) from 159 million kroner in 1983 to 204 million kroner in 1984, based on overall sales of 2.765 billion kroner as opposed to 2.701 billion kroner the year before.

A study group is endeavoring to have the Greenland local parliament and the Danish Parliament reach a decision soon on the takeover by the home rule government of all of KGH as soon as possible, and preferably as soon as 1 January 1986. Everything suggests that this will be possible, according to the latest annual report for KGH. KGH is to be taken over in its present form, with all employees retaining the jobs they have now.

Will Not Close

The catastrophic decline in the cod catch is demonstrated by the fact that 8,000 tons of cod were taken in during 1984 as contrasted with 18,300 tons in 1983 and 21,300 tons in 1982. Consideration has been given to stopping the fishing completely, and to berthing a portion of the trawlers, closing the fillet departments of the plant facilities and discharging a significant percentage of the personnel. There has been a reluctance to do this because of personnel considerations.

Shrimp fishing has been normal, but the quotas impose limits on how much can be caught. The advance in the shrimp take was from 14,700 tons to 16,900 tons in 1984. Among other things, shrimp which have been cooked at sea, and raw shrimp, have been delivered to the Japanese market for about 34 million kroner (compared with 22 million kroner the year before).

Competition

KGH's production activity and sales organization were transferred to the Greenland home rule government on 1 January 1985. Production, which employs 1,370 workers, operates nine plant facilities and 60 smaller production facilities in Greenland. The fish are delivered, among other methods, by nine sea-going trawlers which are owned and operated by KGH. Sales include shrimp products (66%), cod products (21%), halibut (6%) and salmon products (1%), seal skins and lamb products.

The supply activity, with 1,235 workers, has storage facilities, retail outlets, tank facilities, and bakeries, and had a profit of 29 million kroner. The ever-growing and successful private businesses pose significant competition particularly in large cities, where KGH's retail stores are prohibited from expanding, according to the annual report, where this fact is noted with a little sigh.

Atlantic Profits

The Atlantic ships sailed to Greenland with 330,400 metric tons of goods last year, and carried 168,800 metric tons of goods back to Denmark. This included six ships owned by KGH and 12 which were chartered. The result of this traffic was a profit of 8.5 million kroner against a subsidy the year before of 5.5 million kroner--an advance which is due particularly to an increase in freight rates. Subsidies were required in the amount of about 13 million kroner for the airports in Godthaab and Jakobshavn along with helicopters in various Greenland cities.

The overall number of employees was 4,751, of which 81 percent were employed in Greenland. A decrease of 227 has occurred in the number of employees in Greenland, which is attributable especially to decreased activity within the production area. Payroll in Greenland was 498 million kroner and in Denmark, 162 million kroner. The average increase in monthly salaries in Greenland was about 10 percent, while it was about six percent in Denmark.

12578

CSO: 3613/165

ECONOMIC

PORTUGAL

LACK OF INVESTMENT COULD WEAKEN POSITION IN EEC

Lisbon O DIA in Portuguese 18 May 85 p 4

[Commentary by F. Sarsfield Cabral: "Future Poverty"]

[Text] The most recent figures obtained by the Bank of Portugal indicate that the deficit in the current balance of payments for last year may have reached 520 million dollars, which would be less than half the limit (1.25 billion dollars) allowed under the IMF agreement. But this result still does not appear to justify setting off fireworks. The very excess in the correction of the imbalance shows how everything is being done somewhat blindly and with extreme harshness. What's worse is that the avowed target of this governmental pseudo courage has been not only private consumption but productive investment as well, while the State's expenses go right on calmly increasing, and with them the budget deficit.

Officially the decline in the overall formation of fixed capital in 1984 was 20 percent, but more realistic figures indicate a rate of 25 percent, with the decline in industrial investment falling between 30 and 35 percent. In the current year there is no way that any recovery might make up for such a strong decline -- quite the contrary, it will not be surprising if industrial investment by the end of the year shows a further drop of perhaps around 10 percent.

We have reduced the foreign deficit, foreign creditors are unworried (although they are not happy about the growing deficit of the public sector), and the government seems to be satisfied as well, so much so that there is no further talk of economic development policies. Symptomatic of this is the ridiculous Financial and Economic Recovery Program [PRFE], presented almost a year ago, approved (?) only in broad outline by the government two and a half months ago but still not put into effect nor even known to the public in its definitive version (and it is doubtful whether, after these vicissitudes, there is still any practical interest in rehashing the PRFE). Likewise the Program for the Modernization of the Portuguese Economy, promised for December, seems to have fallen into oblivion. In view of this inability of the government to keep to its own schedules, it is not surprising that investment has shriveled.

Raising credit ceilings and lowering the interest rate may give an illusion of economic rejuvenation and pay off in electoral terms but it does little

good in helping to promote investment. Further, in a country in which businesses are excessively dependent on bank credit, it would be much more useful to develop the capital market, particularly the supply of venture capital. Except that that would necessitate a totally different financial, legal, and psychological framework.

To invest is to create future wealth. Since we are not investing, we are going to go into the EEC with an aging, and therefore noncompetitive, productive apparatus. Or in other words, we are now sowing the seeds of future poverty.

12430

CSO: 3542/179

ECONOMIC

PORTUGAL

IMPORT, EXPORT DATA SHOW TRADE DEFICIT DECREASE

Lisbon 0 DIA in Portuguese 19 May 85 p 4

[Text] Portugal's foreign trade deficit declined 49 percent in dollars for the first quarter of this year, as reported by the National Statistics Institute (INE).

In escudos the Portuguese foreign trade balance decreased 32.8 percent, reflecting a significant improvement in comparison with the decreases recorded in the first quarter of the two previous years: 8.7 percent in 1984 and 1.8 percent in 1983, the INE notes.

During this period Portuguese exports rose 30 percent to a total of 228.75 million contos, while imports rose only 7.3 percent to 295.55 million contos.

The coverage rate of imports by exports was thus 77.4 percent, compared with 63.9 and 49.7, respectively, for the same periods in 1984 and 1983.

Of special note is the improvement in Portugal's trade balance with the OECD countries, essentially due to the decrease in the deficit with the United States, which went from 37.3 million contos in 1984 to 13.1 million in 1985.

The total negative balance with the OECD countries went from 47.3 million contos in 1984 to 5.2 million in 1985, the difference between 196.5 million contos in imports and 191.3 million contos in exports.

The EEC, for its part, held a significant place in Portugal's foreign economic relations during the first quarter, supplying 39.5 percent of Portuguese foreign purchases and buying 56.9 percent of the country's foreign sales.

Because of the more rapidly developing growth of Portugal's exports over imports, its trade balance with the EEC has been evolving in favor of Portugal, the INE points out.

Thus, in the first quarter of this year, it went from deficits on the order of 25.6 million contos in 1983 and 0.6 million in 1984 to a positive balance of 13.3 million contos.

Within EEC markets, Portugal showed negative balances only with Italy (4.416 million contos) and the UK (2.733 million contos).

In this context, it should also be pointed out that Portugal had a favorable coverage rate with Denmark of 276.6 percent, followed by 141.7 percent with France and 138.9 percent with Holland.

With the EFTA, Portugal likewise kept a favorable trade balance, increasing from 8.3 million contos in 1984 to 11.7 contos in 1985.

With the countries making up the old Escudo zone (AZE), Portuguese imports for the first three months of this year rose to 4.9 million contos, a significant increase over the 0.9 million contos recorded in 1984.

This growth resulted primarily from an increase in Portuguese purchases from Angola, which went from 0.5 million contos in 1984 to 4.7 million in 1985.

Portuguese exports to the AZE during that period totaled 8.6 million contos, as against 7.9 million in 1984.

Trade with the OPEC countries, however, showed a deficit of 49.8 million contos, 10.8 million more than the negative balance logged in the same period of 1984, representing 74.5 percent of the total Portuguese foreign trade deficit.

12430

CSO: 3542/179

ECONOMIC

PORTUGAL

FIRST QUARTER UNEMPLOYMENT FIGURES SHOW SLIGHT IMPROVEMENT

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 17 May 85 p 16

[Text] Unemployment grew less in the first quarter than in 1984. The number of unemployed registered with the Employment Centers of the Mainland and Autonomous Regions at the end of March rose to more than 343,000 persons. This figure represents an increase of one percent over the previous month and is slightly less than the figure for the same period of the previous year (1.3 percent).

In annual terms, the growth in unemployment was 14.7 percent. Taking account of the variations in the first months of the year, 16.2 and 15.1 percent respectively, for January and February, this confirms a slight decrease in the rate of unemployment growth.

According to these data, just released by the Institute of Employment and Professional Training, the monthly increase in unemployment was higher for males and for first-time job applicants. At the same time, jobs in agriculture showed a strong increase in unemployment, greater than 8 percent, although this figure can be attributed to seasonal factors. In contrast, in the tertiary job categories in industry and civil construction there was a slight increase in the number of jobs.

The number of people receiving unemployment compensation grew during the month to more than 83 thousand, an increase of almost 5 percent in relation to February. The number of additions totaled 848, for a total of 15,658 unemployment applications (more than 11 thousand applicants for unemployment compensation).

Job offers rose to 3,580 (12 1/2 percent more than in February), and throughout the month almost 2,000 were reported (one third more). This shows a certain renewed optimism in this variable, which however is still at a very low level in terms of both activity and net figures.

/Table Captions/

UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1985								
	Job Appli- cations	Unemployed					On Unem- ployment Compen- sation	Job Offers
		Total	Men	Women	First Job	New Job		
Absolute Values								
Dec. 1984	329,481	320,525	133,850	186,675	57,586	262,939	73,822	2,941
Jan. 1985	334,773	325,799	136,749	189,050	57,257	268,542	76,644	3,064
Feb. 1985(p)	340,663	331,626	139,642	191,984	57,442	274,184	79,345	3,181
Mar. 1985(p)	343,879	334,941	141,865	193,076	57,101	277,840	83,159	3,580
Mar. 1984	300,859	291,905	110,655	181,240	55,635	236,270	72,143	4,289
Variations (%)								
Jan. 1985								
Dec. 1984	+ 1.6	+ 1.6	+ 2.2	+ 1.3	- 0.6	+ 2.1	+ 3.8	+ 4.2
Feb. 1985(p)								
Jan. 1985	+ 1.8	+ 1.8	+ 2.1	+ 1.6	- 0.3	+ 2.1	+ 3.5	+ 3.8
Mar. 1985(p)	+ 0.9	+ 1.0	+ 1.6	+ 0.6	- 0.6	+ 1.3	+ 4.8	+12.5
Feb. 1985(p)								
Mar. 1985(p)	+14.3	+14.7	+28.2	+ 6.5	+ 2.6	+17.6	+15.3	-16.5
Mar. 1984								
Mar. 1984								
Feb. 1984	+ 1.3	+ 1.3	+ 2.7	+ 0.5	+ 0.1	+ 1.6	+ 0.4	- 1.7

Source: Institute of Employment and Professional Training

[Editor's note: The (p) above is not footnoted in the table. It may mean 'provisorio'(tentative).]

12430

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ECONOMIC

PORTUGAL

APRIL BALANCE OF TRADE FIGURES ENCOURAGING

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 22 Jun 85 p 19

[Text] In the first four months of this year, Portugal recorded exports running at 78.4 percent of imports, the highest average for this period in ten years, according to provisional figures released by the National Statistics Institute this week.

In the period from January to April in 1981, Portuguese exports only amounted to 38.8 percent of total imports, a level which improved only slightly the following year, to 39.4 percent. During the same period in 1983, the rate rose to 50.8 percent, and in 1984 it reached 61.6 percent.

In the first four months of this year, the Portuguese trade deficit was 84.7 million contos, the lowest for this period in five years. This figure is the difference between 392.5 million contos in imports and 307.8 million contos in exports.

Compared to the same period last year, the trade deficit in escudos fell by 40.5 percent, while imports increased by 5.9 percent and exports grew by 34.7 percent. In dollars, the deficit fell by 54.6 percent due to a 19.8 percent decline in Portuguese purchasing abroad and a 1.8 percent increase in exports.

In commercial trading with OECD countries, the deficit was only 7.2 million contos, an 88.7 percent drop from the 1984 deficit for the same period, which was 63.8 million contos.

The Portuguese trade balance with the EEC, which went from a deficit of 200,000 contos in 1984 to a surplus of 20.7 million contos this year and a reduction of the trade deficit with the United States from 49.2 million contos in 1984 to 16.7 million contos in 1985 were the main factors contributing to this favorable trend for Portugal.

Imports of cereals, seeds and vegetable oils, made mostly in the United States, showed a 37 percent drop.

ECONOMIC

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

JANUARY-MAY 85 INFLATION RATE--Excluding housing, consumer prices rose 10.4 percent in the first five months of this year, compared to 8.2 percent for the same period in 1984, according to figures released this week by the National Statistics Institute. But unlike last year, the growth rate of the consumer price index has been slowing since the first of the year. The greatest pressure on prices in 1985 was recorded in January, which showed a 4.3 percent rise. In the following months, the growth rate fell to 2.7 percent in February, 1.5 percent in March, 1.2 percent in April and .3 percent in May. The behavior of the index was particularly influenced by food and beverage price trends, the factor which is weighted heaviest in calculating the index. In fact, food and beverage prices gradually slowed from a 5.3 percent rise in January to a .4 percent drop last month. In 1984, excluding housing, consumer prices averaged up 1.5 percent in January, 1.6 percent in February, 3.8 percent in March and 2 percent in April, dropping .9 percent in May. Last month, shoes and apparel went up 1.6 percent, housing costs increased .6 percent, and a miscellaneous factor including health, transportation and communications rose about 1.3 percent. Compared to the same month last year, the consumer price index rose 23.8 percent, and the annual inflation rate was 26 percent. The government is aiming for a 22 percent annual inflation rate in 1985 and an 18 percent rate from December 1985 to December 1986. [Text] [Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 22 Jun 85 p 19] 8844

MANUFACTURING OUTPUT DOWN 6 PERCENT--Data furnished by the National Institute of Statistics shows a slackening in first-quarter '85 output by the manufacturing sector (a drop of 6 percentage points). This is attributed to the decline in production of capital goods, since slight increases were recorded in consumer and intermediate goods. Forecasts for the second quarter of 1985 call for a slight increase in production of consumer and capital goods but a certain amount of cooling-off in intermediate goods output. [Text] [Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 1 Jun 85 p 21] 12830

UNEMPLOYMENT FIGURES UP 15 PERCENT--The number of unemployed seeking work increased during the first quarter of this year. According to Ministry of Labor statistics, 331,000 persons were seeking work between January and March, 1985, compared with 288,000 during the same period of 1984, which represents a worsening of 15 percent in the employment picture. [Text] [Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 1 Jun 85 p 21] 12830

ECONOMIC

SPAIN

MIDDLE CLASS SWELLING IN POST-FRANCO ERA

Madrid ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA in Spanish 23 May 85 pp 18-20

[Text] The Spanish transition has not been merely political. Between 1974 and 1980 the distribution of available income among Spanish families definitely consolidated the middle class as the leading social stratum, based on the number of households included in it.

The years between 1975 and 1980 will unquestionably go down in the history books of Spain under the general heading of years of transition.

In judging that period, all the politicians without exception agree in citing the deepseated changes undergone by the society's political and legal structures. But...how have Spaniards perceived these social changes in their purses?

It may be claimed that, between 1975 and 1980 an authentic economic transition took place in Spain, wherein the most significant change from a social standpoint was the great variation in the distribution of the national wealth. Besides the 1978 fiscal reform and the advent of the free trade unions as factors for negotiation and social pressure (events on which most politicians concentrate the economic changes in Spain), the distribution of available income also became a factor for social change not to be underestimated.

For example, in 1974 the average income per household yearly, based on data procured from all the available statistics on the subject, was 400,375 pesetas. Six years later, in 1980, the price index had risen by 167.5 percent. To make it possible, during those years, for the average income per household to maintain the purchasing power of Spanish families, the 400,375 pesetas of 1974 would have to have become 1,070,963 pesetas. The real situation exceeded the estimates: In 1980, that average income was 1,146,811 pesetas per household yearly, whereby the general purchasing power of Spanish households had increased 7.08 percent in real terms

Distribution

But average figures and particularly in the distribution of income, do not usually have anything to say when there is generalization to that extent. To observe the real changes undergone by Spanish households, greater details are

required in the statistics. Certain social areas have increased above the average, and others beneath it. For example, whereas the general average increase in purchasing power was 7.08 percent, unsalaried agrarian business owners (that is, the owners of crop farms who till the soil as a family) had increased their average annual income by 54.9 percent above the rise in prices.

Employees and skilled workers working for someone else, who constitute one of the largest social groups, also raised their annual income 37 percent over the rise in prices; and virtually all the social groups are in the same situation, except for two: those with higher degrees and retired persons.

In the first instance, according to various technical sources queried by this magazine, the reason that they failed to increase their average annual income is the over-abundance of higher degree-holders as a result of the large expansion among them during the first half of the 1970's. A reduction in price is associated with the excess supply, and hence the average annual income per household among executives and higher degree holders remained 2.6 percent points under the rise in prices.

As for the retirees, the reason is a different one. Between 1974 and 1980, the number of households in which the main breadwinner is a retiree increased by 125 percent, rising from 1.1 to 2.6 million. This was due to the major increase in social benefits which the state has kept in the general budgets, which rose by 374 percent. Highly significant in this change was the social pressure from the workers through the trade unions, as well as the economic crisis, which started to destroy employment on a mass scale. During a period of great political tension such as that, it may be said that the state had no recourse other than to "open its hand" and acknowledge more pension rights than what the normal rate of concessions indicated.

The statistics show it: There is a larger middle class than in 1974. The number of rich and poor has declined. Between 1974 and 1980, a major redistribution of wealth occurred in Spain, with a considerable change in the distribution of the total available income. For example, during 1974, 10 out of every 100 Spanish households with larger income, received 39.57 percent of the available national income for families. Six years later, that figure was 29.23 percent.

Conversely, in 1974 approximately 30 out of every 100 Spanish households had an annual income under half the average, whereas in 1980 it was only 20 percent. But, apart from this reduction in the number of households that might be considered poor, parallel to the reduction in the richest ones, the middle group also underwent a major change in its distribution (see table).

The economic equality of Spaniards was greater in 1980 than in 1974. For example, in 1974 10 percent of households with larger income (the richest) had an average annual income four times higher than the general average and 3.2 times larger than the next 10 percent. In 1980, that 10 percent of richest households had an average annual income that did not even triple the general average, nor did it double the next 10 percent; hence the differences had become considerably smaller.

During 1974, the Spanish households with annual incomes ranging between 70 and 120 percent of the general average (between 111,000 and 180,000 net pesetas per month, at current rates) accounted for 39 percent of the total national income.

And in 1980, the Spanish households with that level of income were monopolizing 53 percent of the total income.

If we add to those households the ones which are currently earning between 90,000 and 100,000 pesetas per month, which could also be considered middle class, it turns out that this social stratum, which in 1974 was consuming 45 percent of the national income available for families, was receiving 60 percent of the total in 1980.

Poor, But Fewer

In addition to the distribution of total available income, which has fostered a sizable increase in the middle class, the social strata usually described as poor, whose earnings are under 50 percent of the national average, have also improved their particular situation.

In 1974, of the 30 percent of Spanish households in this situation, a third were receiving an annual income equivalent to 45 percent of the average. Another third was earning income equivalent to 32 percent of the general average, and the poorest were earning an income that was 18 percent of the national average. During 1980, this 10 percent of poorest households was earning income equivalent to 25 percent of the average, and there was only another 10 percent with earnings under 50 percent, with an income equivalent to 39 percent of the general average.

Dividing the total Spanish households into 10 equal parts, and arranging them in order from those earning most to those earning least, the average annual incomes and their comparison with the general national average area as follows:

	1980		1974	
	Income	%	Income	%
1.	3,247,615	283	1,584,285	396
2.	1,818,557	158	491,660	122
3.	1,369,013	119	403,978	101
4.	1,131,575	98	362,740	91
5.	964,660	84	321,902	80
6.	839,447	73	253,838	63
7.	704,034	61	204,591	51
8.	602,708	53	178,967	45
9.	448,488	39	127,318	32
10.	281,853	25	70,466	18
Average	1,146,810	100	400,375	100

Figures in each year's pesetas Source: "Spanish Public Finance," No 47 and No 85, and individual compilation

Greater Speed

Actually, the advent of the Spanish middle class, shortening distances in its income level in comparison with the richest households, was a process that could be seen approaching since the 1960's. Nevertheless, the difference lies in the speed of the change. Between 1967 and 1974 (that is, for 7 years), the amount of national income consumed by the 10 percent of wealthiest households declined only 1.5 points. During the next 6 fiscal years, the reduction was 10.3 percent, at a speed over 10 times greater.

Concurrently, in all households with annual incomes exceeding 50 percent of the average, including the next six levels, the increase was general; whereas up until 1974 only those closest to the 10 percent richest had an increase. How can this change be explained?

If one observes the distribution of income based on occupational categories, the only ones in 1974 with annual incomes definitely exceeding the average were business owners, and higher level technicians and executives. In the other instances, except for agricultural business owners without employees, the incomes usually depend on a payroll. Now then, between 1974 and 1979, the average earnings of workers per hour worked increased at a rate exceeding 20 percent per year, and in all instances it exceeded the rise in consumer prices.

This fact, combined with the notable improvement in agricultural income, owing to the increase of prices at origin, gave rise to a gradual increase in the total available income going into the hands of households with less purchasing power. In other words, the 10 percent of the national income which the richest households ceased to earn was divided among the entire Spanish society; previously, that money would have gone to those who already had an income level exceeding the average.

The Distribution

(Percentages of total family income in Spain absorbed by every 10 percent of households, arranged in order from those earning most to those earning least)

Year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1967	41.32	12.12	9.72	8.39	7.73	6.64	5.52	4.20	3.03	1.33
1970	40.76	12.26	9.90	8.59	7.90	6.42	5.29	4.31	3.13	1.44
1974	39.57	12.38	10.09	9.06	8.04	6.34	5.11	4.47	3.18	1.76
1980	29.23	15.05	11.53	10.01	8.80	7.48	6.31	5.20	3.98	2.41

2909

CSO: 3548/143

ECONOMIC

SPAIN

STUDY DETAILS ABYSMAL SITUATION OF YOUTH

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 11 Jun 85 pp 2-5

[Article by Marius Carol]

[Text] The assessment of the youth of the 1980's as a generation with its access to adult autonomy barred, excluded by the system (particularly in their working activity) and socially isolated is one of the conclusions from a lengthy unpublished report entitled "Report on Youth in Spain," prepared by a group of sociologists headed by Jose Luis Zarraga.

The research is an initiative on the part of the Spanish committee for International Year of Youth and it was coordinated by the Youth Institute of the Ministry of Culture. The authors of the work consider the 1980's generation to be the one comprised of those born between the end of the 1950's and the middle of the 1960's. They note that it is a generation born during the period of the highest post-war birth rates (coinciding with the start of economic development), of intensive migratory movement and with a political situation quite different from that of the previous decade.

Influence of Television

It is a period of massive expansion of schooling and a rise in the living standard of families. From a cultural standpoint, these young people have had a very different childhood, coinciding with the development of television, advertising and the news media.

The study underscores the fact that the 1980's generation began emerging from childhood when Francoism was disappearing. "In this respect, it may be said that they have already found their (historical) destiny decided, and that they have not participated either in the liquidation of the former society nor the determination of the new one."

Moreover, after a mass-scale education, the members of this generation are starting to reach economic activity at the height of an employment crisis, when jobs are no longer being created and the existing employment is being destroyed in massive proportions.

The report, which has evaluated and analyzed 43 polls and research projects, divides those born during the cycle extending from the Civil War until our time into three large groups: the post-war generation, that of 1968 and that of the 1980's.

Crisis of the 1970's

The post-war generation is the one of the parents of today's youth; they are the children of the Civil War and the adolescents of the post-war period, who lived in a world of deprivations, and in an authoritarian society with very stringent ideological and cultural repression. They reached youth during the 1950's and met with a very well defined society.

Their inclusion posed no problems so long as they subjected themselves to the established patterns. But they were not the leading Francoist generation nor did they head the crisis of the 1960's and early 1970's.

The next generation, that of 1968, born during the 1940's and early 1950's, in a period with a low birth rate, experienced a stable and culturally poor childhood, but emerged as youths in a society which was developing a growing economic and cultural dynamism.

It is the generation which, during its youth, led the social, ideological and political crisis that took place starting in 1968 (with the "French May" as a reference point), and which reached adulthood just when Francoism was being liquidated and the construction of democracy was starting, holding a privileged position for playing the leading role in that process.

Sociologist Jose Luis Zarraga stresses: "It may be claimed that this generation of 1968 has achieved a multiple stroke of historical opportunities that could hardly be repeated."

The present youth (the 1980's generation) are not the children of the dominant generation. They may be said to lack a heritage, inasmuch as they are children of parents deprived of political leadership, which has determined their relations but in particular the dynamics of their emancipation.

Lack of Leadership

The leadership in the political transition is not associated either with them or with their parents, but rather with the intermediate generation. The Youth Institute's report points out: "Between the 1968 generation and its parents there occurred a severe conflict, and not a break; but, in that split, both sides could recognize themselves cut off from one another."

"There is no active split, per se, between the 1980's generation and that of their parents, because they are two intensely and extensively different generations, whose personal universes are dissociated. No conflict is posed when there is so little in common."

The 1980's generation is ceasing to be young without its members having managed to become fully involved in the society as adults. Its period as a generation is becoming depleted, while behind it a new generation (that of those born during the early 1970's) is emerging, one which seems better adapted to this society, better qualified and in a better position to find a place in it.

They may possibly show up with a strong leadership, coinciding with the solution to the crisis; but in the case of today's youth, "their period is becoming depleted, yet the 1980's generation has not managed to get out of the morass."

This has caused that generation to appear blocked, excluded and isolated socially. These conditions have caused it to be typified by a lack of social identity and a lack of generational identity.

76 Percent Live With Their Parents or Depend on Them Economically

The 1980's generation, consisting of the population aged between 15 and 29 years, totals 9.5 million individuals. The "Youth in Spain" report establishes a difference between adolescents and youths within this group, based on the degree of emancipation from the paternal household. The 1984 Youth Omnibus Poll, which the study includes, stresses the large number of young people living in the paternal household and depending on parents economically as one of the features of the 1980's generation.

Unlike what happened 10 or 15 years ago, when the youths were attempting to leave home at the first opportunity, as an affirmation of their desire for freedom, at present the economic crisis, the context of freedoms and a certain amount of conformity prompt the youth to resign themselves to a slow emancipation.

According to the aforementioned poll, 76 percent of those interviewed between ages 15 and 29 live in their parents' home or, if they live outside the home, they depend on their parents economically. Nearly half of these (47.1 percent) are single, live in their parents' home and lack the slightest funds.

Two generationally new categories appear in this portion of the youth-adolescents: that of the single or married ones with their own apartments, but living on the paternal economy (4.2 percent) and that of the married ones living in the original household and economically dependent (0.7 percent).

Situation of the Single

It emphasizes that there are only 3.1 percent who are single in a separate household or economically independent. The percentage of those married with a separate household and self-supporting amounts to only 19.6. As for the degree of autonomy that they achieve within the paternal household, the males are still the most benefited: they are more free within the home and this is achieved by more youths. The freedoms which males attain at ages 15, 16 or 17 are achieved by females starting at age 20.

Contrast Between Freedom and Lack of Opportunities Leads to Disillusionment

According to the report of the Youth Institute, the lack of social identity among the present youth generation is a result of the general ideological crisis that has accompanied the change from the authoritarian system to democracy. But in their case the disillusionment has been worsened by the contrast involved in freedom and lack of opportunities.

The 1980's generation does not make generational criticism of the adult society, perhaps because it expects very little of the latter; and rather than passing society, it is finding that society is passing it. Somewhat the same thing, although keeping the distances, holds true of the family, in whose homes most of the youth live, because they cannot pay for their independent support. The members of the family unit try not "to make life impossible for one another," and live together with relative calmness, although with very little communication.

Also, from the cultural standpoint, the members of this generation have experienced a drastic change. As Jose Luis Zarraga notes, "Their childhood coincided with the rapid development of television (it is the first generation to spend over a third of its time idle as television viewers), advertising and the news media, which has turned them into the first over-informed generation."

The 1980's generation consists of the population aged between 15 and 29 years. The population between ages 15 and 24 may be estimated at 6.5 million individuals and that between 24 and 29 at nearly 3 million.

The "Youth in Spain" report establishes a difference between adolescents and youths within this group, depending on the degree of emancipation from the paternal household, and underscores the large number of youths living in the paternal household and depending on parents economically, as one of the features of the 1980's generation, unlike what occurred 10 or 15 years ago, when the young people were trying to leave home at the first opportunity, as an assertion of their desire for freedom.

The 'Ideological' Break With the Family Occurs Without Trauma

The ideological identification or difference between the youth and their parents is another point discussed in the report on Spanish youth coordinated by Jose Luis Zarraga. And in this section he stresses that the generational break occurs soon, when the children have just finished adolescence, and does not entail either trauma or conflict, because they claim that there is nothing in common between themselves and their parents.

According to the data from the First Omnibus Poll, among the group of youths there prevails a state of overt ideological disagreement with the father, and somewhat less with the mother. The comparative results between the two sexes disclose greater ideological affinity between the son and the father and between the daughter and the mother; but the differences are slight and by no means confirm the traditional image of those affinities.

The youths who claim to disagree with their fathers are triple the number of those who state that they are for the most part in agreement. Even when considering the highest degree of agreement with the father or mother, one notes that a third of the youths feel that they disagree with both parents in most areas.

It might be expected that the gap between children and parents is a progressive process and that the children's ages increase their ideological disagreement with their parents would increase. However, this phenomenon occurs only to a very slight extent and at times with sizable reversals in that trend. In fact, the low rate of agreement with parents occur in the same proportions during the initial period of youth, that is, between ages 15 and 19.

To be stressed as the main elements of disagreement are matters relating to sex and sexual relations: 42 percent (15-16 years) and 51 percent (18-19) among males, and 51 percent and 55 percent of females of the same ages; and political issues: 32 percent and 37 percent of males and 38 percent and 42 percent of females. The greatest degree of agreement occurs regarding future plans and projects: 53 percent and 52 percent of the males, and 53 percent and 39 percent of the females agree with their parents in this respect.

Working with all these data, the government study observes that, "Spanish youth can be said to display a deepseated inter-generational split starting at the beginning of youth and terminating in its middle phase (20 to 24 years). Among those age groups, the communication and agreement with parents are very slight, almost non-existent in a third of the youth population and uncertain at least among half. Only in a quarter of the youth of those ages is a level of communication that is relatively high retained with the parents.

But that split remains present in a situation wherein the real emancipation of the youths is delayed, and thus the generational split appears, paradoxically, in a situation of economic dependence and stay in the family household.

The report is explicit on this point: "Such a situation can only be maintained, as it is maintained, if the conflict has been neutralized; in other words, if there has been a neutralization of the tension and confrontation marking the relations between two generations when they are fighting to defend or impose their own views on life and its modes of behavior." And the study includes a statement from a poll on relations between the youth and their parents that might prove significant in establishing this point: "It is not that we are different; it is that we have nothing in common."

The Youth With Schooling Find Work More Easily

The major problem of today's youth which to a large extent determines their role as a generation is unemployment which, although it affects the society as a whole, does so particularly among those seeking their first job. The two Omnibus polls stress the importance of steady employment, because so long as it is not achieved, the situation and family dependence will not change essentially. In any event, and among the army of unemployed represented by

the youth of today, the report discloses that those with a high level of schooling find work more easily.

Based on the responses, it turns out that only 38 percent of Spanish youth between ages 16 and 29 have managed to hold a steady first job working for someone else, and only 26 percent are employed in a job of this kind at present. Only in the group over 25 years of age does one find more than half the youth of both sexes with fixed employment. These steady jobs are of four types among the females: administrative clerk, domestic service, business salesclerk and textile operator. Among males, there are seven jobs in which the majority are concentrated: administrative clerk, waiter, business salesclerk, metal industry occupations (plumbing, welding, ironwork), mason's helper, wood industry occupations (carpentry, cabinet-making, sawmill) and industrial helpers. Only half of these jobs were what is understood to be "permanent on payroll."

Contrary to the phrase coined by Amando de Miguel, who described the university as a factory of unemployed, the "Youth in Spain" report notes that, "At the present time, the unemployment rate among the active population with higher schooling, despite its very sizable growth, is lower."

Although among the youth the jobless rate among those with higher schooling is somewhat higher than among those with only elementary schooling, "the number of jobs on the elementary level has declined by over half a million in only 5 years and, conversely, the number of jobs on the medium and higher levels has increased by nearly half a million during the same period. In other words, a large number of jobs with low qualifications have disappeared, having been abolished and turned into more skilled jobs."

And the report ends this section by stating: "The increase in jobs held by intermediate and higher diploma holders by nearly half a million in 5 years justifies the widespread tendency among the youth toward raising the level of their schooling. The problem is not that there are too many youths with intermediate and higher schooling on the job market, but rather that there are too many youths."

Economic Situation

	Upper Stratum (639)	Middle Stratum (1,269)	Lower Stratum (1,104)
Young "Adults"	27	24	22
Married, in separate household, economically independent	21	20	18
Single, in separate household, economically independent	5	3	2
Married, in original household, economically independent	-	1	2

"Adolescent" Youth	73	76	78
Single, original household, economically dependent, without any funds	49	45	48
Single, original household, economically dependent, with some funds	9	11	13
Single, original household, economically independent	9	14	12
Single and married, away from original household, economically dependent	5	4	4
Married, original household, economically dependent	-	1	1

Issue Areas

	Males			Females		
	15/16 Yrs.	18/19 Yrs.	Diff.	15/16 Yrs.	18/19 Yrs.	Diff.
Religion and Morality						
Almost always agree	36	36	1	31	26	-5
Never or almost never agree	29	37	+8	34	36	+2
Politics						
Almost always agree	37	35	-2	34	36	+2
Never or almost never agree	32	37	+5	38	39	+1
Recreation and Spare Time						
Almost always agree	34	33	-1	30	21	-9
Never or almost never agree	28	35	+7	35	42	+7
Sex and Sexual Relations						
Almost always agree	27	22	-5	28	16	-12
Never or almost never agree	42	51	+9	51	55	+4
Plans for the Future						
Almost always agree	53	52	-1	53	39	-14
Never or almost never agree	14	25	+9	23	30	+7
Personal Problems						
Almost always agree	36	31	-5	30	27	-3
Never or almost never agree	28	31	+3	38	45	+7

Most Common Jobs

Females

1. Administrative	20.8%
2. Business salesclerk	15.9%
3. Textile industry jobs	11.8%
4. Domestic service, assistant, cleaning	9.8%
5. Child care	4.6%
6. Clinical aides and assistants	4.5%
7. Teachers in educational centers	4.4%
	(71.8%)

First "steady" job
working for someone else

Males

1. Administrative	15.2%
2. Waiter	8.8%
3. Business salesclerk	6.1%
4. Plumbing, welding, ironwork and others in metal industries	5.9%
5. Mason's helper	5.9%
6. Carpentry, cabinet-making, saw- mill and others in wood industries	5.1%
7. Industrial helper (un- specified)	4.9%
8. Mechanic, mechanical repairs	4.3%
9. Bellboys, receptionists, janitors	4.1%
	(60.3%)

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ENERGY

DENMARK

STATE MONOPOLY, PRIVATE FIRMS AGREE ON DRILLING SEARCH FIRM

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 26 Jun 85 Sect III p 4

[Article by Lars Dyrskjot: "Danish Operator Ready With 50 Million Kroner"]

[Text] Following two months of negotiations, DONG [Danish Oil & Natural Gas], OK [East Asiatic Company] and the Grepco Consortium have reached agreement on forming a state/private operator company which is to enter the search for oil and gas in the Danish concession area.

After more than two months of intense negotiations, an agreement finally was reached on Monday at 1:17 pm concerning the establishment of Danish Operator Company I/S. The four leading negotiators were able to sign the agreement so that the newly formed company, which in the future will be called Danop, became a reality. The government-owned DONG and the private companies, OK and Grepco, with the Lauritzen group and Monberg & Thorsen as negotiators, had formed the largest Danish joint venture between state-owned and private interests.

"The new Danish Operator Company will provide the best possible basis for competitive Danish industry and businesses being able to have a significant portion of the large investments in oil and gas activities in the Danish area in future years," states DONG's chairman Holger Lavesen. "Formation of the company is proper, both from industrial policy and employment considerations."

Deficit

Danish Operator Company will become a partnership with an expected capital requirement for the coming year of 40-50 million kroner, which the partners will contribute as the company has the need for the money. The private companies in Danop will make up a limited partnership whereby the companies can include the expenses for operation of the operator company in the firms' operations. The companies thereby also will be able to deduct from their taxable income possible losses in connection with the activities of the operator company.

"Although the expenses of the operator company will be covered by the other partners in the consortia, a deficit can hardly be avoided--among other reasons, because in order to learn enough, we are required to have a manpower overcapacity," states director Jens Thorsen of Monberg & Thorsen.

The limited partnership has not yet been named, but in the report to Energy Minister Knud Enggaard, the firm is called "X," and therefore, it immediately has been named "the boring X". The present private founders, OK and the Grepco group, initially will be responsible for half of "X"--shared equally--while investors will be sought for the remaining half. Emphasis will be placed on choosing investors who have an interest in participating in the second bid round as well as previous experience in the oil and gas sector.

Ten Percent Share

The idea is that during the upcoming second bid round, the company should be able to represent three-five operator companies, including one for offshore. Thus, the operator company should be able to perform work for those consortia which are granted licenses. The company is expected to receive a 10 percent share in the consortia, of which, half is to be borne--or paid--by the other participants. Each of the founders in Danish Operator Company has experience as well as future development potentials as the theme of participation:

* Dopas--the full name of which is Danish Oil & Gas Production--has acquired wide experience from 15 drillings on land in the role of operator. In the late summer, Dopas is to act as operator for the first land drilling for hydrocarbons, whereas the earlier drillings have involved warm water and salt domes.

* OK has acknowledged in advance that the company wants an active role in Danish exploration. With a 25 percent membership interest in "X," the company has both a good and sure ticket to the second concession round. During the first round, OK's participation ran aground primarily because possible consortia participants themselves wanted to have the operator position.

* The Lauritzen group has previous experience from oil and gas exploration, partly from the United States and partly from the operation of drilling rigs in, among other places, the North Sea. On the longer term, it is the employment aspects--not the least for Aalborg Shipbuilders, which is expected to take over 5 percent of Lauritzen's 25 percent interest in Grepco--which counts.

* For Monberg & Thorsen, together with the other contractor companies within the Grepco group, it also is the employment possibilities in a possible exploration phase which is decisive for the concern being a participant. The members of Grepco already have made large deliveries to DUC [Danish Underground Consortium].

Help on the Way

"I still am of the opinion that no Danish company--with the exception of A.P. Moller--has sufficient experience to undertake the role of operator in off-shore exploration and drilling. But through the company we expect to be able to establish a cooperation with an international oil company so that later, we can acquire the necessary expertise," states director Jens Thorsen of Monberg & Thorsen.

DONG already has had contacts with the Norwegian Statoil, which continues to be interested in acting as instructor, and the Grepco group has joined with the BP consortium [British Petroleum] in the first concession round.

The chairmanship within Danish Operator Company will shift each year between Dopas and the private companies. The board of directors, with eight members, will have an equal number of representatives from each side. The operator company will have independent directors and a staff of about 10 people, who initially will have offices in the Copenhagen area. The company also can draw employees from the participating firms.

Oil exploration and recovery normally is undertaken by a group of companies--typically between three and six--which form a consortium. Exploration at sea costs at least 100 million kroner for each drilling. The development of a field where oil or gas is discovered normally involves investments of billions of kroner.

In relation to the group which DONG's chairman Helge Lavesen initially invited to participate in Danish Operator Company, only two companies in fact have fallen out. They are the contractor firm, A. Jespersen & Son--which is included in the Grepco consortium, and thereby is part of BP's concession--along with F.L. Smidth, which said "no" to the invitation right from the beginning, but which is participating in the first round in the Amoco consortium.

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ENERGY

DENMARK

GOVERNMENT, SDP DIVIDE ON NORTH SEA OIL SEARCH POLICIES

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 26 Jun 85 Sect III p 10

[Article by Ole Dall: "Government, SDP Divide on North Sea Oil Search Policies"]

[Text] The government has support from the Liberals in rejecting the proposal for the subsidiary of DONG [Danish Oil & Natural Gas]--Dopas [Danish Oil & Gas Production]--having independent operator status at sea. The Social Democrats insist that Dopas should have such authority and thereby, a broad majority on oil exploration has evaporated.

"We have tried to join forces in Denmark--on both the private and public sides. Therefore, an agreement has been made between private companies and Dopas, and I believe that Dopas will have its hands full with this undertaking."

This was the statement of Energy Minister Knud Enggaard (Liberal), after he had been in consultation yesterday with the energy committee of Parliament concerning the second bid round.

DONG's subsidiary, Dopas, and the private companies agreed on Monday to join together in the search for oil. This occurred in connection with the formation of "Danish Operator Company".

The Social Democrats support the formation of this company, but the party believes that Dopas additionally should have independent authority to operate.

"For this reason, I would estimate that the possibilities for a compromise are relatively limited," states the energy minister.

Even before the meeting yesterday, Hans Haekkerup (Social Democrat) issued a press release in which the Social Democrats disassociated themselves from the government:

"In the first bid round, Dopas received operator status on land and a natural extension must be that it receive operator status at sea during the second round. Dopas already has an expertise which we naturally want to make available to the private companies, but that must not mean that Dopas should be spared from itself developing as an independent company.

"The government seemingly will do anything to clip Dopas' wings. Previous experiences with exploration in the Danish underground have resulted in our believing that the interests of the Danish society are best served by having a strong state company. Therefore our support should not be counted on," Hans Haekkerup wrote.

However, the government has support from the Liberal Party, and thereby, a majority. The leader of the energy committee, Lone Dybkjaer (Radical Liberal) says:

"We believe that it is proper to join resources in one common organization and the combination between the state and the private companies is the proper method. I never have been a supporter of a fantastic development of DONG because one thereby would risk that it would become a state within the state."

The energy committee is expected to have the committee's report finished next week. A draft of the report is expected on Friday.

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ENERGY

SWEDEN

BRIEFS

ELECTRIC POWER PRODUCTION INCREASES--Consumption of electricity in Sweden rose 6 percent in June compared with the same month last year. At the same time the production of electricity rose 10 percent, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics. This meant that exports were greater than imports, which were cut in half. Some 65 percent of the electricity production came from water power, an unusually large amount. Nuclear power produced an unusually small amount of electricity, only 31 percent. Conventional thermal power, which is based on coal, oil and domestic fuel, continues to increase. It was responsible for 4 percent of total electricity production in June. In the last 12-month period both electricity consumption and electricity production rose 8 percent compared with the previous period. Electric power trading with other countries declined around 20 percent. Imports now cover only 4 percent of consumption and roughly the same amount is exported. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 23 Jul 85 p 8] 6578

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ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

DENMARK

INSTITUTE, MINISTRY IN PROJECT TO STUDY WATER POLLUTION

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 25 Jun 85 p 9

[Article by Jens J. Kjaergaard: "Water Pollution Studied"]

[Text] The Water Quality Institute, VKI, in cooperative arrangement with Agriculture Ministry

The risk of nitrate pollution is being studied now in close professional cooperation between researchers from the Agriculture Ministry and the Water Quality Institute, VKI in Horsholm. The project may receive support from the EC.

"The goal must be that agriculture can maintain practical levels of production at the same time that the environment is protected," states senior engineer Jorgen Simonsen from VKI to BERLINGSKE.

Jorgen Simonsen last year was in a heated debate with Agriculture Minister Niels Anker Kofoed. VKI and the Environmental Commission wanted to accept a ministerial report which, based on information from the State Plant Breeding Research Institute, exonerated agriculture from liability for the increasing nitrate pollution of ground water.

"It is the increasing use of artificial fertilizer which is polluting drinking water and the fjords," said Jorgen Simonsen.

The agreement for cooperation between VKI and the Agriculture Ministry's research and experimental activity has been signed. The idea is that during the next four years, material will be collected in a data bank; mathematical models of water routes in the Danish underground will provide agricultural consultants with a good working model when they will be required to consider and make decisions.

The models will be adjusted in accordance with the acquisition of new knowledge of the problems and not just by VKI and ADK [Agricultural Areal Data Office], but rather, by all of the researchers who will participate. A broad invitation is about to be issued.

The project has a support group which includes both researchers and environmental authorities.

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